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1. Introduction: Democracy and economic
development
The prospects for democracy in sub-Saharan African countries figure
promInently on the agenda and in the current public debate within
individual countries.1 While the effects of integration in the world economy
were a focal issue in the 1970s, there is today a tendency to emphasise
domestic factors when explaining the economIc crises in African countries.
Attention has been devoted to factors such as economIc policy, planning,
public admInistration and implementation of development activities. But the
focus has been shifted towards the political systems themselves. Key-
elements to which attention is paid today by both researchers and
politicians inc1ude: a less interventionist and more accountable state,
political pluralism and popular participation in the development process. A
pertinent issue is the relationship between political system and economIc
development - especially to what extent democracy may impede or
facilitate economIc development.
Reference is often made to Botswana as the African country which has
succeeded in accomplishing economIc development in a context of multi-
party democracy. This country has for more than 25 years experienced
economIc growth rates which are unique on the African continent. The
resilience of democracy in Botswana, together with Gambia and Mauritius,
is in arecent comparative study contrasted to the general failure and break-
down of democratic rule in Africa (Diamond, Linz & Lipset 1988). The
main objective in this study is to analyse how democracy works in
Botswana, and how the political institutions have had an impact on
development planning and the choice of economIc strategy. Democracy
refers in this analysis to the governmental structure of a polit 
y . 2 In terms
Sub-Saharan Africa wil for the sake of simplicity henceforth be designated as Afržca in
this report.
2 The concept "polyarchy" as defined by Dahl (1989:233) underlies my understanding of
democracy, in which the most important criteria are: elected officials having controlover
governmental decisions; election of officials in relatively frequent, fair, and free
elections; a general right to vote and run for public office; and presenee of civil and
political liberties (e.g. freedom of expression and the right to form and join autonomous
organisations) .
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of economic policy-making, the overall issue under scrutiny, three
dimensions make Botswana especially interesting: First, the sustainability
of the formal democratic institutions, second, the abundance of financial
means provided by the diamond industry in the post-independence period,
and third, the continuity in the economic strategy pursued. The second
implies that the governments room for manoeuvre is under less constraint
than most other developing countries, but also that there has been a
functional need for development planning - as a tool to manage the
wealth. One of the main objectives in this analysis is to link the three
dimensions, by discussing how and to what extent the democratic
institutions affect the use of public funds and economic policy decisions.
Outlines of Botswana's economic and political post-independence history
will be presented, and I will analyse two policy-making processes: one
closely related to the substantive aspect of Botswana's development strategy
(the income policy), the other conceming the allocation of public funds (the
policy-making behind the current seventh National Development Plan and
the annual budget). This implies that democracy is conceptualised in an
instrumental mode, as I will neither address the normative issue of
democracy as a good in itself, nor directly discuss which pre-conditions
may be necessary for democracy to survive.
1.1 Is there a relationship between political system and
economic development?
By focusing on the role of the Botswana political institutions in economic
policy-making, I address the question of the relationship between political
system and economic development. This issue has directly and indirectly
been analysed in various areas of development research concerned with
political and socio-economic development. Political scientists and historians
have dealt in particular with the socio-economic prerequisites for various
paths of political development (e.g., Lipset 1959; Moore 1966). However,
in the current debate on democracy in Africa, emphasis is often put on the
reverse causal direction of this relationship: how can the economic crisis be
explained by the operation of existing political systems, and what can be
expected from democracy in terms of socio-economic improvement in the
future.
It has been argued that democracy may impede the economic
development process in poor countries. Not only do authoritarian rulers
themselves justify repression by the need for "law and order" for their
countries to pro sper. The same arguments have also been put forward by
2
respected scholars, especially in the L 970s when "bureaucratic
autlioritarianism" was a term frequently found in the academic debate.
ü'Donnell (1973) and Huntington and Nelson (1976) are widely cited
proponents of the argument that democracy and popular demands may
frustrate economic development, and that suppression of civil rights is thus
justified. In the African context, similar arguments have been presented by
Mugyenyi (1988: 182) who, for example, writes: "development leads with
democracy in tow." The supportive arguments will not be discussed in
detail here, but they centre on the limited capacity of the state to cope with
popular demands, and on growth-related macro-economic variables; e.g.
wage leveIs, savings and investment rates and public spending. Political
freedom, as manifested inter aUa by elections and trade unionism, is
expected to have detrimental effects on those variables. An underlying
presumption seems to be that because financial resources usually are scarce
in a developing country, these have to be used frugally in a long-term
perspective to obtain optimal developmental effect, a requirement which
cannot be met if excessive short-term popular demands are allowed to
influence policy.
Attempts have been made by cross-national quantitative studies to
validate that democracy tends to retard economic growth. In his review of
such approaches, Wede (1983) argues that these fail to take in to account
other economic and political conditions (e.g., the size of the military or the
degree of state involvement in the economy). Although democracy is found
to have a weak negative effect on economic growth in his own multiple
regression analysis, Wede concludes that overlooking other factors makes
it impossible to support unambiguously the claims that economic growth
is incompatible with democracy. Although there seems apparently to be a
link between authoritarianism and economic growth in some East Asian
countries, i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, the
particularities of these cases do not justify a generalisation that an
authoritarian regime is necessary for economic development (Haggard
1990). Leong (1991), for example, argues that Malaysia has in a democratic
context been able to pursue the same economic strategy as her East Asian
neighbours mentioned above.
The limited experiences with competitive democracy in Africa makes a
quantitative comparative approach problematic. However, in a comparative
analysis of various African countries, Sandbrook (1988) observed that
African authoritarian regimes have in general worked against economic
development. As Sandbrook argues, the historical and cultural background
which explains the authoritarian developmental regimes in East Asia may
not be found in Africa. This may support Donnelly's (1989) argument that
3
the "rationale" behind authoritarianism and violation of civil and political
rights has in general not been the economic imperative of development, but
should be seen as a matter of political choice and character of the rulers.
With reference to African authoritarian regimes, Anyang' Nyong'o (1987)
similarly argues that participation is controlled mainly because the
governing elites are driven by their private interests rather than the common
good.
There are many reasons for arguing that a qualitative case study approach
will be more feasible than a quantitative comparative analysis to illumÏnate
the relevance of various dimensions of a political system to economic
development. In his case-oriented comparative analyses Sørensen (1991;
1992) repudiates any deterministic causal relationship between
authoritarianism and economic development, and argues that the dichotomy
between "democracy" and "authoritarian system" obscures important
differences between the particular cases; i.e. some authoritarian regimes
perform better than others, and some democracIes are more responsive than
others to demands from the masses. One of Sørensen's main arguments is
that what really matters is the orientation of the ruling elites, and the
relationship between the political rulers and economic elites, although the
latter do not constitute any clear pattern. Elite dominance characterises, for
example, both the democracies in India and Costa Rica, but the rulers in the
latter have been more oriented towards improving the welfare of the masses
than in the former. Similar conclusions have been drawn by Haggard and
Kaufman (1989) in their analysis of structural adjustment programmes in
various developing countries. These scholars argue that authoritarian
regimes differ in their implementation of structural adjustment policies
according to the "strength" of the regime. Similarly, they found differences
among the democratic regimes with regard to the durability of democracy
as the prevailing political system; and they concluded that "the
macroeconomic policy stances of the continuous democratic regimes are
virtually indistinguishable from those of authoritarian regimes" (1989:61).
The inconclusive findings of analysis linking regime type to economic
development suggest that one has to look beyond the dichotomy democratic
vs authoritarian. Common features of the states, both authoritarian and
democratic, which have been successful in their development should be
sought. One recurring issue which, explicitly or implicitly, underlies the
"political system - economic development" question, is how differences
in political system are variants of the way in which the relationship
between the state and societal actors is organised. In addition to uncovering
the presence and capabilities of various societal actors, a relevant point of
departure for a study of this relationship seems to be the P olitic al
4
institutions and to what extent they allow participation in decision-making.
However, to reach a comprehensive picture of a state' s development
capability is certainly not sufficient to analyse state-society relationships.
As Haggard (1990:45) argues, "intern al organizational characteristics of the
state" and "the range of policy instruments the state comrands" should also
be considered.
Figure 1.1
Possible domestic actors in econornc policy-making
I State-centred forces I
-policy experts
-bureaucrats
political
executive
-classes
I
-interest groups
-ethnic groups
Society-
centred
forces
I
-individual politicians
-poli tical parties
--------------
- Decision- -
- making -
- arena -
--------------
Economic
Policy
Underlying this discussion is a SUpposition that econornc policies
pursued by the state are important in the econornc development process.
Econornc policies both include the framework defined by the state
conceming the division of labour between the private and the public sectors
in the economy (e.g. the conditions for private entrepreneurs), and how the
state allocates public funds. In the schematic figure above, it is suggested
that econornc policies may be the outcome of a process involving actors
both within and outside the institutions of the state. The responsiveness of
the decision-makers to the interests of society-centred forces becomes one
variable behind the choice of econornc policy. One dividing line between
democratic and authoritarian systems may thus be conceived theoretically
as differences in the accessibility of society-centred forces to the decision-
making arena. For example, the presence of parties, elections and a
representative assembly in a democracy may be perceived as possibilities
for societal actors to channel interests and demands into the decision-
making process - the "electoral channel of decision-making" in the terms
of Stein Rokkan. I will in this study analyse the influence and role of the
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elected politicians in Botswana, but also discuss to what extent political
freedom has given other societal actors access to the policy-making process,
for example, through the "organizational channel" (Rokkan 1966: 105- 1 10).
Before elaborating the theoretical and analytical approach further, I will
briefly introduce the empirical case.
1.2 Some broad lines in the history of Botswana
The area of present-day Botswana has traditionally been dominated by
various Tswana tribes, with the Ngwato state as a powerful centre.3 The
population is ethnically less divided than what is the case in most other
African countries. However, as Parsons (1985) points out, a diversity of
ethnic identities has been present, but expansion of the Tswana dynasties
succeeded in spreading their domination over what today constitutes
Botswana - during the colonial period named Bechuanaland. Seemingly
giving some support to the argument that the area inhabited by the Tswana
tribes has resemblances to the Western nation-state, Parsons (1990:95)
writes:
The Ngwato state had achieved the incorporation of a diversity of ethnic
minorities within a common political structure, under the cultural-
linguistic hegemony of a successful ruling minority. In that way, maybe
the Botswana of today is merely yesterday's Ngwato state writ large.
A protectorate under British rule was established after 1885, covering the
Tswana dominated area. An important motive behind the creation of the
Bechuanaland protectorate was to protect British interests against expansion
of the German colonialists to the west and the Boers to the south-east. No
permanent colonial administration was established within the protectorate.
The British High Commssioner, based in Cape Town (later in Pretoria),
issued laws by proclamation. The administrative headquarters and the
"Resident" Commssioner was (after 1895) located in Mafikeng, just
outside the southern border of the protectorate. Within Bechuanaland the
colonial ruler was represented by a resident magistrate and District
Commssioners. However, colonial presence did initially not disrupt the
distribution of power between the various Tswana tribes and the position
of the traditional rulers, the chiefs and their headmen. Generally , scholars
3 Jf not otherwise stated, this historical outline is based on Picard (1985); Parsons (1990)
and Tlou & Campbell (1984).
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seem to agree that British rule, although certainly not without impact, was
less imposing in the Bechuanaland protectorate than in the colonies.
As Parsons (1985:37) warns, one should be careful about dating the
appearance of opposition to British rule and claims for nationalism too
strictly to the initiatives just prior to independence in 1966. However, the
crucial events leading up to independence occurred mainly after the Second
World War. One point of departure may be the marriage of Seretse Khama,
the heIr to the chieftainship of the most powerful tribe, to a British woman
in 1948. The marriage led to turbulence within the tribe, but, after the elder
notables backed down, Seretse was acclaimed chief of the tribe in 1949.
The alliance, however, was not fully accepted by the British rulers,
allegedly through fear of damaging British relations with South Africa
(Parsons 1990:79-84). The couple was exiled to London from 1950 to 1956.
Seretse fin all y abdicated the right to the chieftainship and returned to
Bechuanaland. The incident, according to Parsons (1990:94), enabled
Seretse Khama "to translate himself from tribal leader to national leader."
While Seretse represented a moderate movement for independence, another
historical accident had generated a more radical nationalist wave. The
banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist
Congress (P AC) in the powerful southern neighbour had an impact on the
political climate in the protectorate - manifested by the presence of ANC
and P AC exiles. However, the developments leading to independence were
peaceful, and dominated by the moderate Seretse fraction. A Legislative
Council with representatives from the various tribes, districts and the
European settlers was established in the early 1960s. In the first general
election held in 1965, three parties had been established, although one split
into two factions. Seretse Khama became Prime Minister, and headed the
negotiations with the British rulers which led to a peaceful inauguration of
the independence period on 30 September 1966.
The introduction of democratic institutions and the setting up of a
national government with jurisdiction across tribal boundaries, represented
a novel system of governance in the Tswana dominated area. Although a
hierarchical structure had existed to a certain degree among the various
tribes, this "acknowledgement of genealogical seniority" had not implied
that one single tribe had caried authority over the others (Parson
1990: 142). Consequently, parallel to the process of establishing and
transferring decision-making authority to modern political institutions, both
at the national and district levels, the power of the chiefs and their headmen
had to be neutralised.
At the first post-independence election in 1969, the Botswana Democratic
Party (BDP) obtained two-thirds of the vote and 24 of the 31 contested
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seats in the National Assembly. Three other parties also became represented
in the parliament. Support for the majority govemments heade d by
President Khama was reconfirmed in the two elections held in the 1970s.
This initial continuity was also signified by Vice President Quett Masire
accompanying the President since the early 1960s. Masire was in a
powerful position in his own right as head of his own creation, the Ministry
of Finance and Development Planning.
The importance of the traditional power-structure came to the fore after
the death of Seretse Khama in 1980. Masire was affiliated to a less
powerful tribe than Khama, and his succession to the presidency might have
been challenged if legal-rational principles had not been established in
Botswana politics previously. The large turnout at the elections both in
1984 and 1989, and the persistence of support given to the BDP by the
majority of the electorate, suggest that the democratic institutions genuinely
were on their way to becoming institutionalised. Although with limited
success, the opposition has continued to participate in the elections. The
election in 1989 indicated that the support for the ruling party, the BDP,
had stagnated, and the largest opposition party, the Botswana National
Front, was gaining strength.
The economic history of Botswana is in one respect strikingly paralleI to
its political history: While almost no economic modernisation had taken
place until the 1960s, the post-independence period has been characterised
by dramatic changes. This does not imply that the colonial period had no
impact on Tswana society. Trade, taxation, the proximity to South Africa,
and presence of foreigners certainly had a bearing on the economy of the
protectorate and its inhabitants. However, the British rulers made nearly no
efforts to industrialise, modernise agriculture, or develop infrastructure. The
Batswana majority based their livelihood on subsistence agriculture, hun ting
and gathering, small-scale cattle rearing, and temporary migration to South
African mines.4 There was also a small economic elite of Batswana and
European settlers, prospering on arable farming and large herds of cattle.
The physical conditions have certainly been one determining factor in
shaping the economic structure and the development pattern in Botswana.
The country covers a territory about the size of France. However, the small
population (1.3 mill. in 1990) places Botswana among those countries in
the world with the lowest population density, 23 persons per 1,000 ha. In
comparison, the population densities in neighbouring Zambia is 114, and
251 in Zimbabwe (UNDP 1992:table 22). Botswana is landlocked, flat, and
4 While the name of the country after independence is named Botswana and Setswana as
her language, Batswana is the plural form of the citizens, and Motswana the singular.
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about two-thirds of the country are semi-desert. The Okavango delta in the
north-west, and fertile soils in the eastern region, are green spots in the
otherwise harsh physical environment.
When Botswana became independent it was regarded as one of the ten
poorestcountries in the world (Murray & Parson 1990:167). The lack of
infrastructural development, the physical disadvantages, and the virtual
absence of industries made the future look bleak. However, prospecting
operations soon after independence revealed a potential for diamond and
copper-nickel mining. During the first decade large investments were made
in developing the mining industry. This undertaking has paid large
dividends. Botswana is today one of the most prosperous developing
countries, a "middle-income economy" in the terms of the World Bank, and
ranks above countries like Pol and and Turkey in per capita income (World
Bank 1992:table 1). However, according to the same source (table 30), the
distribution of income is among the most uneven in the developing world.
As will be elaborated later in this study, the Botswana government has
given itself a limited and indirect role in the economic development process
in terms of involvement in employment creation and the welfare of the
individual citizen. On the other hand, the government has at its disposal a
large share of the revenues generated by the mining industry, and the
relative size of public expenditures compared to the gross national product
is among the largest in Africa (World Bank 1989:table 25).
Regardless of weaknesses found in the development strategy (e.g. the
skewed income distribution), Botswana is a positive exception on the
African continent. Such prosperity might not have been possible without the
diamond wealth, but itis'notdifficult to imaginethat this asset;might have
been wasted if the political power had been in the hands of an arbitrary
ruler. In other words, the largely successful utilisation of the diamond
wealth seems to reflect consciously chosen policies and diligent political
management.
1.3 Analytical approach
Development planning seems to have been an important tool used by the
Botswana government in the management of the diamond wealth - in the
sense that planning may simply be understood as applying a time horizon
in policy-making beyond making day-to-day decisions. Planning in its most
plain modality may be perceived as attempts made by a government to
balance the growth of public expenditures with the forecasted amount of
funds available. A step further may be to coordinate public policies with
the objective to pursue a coherent development strategy. Development
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planning in its most ultimate form may be illustrated by the comprehensive
experiments undertaken in centrally planned economies to direct economic
policies towards ideological goals; e.g. self-reliance, de-privatisation, and
nationalisation of enterprises. In this study I will mainly be concerned with
planning in its plain form: budgeting and policy-making within a mixed-
economy. In such a setting, private entrepreneurs will need a predictable
environment to make decisions concerning long-term investments. A
government may facilitate such conditions by applying indicative planning,
in which it presents economic forecasts and information about the activities
the government intends to undertake in the future.
The recent economic crisis in Africa suggests that the various
governments have not become more effective in their planning efforts since
Killick (1976:163) reached the following conclusions in the mid-1970s:
...there would probably be Httle disagreement today that the practice of
planning has generally failed to bring many of the benefits expected from
it (...) I know of no African state which is currently engaged in a serious
planning effort, in the sense of using a plan as a guide to day-to-day
decisions and the preparation of its budgets.
There are several factors which may frustrate effective development
planning. To achieve long-term balances in public revenues and
expenditures one needs reliable information about the economic situation
and projections about future developments. Wild av sky and Caiden
(1989:149) claim that developing countries are facing an especially high
leve! of uncertainty which makes forecasts about the future economy
unreliable: technical capacity to estimate the real costs of projects is often
insufficient; the revenue situation is unpredictable and vulnerable to
fluctuations in foreign aid and international prices; and the real value of the
domestic currency is of ten unstable. Killick (1976) emphasises the problem
of planners having adopted a too technocratic approach. By overlooking
crucial non-economic considerations, the final plan documents end up not
being implemented. Concretely, Killick points to the problems caused by
the institutional distance which often exists between the planning agency
and the finance mini stry which is closer to the arena where decisions are
made. The planning efforts fail because the plans are without de facto
government support. Sagasti (1988:431) similarly argues that "most
planning exercises appear to be rather isolated from the main concern of
policy and decision-makers in developing countries." A dilemma, however,
may emerge if the planners attempt to make the planning efforts more
"realistic" by adapting to short-term political concerns. The critical long-
term issues may thus become secondary, and the planning efforts less
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relevant to "concerns that are crucial for the future development of a
country", Sagasti (1988:434) argues.
The achievements in Botswana seem to reflect a certain balance between
politics and technocratic considerations in the country' s policy-making -
or between short-term and long-term considerations. In other words
(recalling figure 1), although the decision-makers may be responsive to
society-centred forces, the government seems somehow to have been in a
position to make autonomous decisions conceming the use of public funds.
This presumption, or hypothesis, directs our attention to a key issue in
research concemed with econoinc policy-making and political economy.
The literature distinguishes broadly between two approaches (e.g. Grindle
and Thomas 1989; Haggard 1990; Hall 1989; Meier 1991; Nordlinger 1987;
and Skocpol 1985); one ascribing society-centred forces much influence
conceming policy choices, the other as signing the state substantial capacity
to make autonomous decisions.
In this study I will focus on the institutions of the Botswana state at the
centralleveL. Migdal (1988:19) offers the following, Weberian inspired,
ideal-type definition of the state:
...it is an organization, composed of numerous agencies led and
coordinated by the state's leadership (executive authority) that has the
ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the
people as well as the parameters of rule making for other socIal
organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way.
Migdal(1988) underscores that the extent to which the state institutions
constitute a coherent entity is an important variable that makes states differ
from the ideal-type. It may further be problematic to define specifically
which actors or institutions are part of the state. Nordlinger (1987:362-64),
for example, applies a very broad definition of the state, which is taken to
include most individuals involved in public policy-making, including
members of legislatures. Skocpol (1985:fn.9) questions the analytical value
of such an all-inclusive definition; an objection which I find justifiable as
the elected representatives who make up the legislature are in this study
perceived as intermediaries between the state and society. I will in chapter
2 further clarify how the state concept may analytically be applied.
In state-centred approaches it is to some extent assumed that actors
within the state reach decisions about public policies without being directly
guided by society-centred forces. The institutional arrangements linking
state and society represent one important set of variables which regulates
the ability of society-centred forces to exercIse leverage. As Haggard
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(1990:43) writes: "the very power of societal forces is a function of the
legal and institutional setting in which they operate." The approach includes
also an awareness that competing interests may be present among state-
centred forces. For example, senior civil servants within the bureaucracy
may be powerful actors, both as individuals and as a group (Grindle &
Thomas 1989; Haggard 1990); the distribution of power between various
public institutions (e.g. ministries) may be hierarchically ordered, and has
to be uncovered; and the relationships between the political executive and
the administrative apparatus may be an important explanatory variable
(Olsen 1983).
Society-centred approaches include both the marxist and neo-marxist
focus on the power and influence of social classes and external forces, and
pluralist perspectives which emphasise that economic policies may have to
accommodate several societal interests. A point of departure for marxists
when it comes to explain economic policies, is to analyse the dass
configuration in society. A prevailing presumption is that the state will
adapt its policy choices to the interests of the dominant economic elites.
Scholars associated with the dependency school do not only emphasise the
power of domestic elites, but argue that the capitalist world economy by
itself represents a constraint and a source of influence on the governments
of developing countries. The marxist approach is certainly not uniform, and
a focus on the institutions of the state is not necessarily precluded in studies
within this tradition (Skocpol 1985). The pluralist approach is no less
inclusive, and may be seen as overlapping with marxist approaches in the
sense that both may vie w a particular economic policy decision as
reflecting a dominant society-based coalition. Studying economic policy-
making from a pluralist angle, however, seems to imply an openness for
various society-centred forces to exercise leverage on the policy-making,
not only economic elites (Dahl 1971). According to Grindle and Thomas
(1989:218): "groups also form around shared concerns for neighbourhood,
ethnicity, religion, values, or other issues." A point of departure for the
pluralist approach is that coalitions may emerge with the objective to make
public policies accommodate their interests. The state may thus be seen "as
an arena through which coalitional battles are waged (Haggard 1990:34)."
A problem of a society-centred approach may be to explain exactly how
societal actors exercise leverage on the policy-making process. It is not
sufficient to argue that a societal group is influential simply because it is
favoured by a public policy.
By sugge sting that institutions at the core of the Botswana state have to
some extent been able to make autonomous decisions, I expect a state-
centred approach to have explanatory power. However, I do not a priori
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reject the explanatory power of society-centred approaches. To explain the
substance of Botswana's development strategy, i.e. the ideological
dimension, it seems required to focus explicitly on the configuration of
various societal groups. However, when focusing on the coherence in policy
and choice of policy instruments, as in this study, I expect the state-centred
approach to be more feasible. It is unfortunately beyond the scopeof the
study to analyse in depth the presence and influence of various society-
centred forces - to fully test the society-centred approach - but some
departures into the alternative approach will be made. To incorporate the
impact of state-society relationships in the analysis, I will first discuss the
capabilities of identifiable and organised society-centred institutions,
especially the nature of the political parties and elections, but also the
capabilities of other organisations in civil society. Policy-making processes
will thereafter be analysed to uncover policyelites within the state
institutions, and to assess how institutional arrangements regulate the ability
of society-centred actors to exercise leverage.
1.4 Some methodological aspects
This analysis is primarily a case study of development planning and
political processes in one particular country - Botswana. However, a
comparative perspective is also incorporated in the analysis. To use a term
from Bradshaw and Wallace (1991), it is my ambition that the case study
may somehow inform relevant theories within the field; in other words,
contribute to the theory-building concerning the relationship between
political system and economIc development.
I pointed above to weaknesses inherent in a cross-national quantitative
approach when studying the relationship between political system and
economIc development. Such an approach may easily ignore factors beyond
the variables directly linked to the political system differences which are
put forward to explain the economIc conditions in a particular case. A case
study implies that a more holistic approach is undertaken. As Bradshaw and
Wallace (1991: 165) state: "the purpose of comparative case studies is to
examIne the historical, economIc, political, and cultural features of
individual cases."
Can a single case study contribute to theory-building? It is certainly not
possible to reach theoretical generalisations based on one individual case
study only. As Ragin (1989:61) writes: "a single case ensures an univocal
answer." However, a recurring argument in the article of Bradshaw and
Wallace (1991) is a claim for case studies in general being able to inform
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aspects of various theories. They claim that single case studies may also be
comparative by viewing the individual study in the perspective of other
studies, and, as Ragin (1987:4) simIlarly argue:
Many area specialists are thoroughly comparative because they implicitly
compare their chosen case to their own country or to an imaginary but
theoretically decIsive ideal-typic case.
The theoretical framework in this study is based on various theoretical and
empirical works discussing the relationship between political system and
economIc development. Some of these are specifically related to African
experiences, whileothers are based on case studies of countries in other
regions. Based on recent literature I will present an "ideal type" of the
crisis-ridden African. state, and some of the dimensions put forward to
explain the decay in this model will be applied in the study of Botswana.
The particularities of the Botswana case have made me abstain from being
too ambitious about reaching innovative theoretical findings. However, a
less ambitious goal for this analysis has been to create a better
understanding of which dimensions are of most relevance in studies of
relationships between political system and economIc development.
The empirical analysis is based on historical data concerning the
economIc and political developments after independence, and more current
information about policy-making processes between 1989 and 1991. The
data material is by and large of a qualitative nature, although the
discussions concerning economIc changes (e.g. employment structure and
urbanisation) and the p olitic al context (e.g~election results) to someextenhi.
rely on statistical information and quantitative analysis of changes during
the post-independence period. As the summary below reveals, information
has both been collected from secondary sources and primary sources (i.e.
interviews, policy documents and statistics).
Sources of information:
(a) Monographs, anthologies, periodical articles, unpublished papers, party
programmes, and newspapers.
(b) Semi-official documents (e.g. reports of studies undertaken on request
from the government, manuals for the bureaucracy, internal planning
documents, Notice- and Order Papers of the parliament).
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(c) Official documents (e.g. development plans, budgets, policy white-
papers, parliamentary reports, published speeches, legal documents).
(d) Statistical material (e.g. annual budgets, development plans, election
reports, international statistics).
( e) Qualitative interviews undertaken in Botswana.
The interview material consists of thirty qualitative interviews with
representatives of parliament - MPs (11), civil servants at the ministerial
level (9), and other informants (10) knowledgeable about politics and/or the
economic situation in Botswana (see appendix A). In addition I was able
to present my ideas and preliminary findings to scholars at the University
of Botswana.
Some of the questions needed to be asked were associated with some
sensitivity as they related to how politicians and civil servants perceived
their own and others ability to wield influence on economic policy-making.
It was thus explicitly stated that "this is off the record," or I tacitly
understood that the informants expected me not to compromise their
personal judgments. Although a large share of the oral information has been
of a technical nature (e.g. how the policy-making proceeded), and as such
non-controversial, I consequently do not refer to specific informants when
interview data are used in the analysis, especially in chapters 6 and 7. This
certainly does not facilitate reliability testing of the interview data by others
than myself; the assessments and conclusions made in the analysis thus
have to be ascribed in entirety to the author.
1.5 The structure of the study
Chapter 2 introduces furthera theoretical framework focused on how to
conceptualise the state, and how its relationship to society-centred forces
may affect policy choices. Some of the main arguments found in the
literature about how the economic crises in African countries are related to
the nature of the state will be presented. To facilitate an analysis of the
importance of the Botswana democratic institutions, I will discuss various
dimensions relevant for the analysis of the distribution of power between
the political executive and the legislature in parliamentary democracies.
In Chapter 3 I analyse the economic history after independence. The
objective is to uncover critical aspects of the development strategy pursued,
to be explained in the subsequent chapters of the study. The initial approach
of the Botswana government to economic development will be compared
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with the recent strategy as expressed in the seventh National Development
Plan (introduced in 1991). The role of development planning in the
economIc development process will be dealt with in particular.
The nature of the Botswana state will be introduced chapter 4, and some
preliminary explanations of its distinctive features will be presented.
The objective in chapter 5 is to reach an understanding about the nature
of the political context. The emergence of the various parties and their
present position will be analysed in a historical perspective. I will
especially discuss whether or not ideological and functional cleavages are
present in Botswana politics, and the importance of elections. The
capabilities of civil society will also be analysed.
In chapter 6 and 7 I will analyse policy-making processes more closely.
The capacity of the society-centred forces, which was discussed in the
preceding chapter, to exercise leverage on the qualitative aspect of the
development strateg y and the allocation of public funds will be discussed.
A state-centred approach prevails in these chapters, and the main objective
is to analyse how procedures and the institutional framework regulate
access to the decision-making arena, and the distribution of influence within
the state. An important issue will in this regard be the role of elected
politicians. The decentralised aspect of development planning will also be
discussed.
The final chapter summarises the main findings, and some broad lines
linking the Botswana case to theories of policy-making, state-society
relations, and economIc development will be drawn.
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2. The weak African state: A basis for
.
comparison
A general hypothesis in this study is that the Botswana state is strong
compared to the general crisis-ridden "African state". Its strength, I will
argue, is signified by the capacity to carry out development planning and
to adhere to a coherent economIc strategy. Seen from a neo-classically
oriented economIst' s point of vie w , the approach to development in
Botswana may be characterised as rational in terms of the efforts to pursue
a sound macro economic policy. However, the focus in the rest of this
study will be less on the substance of the strategy, than on the Botswana
government' s adherence to a planned approach in its use of public funds.
Although I will argue that the capability to adjust the lev el of expenditures
to the revenue situation reflects a policy-making process insulated from
direct influence by society-centred forces, I will not maintain that the state
in general has autonomy vis-à-vis the Botswana economic elite.
The primary objective of this chapter is to identify critical dimensions for
the subsequent empirical analysis. A further objective is to present some
aspects of the relationship between politics and economIc development
which recently have been presented in the literature dealing with African
countries. The intention is to discuss the Botswana case in the light of that
outline, and thus incorporate a comparative perspective in the analysis.
However, the comparative ambition is limIted and mainly intended to
further expose the p articul arit y of the Botswana case.
2.1 Analytical concepts: Insulation, organisation and policy
instruments
The state as a concept and its relations to society is an important issue on
the recent research agenda of political scientists - as the title of Skocpol' s
(1985) essay suggests: "Bringing the State back in", or "Taking the State
seriously", by Nordlinger (1987). In recent analyses of African politics and
economIcs by authors like Anyang'Nyong'o (1987), Callaghy (1990),
Hyden & Bratton (1992), Jackson & Rosberg (1982), Oyugi et aL. (1988),
Sandbrook (1986), and Sklar & Whitaker (1991) the nature of the state is
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an important analytical dimension. Some of the best known works on
Bötswana politics devote special thought to the state (e.g. Gunderson 1970
and Picard 1987). Although the economy in Botswana for a long time has
been characterised by an expanding private sector, the preceding chapter
revealed that the state has played a crucial role in the development process.
Nothing suggests that the state will be a less important actor in thefuture.
A definition of the state was introduced in the preceding chapter. It was
announced that the core institutions of the state will especially be focused
on. The state as an organisation in which economIc policy-making takes
place, includes in Botswana the executive (i.e. the president and the
cabinet), the legislature (the National Assembly) as a collective unit, the
civil service, the political institutions and public admInistration at the
district level, members of permanent advisory bodies, and appointed
members of ad hoc committees on specific policy issues. The problem of
drawing boundaries for the state organisation is demonstrated by including
members of the two last mentioned forums into the state, in their role as
private citizens, trade union representatives, and foreign experts. The
government will therefore be used as an analytical concept to make possible
an analysis of the relative influence of vafioÜs gìoups, both wìthìnand
outside the state, on economIc policy-making. The government refers
mainly to the executive, but also includes representatives of the ruling party
in the National Assembly who are not members of the cabinet - the
backbenchers. The bureaucracy will be given special attention, because, as
Gunderson (1970) observed, civil servants seem right from the start of
independence to have been influential actors in the policy-making process.
To fully understand the nature of the state one must consider its
relationship to society at large. The society is, however, an all-embracing
concept, which ultimately also includes the state. Analytically, to make a
demarcation between state and society, it is therefore convenient to use the
concept civil society, although this may be problematic as well. As Bayart
(1986) emphasises, civil society is a plural concept; it should be viewed
beyond a structured set of institutions, and it includes different practices
and modes of political action. The constitution of civil society is often
perceived as crucial for a democratic political system; as Tostensen
(1992: 11) writes: "CivIl society constitutes a terrain in which democratic
struggles take place." In this study I will conceptualise civil society as the
aggregate of groups or actors, above the individual households, and outside
the formal set-up of the political institutions (i.e. the District Councils, the
legislature and the executive), which may attempt to influence economIc
policy-making (e.g. the media, trade unions, business groups, cattle-
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owners).5 Although analysed separately in this study, political parties may
also be perceived as part of civil society. As will be discussed in chapter
5, traditional community based decision-making forums, dating back to the
pre-colonial period, have survived as institutions of some importance in
Botswana, and remind us that attention has to be given to the particular
historical and cultural setting.
When characterising civil society, for example by its relative strength,
one may focus on dimensions like: the multitude of organisations
representing various occupational groups, membership, intern al
organisation, and financial capacity. The latter may be closely linked to the
autonomy of organised groups in civil society towards the state. In
Botswana, for example, according to Holm and Molutsi (1990a), civil
society organisations are largely dependent on funding from the state -
and consequently, to some extent, controlled by the state. On the other
hand, as emphasised in society-centred approaches, societal groups may
have substantial influence on public policy-making. The latter is a question
which may also be analysed by a state-centred approach. For example,
Apter (1991:473) conceives the new institutionalism as a response to the
traditional institutionalist narrow focus on state institutions, and claims that
institutionalists today are concerned with how various sectors and groups
in society strive for allocations of public funds. Olsen (1983:7), for
example, argues that public policies are neither produced autonomously by
the state and its institutions, nor are they the outcome of "environmental
factors" like economic, technological, demographic and cultural constraints.
Policy-making, he writes, "takes place within complicated networks of
organized, public and private actors," and he calls for a "new
institutionalism" which addresses "ho w , and to what degree, behaviour and
outcomes are molded by political institutions." As Olsen argues, the
relationship between state and society should be seen as reciprocal, and
March and Olsen later write (1989: 17):
Without denying the importanee of both the social context of politics and
the motives of individual actors, therefore, institutional analysis posits a
more independent role for political institutions. The state is not only
affected by the society but also affects it.
Skocpol (1985:85) also emphasises the possibilities of the state to
"influence the formation of groups and the political capacities, ideas, and
5
"Society" and "civil society" wil henceforth be used interchangeably, although the latter
will, when used, refer to identifiable actors.
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demands of various sectors of society". The focus here, however, is on
economic policy-making and planning, and the ambition is limited to
looking more narowly at how actors both within and outside the state are
involved in policy-making, and not the state's relationships with the civil
society per se.
Approaches which emphasise the state or its institutions as independent
actors in policy-making suggest a degree of state autonomy (March &
Olsen 1989; SkocpoI1985). State autonomy, as an analytical concept, may
be seen as a question of whether the policy-makers are manipulated and
constrained in their ro om for manoeuvre, or whether they are able to act
autonomously - considering the preferences and demands in the civil
society, but in the end translating their own preferences into authoritative
actions (see, for example, Nordlinger 1987; Skocpol 1985). One approach
emphasises the antagonistic aspect of state autonomy, and autonomy is seen
as the ability of the state to suppress the actual or potential opposition of
powerful groups regarding specific policy issues. Skocpol (1985: 14), for
example, writes that state autonomy "can come and go." Others ascribe to
the state a substantial degree of autonomy, and assert that the state may
also be seen to act autonomously even if divergence in state-society
preferences is absent (Nordlinger 1987). Haggard (1990:34), however,
suggests that the latter also may account for absence of state autonomy:
"...social structure can operate as a constraint on government action through
the 'law of anticipated consequences' even in the absence of overt attempts
to wield influence." This underscores the difficulty of identifying which
societal actors have exercised leverage on a particular policy. Haggard, for
example, points to the mistake of inferring that a given social configuration .....
was the source of a policy, only because it is favoured by the policy, and
writes (1990:34):
A much more stringent crIterion for demonstrating societal influence
involves showing how groups overcome dilemmas .of collective action,
gain access to centres of decision making, and exercise influence.
Without excluding a focus on societal actors outside the state, Haggard
(1990) thus put emphasis on how the legal setting and the state's
institutions regulates access to the decision-making process - one of the
main issues in the present study.
The concept insulation seems, analytically, to be more manageable than
state autonomy in empirical analysis of how societal actors exercise
leverage on policy-making. However, I do not argue that the substance of
the concepts differs, but insulation refers to more identifiable constraints
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and possibilities for access to decision-making centres. Insulation "is a
function of the institutional arangements linking state and society,"
Haggard (1990:43) writes. The lesson from the fast growing East Asian
countries seems to be that insulation of the policy makers from narow
societal interests, both dominant and subordinate social groups, has been
crucial for their progress (Haggard 1990). However, as Leong (1991)
argues, insulation may not only be facilitated by authoritarian political
systems, but also in democracies - as his case study of Malaysia allegedly
demonstrates.
Insulation may be facilitated by legislation and other means which
regulate the organisation of occupational groups and their access to policy-
making processes. Independently of whether politicians are elected or
selected - as in many authoritarian regimes - insulation may further be
determined by the boundaries within the state between the politicians and
the administrative apparatus. Another important organisational condition for
insulation seems to be the coherence of the state's institutions. Institutional
coherence may not only be seen as a precondition for a collectivity to act
coherently (March & Olsen 1989), but lack of coherencemay also make the
state vulnerable vis-à-vis societal forces. Nordlinger (1987:377), for
example, writes:
In a cohesive state any one set of officials has the resources of others to
rely on freeing itself from a dependence up on societal actors. In the case
of divided states, public officials find it difficult to circumvent or mitigate
the impact of societal support and opposition since private actors are
advantageously situated to play them off against one another.
Haggard (1990) emphasises both the importance of cohesiveness. and
centralisation of decision-making, and claims that the low level of intra-
bureaucratic conflict in East Asian NICs, compared to those of Latin
America, has been an important aspect of the former' s success.
An important aspect of a state-centred approach is to analyse how the
institutional framework affects the distribution of power within the state, for
example, between the civil servants, the military, the legislature, the cabinet
and policy experts (March & Olsen 1989; Nordlinger 1987). Collectives of
state elites (e.g. bureaucratic, political, and military) may be seen as
powerful actors with coherent or divergent interests which affect the choice
of policies (Haggard 1990; Skocpol 1985). With reference to Weber,
Nordlinger (1987), however, questions the possibility of "collective
personalities", and puts more emphasis on the individual actors within the
state's institutions - and his/her capability to act autonomously.
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In addition to the insulation of the decision-makers from societal forces
and the organisatiönal framework of the state, an important dimension when
addressing the issue of the capability of the state to make autonomous
decisions may be to ask which policy instruments are available. This is not
only of relevance in a study about implementation of policies, but
constitutes constraints to which the policy-makers have to adjust (Haggard
1990; Skocpol 1985). Policy instruments may be concrete factors (e.g.
available funds, technology for information processing and skilled officials),
or more complex instruments for intervention in the economy (e.g. financial
institutions). The capacity to appraise various policyalternatives is
dependent on several factors, but may in itself be looked upon as a policy
instrument.
The ultimate ability of a political ruler to realise own interests may,
according to Haggard (1990:43), be seen as the aggregate of the above
mentioned state-focus dimensions: insulation, organisational characteristics
and policy instruments. However, as Haggard (1990:264) himself hesitates,
one should be careful of applying too generally the distinction "strong-
weak" when comparing the development capacity of states. Such a
distinction may conceal variations within a country. State capacity may, for
example, vary across issue areas or a state may be insulated from pressures
from one social group but not others.
As will be elaborated in the next section, the "African state" differs
substantially from the successful East Asian countries. While the economIc
success in the latter may be explained by a state-centred approach, Healey
and Robinson (1992) conclude in a review of relevant literature that the
same approach may explain the failure in the former. Although organised
groups in African societies and legislatures have exercised insignificant
leverage on the choice of economIc policies, this insulation has not
supported a developmental state in African countries. Healey and Robinson
emphasise the weakness of the African bureaucracies, especially vis-à-vis
the single autocrat or the small oligarchy which has domInated economIc
policy-makng. The weakness of the "African state" is apparently explained
by a further dimension which makes state autonomy irrelevant: patron-
client relationships.
2.2 The "African state"
Despite historical, geopolitical, economIc and social differences, African
countries seem to share certain basic characteristics of political and
economIc institutions. In the literature on Africa, a certain model of the
"African state" has emerged. This model may serve as a point of reference
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for my discussion of Botswana - which differs in many respects from the
other countries in Africa. One should keep in mind the differences between
diagnosis, causes, and cures. In studies of current African politics, the first,
diagnosis, seems to be less associated with different normative positions
than the others. In other words, there seems to be less disagreement in
various analyses on how the "African state" has operated in the post-
independence period, than on the reasons for this pattern or on the cures.
The strength of the state is central in the discussion of the political and
economic development in post - independence Africa. The size of the
"African state" and its involvement in the economy has in general not been
less extensive than in other developing countries. State-directed
development seems after independence to have been a ruling paradigm in
many African countries (Gulhati i 990b). However, various authors seem to
agree that it has been less effectively developmental - a view expressed,
for example by Jackson and Rosberg:
In African countries governance is more a matter of seamanship and less
of navigation - that is, staying afloat rather than going somewhere. This
is a source of considerable dismay to planners, economists, and policy-
makers (among others) who want African governments to initiate a
rational and concerted assault on poverty, ignorance, disease, and other
problems of underdevelopment (1982:18).
Bratton and Rothchild similarly write:
The use by African elites of arbitrary and repressive measures and their
inability to apply governmental regulations throughout the national
territory is a sign of state weakness or "softness". Paradoxically, the
independent African state consolidates power at the political centre and
extracts considerable economic resources from society; yet it spends much
of what it obtains on itself and lacks the capacity to spur the country' s
development as a whole (1992:263).
The crisis facing perhaps the majority of countries in Africa is dual, as it
relates to both the political and economic spheres. It is commonly accepted
that these are interrelated, and that the nature of the "African state" is one
important domestie factor behind the economic adversity. The weakness of
the "African state" to act as an agent for development is a result of its
relations with the society. As the literature reveals, this factor seems to be
complemented by organisational factors and the availability of policy
instruments.
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The colonial legacy
A point of departure for analyses of the current "African state" is of ten the
colonial structure inherited at independence, and the subsequent
transformation of the state. With support from the popular masses,
nationalist leaders gained power through the struggle for independence. The
western democratic institutions introduced in many of the newly
independent countries were, for. various reasons, soon replaced by more,
authoritarian and centralised state structures usually headed by a president.
Legitimacy based on popular support through elections was replaced, in
some cases complemented, by coercive authority and socIal control, of ten
throughthe structure of one-party systems. Pervasive clientelism bought the
rulers apparent support. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine
deeply the reasons for this development pattern. However, the roots in the
colonial executive system are of ten referred to. Colonial bureaucracies had
been established in most colonialised African countries. As Oyugi
(1988: 101) writes, the "administration was the government" - an
autonomous actor free from socIal controIs, and (p.102):
Colonialism promoted the growth and development of the cIvIl
bureaucracy at the expense of competitive polities. Thus in Africa, the
bureaucracy developed before competitive politics through which it could
be controlled. ..
Kennedy (1988) accordingly characterises the state inherited by the new
African rulers after independence as overdeveloped, because its size has
been disproportionately large compared to other organised groups outside
the state. However, seen in the light of development needs, the capacity of
the state has been insufficient (Gulhati 1990), as witnessed by the low leve!
of economic development and insignificant economic diversification. As
Goulbourne writes (1987:37):
...there can be liule doubt that the underdevelopment of socIal c1asses in
Africa has been an inhibiting factor on many aspects of development,
inc1uding politics and the state.
The general validity of this argument has, however, been questioned.
Kennedy (1988:87), for example, writes that one should be careful of
exaggerating "the extent to which indigenous business acti vit Y was inhibited
during the colonial period." Some authors, for example, have argued that
indigenous entrepreneurs in Kenya hel d some influence at independence
(e.g. Swainson 1980). However, nobody seems to repudiate that the role of
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the "African state" became after independence decisive in the economIc
development process - sometimes with positive, sometimes with negative
effects. The post-colonial state somehow became involved in most sectors
of the economy, and the development of the private sector has in many
cases been constrained by state intervention (Iliffe 1983; Kennedy 1988).
Access to the state became after independence an important determInant of
individual prosperity in most African countries, partly because of the low
level of economic development and the numerical insignificance and
organisational weakness of societal groups outside the state. As Callaghy
writes (1990:258):
(After independence aJ new political dass began to emerge that used the
state as its arena of action and source of power, status, rents, and other
forms of wealth. The state was used to begin to build an economic base
for itself. All groups concentrated on the weak, but newly autonomous,
state as the major avenue to power, status, and wealth because other
avenues of upward mobility, such as private capitalist activity, were much
more difficult, constrained, time consuming, and uncertain.
P atrimonialism
One of Callaghy's (1987;1988;1990) main arguments is that the state after
independence has become patrimonialised. This concept is certainly
multidimensional, but personalisation of government and weakening of
bureaucratic legal-rational principles are important aspects that have been
emphasised by several other authors (e.g. Hyden 1983; Jackson& Rosberg
1982; Sandbrook 1986). As will be elaborated below, patrimonialism may
be seen as a threat to the insulation of the policy-making process.
In their analyses, both Callaghy and Sandbrook make reference to
Weber' s writings on the development of capitalism in European countries,
and his emphasis on the developmental role of the state, not least through
its bureaucratisation. Callaghy observes simIlarities between precapitalist
Europe and the current situation in large parts of Africa, and focuses on
intemal obstacles for (capitalist) economIc development - the role of the
state is crucial because it may both "foster or hinder the development of
capitalism", he writes (1988:73). The African patrimonial state is seen as
authoritarian as it is neither constrained by legal-rational principles, nor by
traditional authority. The state is, however, looked upon as weak, partly
because it lacks the political and procedural predictability necessary for
economIc development, but also because it is penetrated by society-centred
forces through patron-client networks intended to build support. Clientelism
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may be recognised in various practices, such as corruption and patronage.
As an aspect of state-society relationships, corruption may be related to the
necessity of societal actors to pay for state favours; for example, in order
to obtain an import licence or a permit to open a shop. Patronage, on the
other hand, is a prevalent means used by the state to obtain political
support. Political loyalty may be rewarded by recruitment into the civil
service. In Nigeria, according to Sandbrook (1986), this practice has led to
overstaffing and administrative inefficiency.
Patronage in the form of subsidising various goods and services (e.g.
food, fuel, housing and health) is also frequently applied to obtain political
adherence(Bates 1988; Callaghy 1990). Both Bates and Callaghy argue that
such politically motivated allocations of public funds are of ten biased
towards the urban sector. It should be noticed that Botswana, with her small
urban population, apparently differs from this pattern. Urban bias is,
according to Callaghy (1990), partly rooted in the multiparty electoral
systems which existed in the early independence period. Even after political
freedoms became suppressed, the need to maintain political control of the
urban masses has made the new rulers extract resources from the
agricultural sector to finance parastatals, urban-based welfare services and
various subsidies. This has been detrimental to the agricultural sector. Bates
(1981;1988) has elaboratedhow the agricultural marketing boards that were
established by the colonial rulers have facilitated monopolistic control by
the post-colonial state over trading in agricultural products. As he writes
(1988:334):
They could purchase export crops at an administratively set, low domestic
price; they could then market these crops at the prevailing world price;
and they could accumulate the revenues generated by the difference
between the domestic price at which the goods were purchased and the
world price at which they were sold.
According to Bates, marketing board revenues have not been used to
modernise the agricultural sector, but have been transferred to other sectors
of the economy. Investment in industry has largely been insufficient,
however. Agriculture has consequently deteriorated because farmers have
responded negatively to low producer prices. Food prices have been used
as a political means to hold down wage leveIs, because the urban
consumers are seen as a potent political force:
When urban unrest begins among food consumers, the political discontent
of ten spreads rapidly to upper echelons of the polit y; to those whose
income come from profits, not wages, and to those in charge of major
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bureaucracies. Political regimes that are unable to supply low-cost food
are seen as dangerously incompetent and as failing to protect the key
elements of the socIal order (Bates 1988:347).
The main point to make is the political rationale behind the decision to
lower the prices paid to the agricultural producers and the retail prices on
food. An important dimension is the political power of the producers. In
cases of an agricultural sector dominated by a poor peasantry, the producers
are likely to be exploited. On the other hand, if the agricultural producers
constitute a political elite, the agricultural sector may even be subsidised by
the state. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the latter is the case
in Botswana. This may not only be explained by the initial strength of the
Batswana cattle owners, but also by the small urban population, and the
diamond industry as an alternative source of revenue for the state. Bates'
reasoning is similar to what Callaghy (1990:263) refers to as the "political
logic", and to Gulhati's (1990b:1152) conclusion: "The central motivation
behind economic policy was regime survivaL."
Clientelism may not only have an adverse effect on agricultural
development; it may also lead to overstaffing of the bureaucracies. Of
relevance for the issue in this study is the impediment of the long-term
horizon needed for efficient development planning caused by penetration
of society-centred forces (see chapter 1). A multitude of other negative
effects are revealed in current literature ( See Gulhati 1990a/b and Healey
& Robinson 1992).
Organisational and administrative factors behind state weakness
The post-colonial states had from the outset weak capacity to face their
multitude of developmental tasks. The quality and nature of the
administrative systems inherited at independence certainly varied, but a
recurring observation seems to be that the departure of the colonial rulers
left a "c ap acit y-gap" in many administrative structures, not least in terms
of skilled officials. The higher ranks in the administrations had of ten been
dominated by expatriates, and indigenous civil servants had insufficient
experience from senior positions. According to Hyden (1988: 19), "the
introduction of the African to modern organizational principles was never
complete."
Today, three decades after the liberation era, administrative inefficacy is
a key aspect of the general weakness of the "African state". This may not
only be verified by "administrative variables" (e.g. technical skilIs and
organisational structure), but also seems to be strongly linked to the nature
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of the relationships between the administrations and the politicians, and the
level of administrative "insulation" vis-à-vis the society in general. Again,
the multiplicity of cases should be kept in mind. Some African countries
have more effective administrative structures than others.
Attempts to improve public administration in African states have,
according to Hyden (1988), in general been obstructed by the "supremacy
of politics" which has worked against bureaucratic norms and principles.
Callaghy (1990) argues that there is a dualism between the political and
administrative spheres in the economic policy-making of the current
"African state". The technocratic half of this structure has been the weaker
side, partly because it has been subject to the political logic of the
patrimonial state; especially in terms of how public funds are decided to be
used. As Gulhati (1990a:30) writes: "There is little appreciation of how
technical policy analysis can fe ed into the decision-making process." One
effect of this subordination of the administrative side has been that the flow
of communication and feedback from implemented policies has been
constrained. Politicians have not been receptive to "negative" information
from the civil-servants, and the latter has thus withheld such information.
This lack of two-way communication underlines the absence of
accountability amongst the individual political rulers, as mistakes are not
taken into account (Gulhati 1990a; Healey & Robinson 1992).
As bureaucratic norms and principles in general have been undermined,
Callaghy (1987:96) coneludes that "African states do not have true
bureaucracies" in the W eberian sense. Support for such a elaim is provided
by Hyden (1988) who elaims that communication is often oral, not written,
and laws areapplied inanatbitrary fashion. . Thispattemmaynotonlybë':'
related to the "opportunism" bred by personal rule, and the need to please
the politicalleaders, but is also related to patron-elient relationships. The
administrative apparatus is penetrated by various social groups to which the
individual office holders have obligations (Healey & Robinson 1992).
Hyden (1983:37) labels this phenomenon "elan politics", which may be
described as "the ability to take advantage of public resources for purposes
other than those officially prescribed." "Clan politics" is a phenomenon
beyond socio-economic eleavages, but is ordered by various affective
criteria, like, for example, religion, kinship or ethnic ties. This penetration
may lead to fragmentation of the administration as the individual office
holder obliges various ethnic groups (Healey & Robinson 1992).
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2.3 The structuring of democracy
As discussed in chapter 1, various authors have pointed to possible costs
of democracy. Of relevance to the issue under scrutiny in this study are the
arguments by Callaghy (1990:264), who c1aims that elections will weaken
the capacity of the rulers to undertake economIc reforms, and Haggard and
Moon (1990:212) who relate the freedom of manoeuvre of a government
to the strength of the legislature. A strong legislature with political parties
playing a representative role, will in their view make it problematic for a
government to pursue "sensitive economIc policies." In terms of the
possibility of pursuing a consistent development strategy in a liberal
democracy, Haggard (1990:45) appears to be rather pessimIstic, as he
c1aims that economIc policies "are less likely to be consistent and internally
coherent" in such a political context.
However, it is far from unrefutable that the effects of democracy,
understood as more openness and transparency in decision making, will
mainly be negative - on the contrary. In the recent debate it is frequently
argued that democracy may induce political rulers to become more
accountable. Anyang Nyong'o (1988a:74), for example, writes that:
Democracy requires that people participate openly in the process of
government, that their preferences for public policies be taken into
account by those who govern, that those who govern derive their power
from the governed, that they maintain a system of communication with
the governed and that they be periodically ready to account for their
activities and either be recalled from office or be returned depending on
the verdict of the governed.
Incorporating the mechanism of accountability into decision-making
inc1udes, according to Keech (1992:260), two elements. First, the political
rulers are required to "explain, report, or justify." In a democratic setting
this implies that a government should keep the citizenry informed about its
activities, inter aUa through participation in policy-making by elected
representatives. Second, accountability implies that politicians are "subject
to sanction." Democratic mechanisms should, ideally, remove politicians in
the event of inadequate performance, e.g. the legislature may dec1are a vote
of no confidence in the government, or individual representatives may not
be reelected in the forthcomIng election if the electorate is dissatisfied with
their performance. The first element, tran sp arency , may be seen as an
unambiguous advantage in policy-making, in that corruption becomes less
easy to hide. The second element, however, seems to be at the core of the
debate about the effects of democracy on economIc policy-making. Critics
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daim that fear of not being reelected, will induce politicians to make
populist economic policy priorities without grounding them on technocratic
efficiency criteria - democracy may force a government to overspend.
It is too simplistic, however, to assume that democracy will inevitably
become a seedbed for populism. In a situation of extremely scarce
resources, as in most of contemporary Africa, there may simply not be
much scope for expansionist policies. As emphasised by Hyden in his
outline of the governance approach, legitimacy may be grounded in factors
beyond the distribution of patronage - responsible leadership may be a
feature of similar importance as responsiveness for the existence of an
atmosphere of trust and reciprocity between state and society (Hyden
1992: 12). As this analysis of the Botswana case will demonstrate, regularly
held elections do not necessarily impel a government to loosen control of
public spending even if ample resources are available.
Apter (1991:476) underscores the importance of democracy facilitating
two-way communication, constituting an "information system", and argues
that one of the advantages of democracy compared to the coercive state is
that people pass on information which may not be agreeable to their
superiors - information that in the end may be crucial for innovation and
growth. As such it is the task of the elected politicians to feed this
information from society into the policy-making process. The presence of
a legislature may for example improve the development efforts of a
government by making development programmes become doser to real
needs (Smith & Musolf 1979).
It was argued above that an important aspect of understanding how the
particular political system affects economic development is to find out how
the policy-making process is organised. Haggard (1990:43), for example,
perceives the degree of insulation from societal pressures as "a function of
the institutional arrangements linking state and society." Democracy gives
the civil society freedom and opportunity for organisation and expression
of the interests of various society-centred forces. This aspect of democracy
raises important questions: Is it possible for the state in a democratic
context to be strong - in terms of capability to insulate itself from the
influence of particular groups? To what extent does the access to the
decision-making process by elected representatives itself constitute a threat
to the autonomy of the state? Even between democratic regimes with
similar formal institutional frameworks, great differences may exist in the
daily functioning of the political systems. One should thus not be too
ambitious about seeking general answers to these questions. The position
and strength of the political parties, and the vitality of civil society are
seemingly important variables. One further aspect is the relationship
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between the legislature and the executive. Haggard and Moon (1990:212)
see the relative strength of the legislature as an important factor for the
developmental strength of the state, and "weak legislatures that limit the
representative role of parties" is in their view seen as an advantage.
The relative strength of the executive vs the legislature
The executive-Iegislature relation in the parliamentary system may,
theoretically, be conceived through the "parliamentary chain of
government" (Olsen 1983:77). The legislators' actions are here expected to
reflect the public' s preferences. The cabinet is seen as the top of an
electoral hierarchy, whereby the executive derives its authority from the
representatives of the people. One important determinant for the distribution
of power between the legislature and the executive is how dependent the
latter is on support by the former.
Internal characteristics of the organisation of the executive have to be
analysed when discussing its strength. An important dimension to study is
the relation between the political rulers (i.e. the Botswana President, the
ministers and assistant ministers), and the civil service. An important
question, according to Olsen (1983:78), becomes "the degree to which
politically appointed leaders are able to give direction to a large
administrative apparatus acting in their name and how they give this
direction." This may be a question of the capabilities of the politicians:
their educational background, experience, length of tenure in the cabinet
and in the individual ministry, and their political support in general. In
Botswana the development planning has increasingly become more
sophisticated, the portfolio of the development programme has expanded,
and the state has somehow become involved in most spheres of the
economy. Although the political rulers may have become more experienced
and capable of exercising political leadership, it is reasonable to assume
that increased workload and the need for specialised administrative units
make it increasingly difficult for the politicians to control the administrative
side of the executive. As Olsen (1983:45) writes: "The more decisions
made on the behalf of the state, the smaller the share of those decisions can
be attended to and given thorough consideration by a single institution."
Mezey (1979) classifies the strength of a legislature in accordance with
its general support in the population and its policy-making strength. The
latter dimension will here be emphasised. An illustrative example is how
bills are dealt with. In a compliant (weak) legislature, according to Mezey,
bills pass easily and quick, while in a free (strong) legislature, much time
is spent on discussing bills and amendments may be made by the
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representatives. Wildavsky and Caiden (1989) illustrate the power of the
legislature by the extent to which it is able to amen d the leve! of public
spending. The constitutional constraints on the ability of the Botswana
legislature to raise public spending, thus places the legislature in a weak
position in this respect.
The existence of an efficient commttee system may be indicative of the
strength of the legislature. By concentrating skills in various commttees,
the legislators may become more prepared to raise issues and amend
proposals presented by the cabinet (Smith & Musolf 1979). As Hopkins'
(1979) study of the legislatures in Kenya and Tanzania reveals, physical
working-conditions of the MPs are further important for their ability to
participate in policy-making.
The de facto power of the representatives in the legislature to modify
proposals from the executive may be difficult to analyse, because
modifications may not only be the outcome of an open debate, but may as
well be the outcome of consultations prior to the official debate (i.e. private
discussions between ministers and MPs). It may be in the interest of the
executive to avoid open clashes, and the executive may during the process
of preparing proposals try to anticipate opposition. For example, with
reference to the Norwegian parliament, Olsen (1983:67) argues that the
executive-Iegislature relation is not characterised by confrontation and
domination, and that "much coordination takes place through anticipated
reaction and mutual adjustment."
Recalling figure 1.1 in the preceeding chapter, the elections and the role
of the elected representatives may be perceived as a bridge between the
state and society. An important dimension in analyses of the position of
legislatures is the relation between the representatives and the electorate-
the citizens. One way of approaching this issue hasbeen through the
demand-input conception of the representative model (Olsen 1983; Wahlke
1971). The interests of the citizens are seen as policy demands which are
transferred into the policy-making process through the elections and the
legislators. Such an understanding of representativity may, according to
Wahlke, be questioned. In terms of specific policy issues, one may question
what mandate the elections actually give the representatives. The political
consciousness of the average citizen may vary. V oters may be less
concerned with specific policy issues than other factors determining their
party preference (e.g. social background, ideology, ethnic affiliation, and
the personality of the individual candidates). Party programmes may be
general in nature, and it is plausible not to expect a mass of voters to
support all aspects in a programme (Olsen 1983). This does not necessarily
imply that the politicians act (make policies) without concern for the views
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of the public. Aspirations for the next election may still discipline the
politicians to seek conformity between their actions and the public's
opinion. Wahlke (1971) even suggests that the representatives in some cases
may see themselves as more supervised by the electorate than they actually
are.
Same African experiences
Studies of the performance of legislatures in those African countries where
such institutions have been present are scarce. The issue is usually not
given much attention in booksandarticles on thedemocratic experiences
of African countries, or the future role of democracy (e.g. Diamond eta!.
1988). Studies which have been concemed with African legislatures have,
according to Healey and Robinson (1992), not ascribed legislators (MPs)
much influence in policy-making. Not surprisingly, the possibility for
criticism or presentation of policyalternatives has been found to be limited,
especially in one-party systems. However, in his comparison of the
legislatures in Kenya and Tanzania, Hopkins (1979) argues that, if not de
facto decision-makers, the activities of the MPs are still important in the
development process. Although these countries have important differences,
and may be of less relevance for a discussion of policy-making in a multi-
party context, it seems to be worth gi ving atten ti on to some of Hopkins'
observations concerning the role of the individually elected politicians.
Hopkins claims that the particular development strategies pursued in
Tanzania and Kenya . have only insignificantly been influenced by the ....
legislatures, and mainly been determined by key political figures with
executive power. The private sector has in addition been an important
influence group in Kenya, while the T AND party has been an important
arena for political decisions in Tanzania. The role of the legislatures in both
countries has mainly been to formalise and legitimise the decisions made
by the political executive. The legislatures as an arena in policy-making
have thus been characterised by building supportive coalitions for decisions
taken elsewhere (Hopkins 1979: 183). However, Hopkins argues that one
has to view the role of the MPs beyond those tasks constitutionally
prescribed. It would be clearly noticeable that MPs are part of politics in
these countries if the legislatures disappeared. The informal and indirect
functions of the MPs are emphasised. For example, in Kenya the legislature
was observed to be an important arena of recruitment for leadership.
Although the freedom to criticise the government in both countries has been
constrained, the role of MPs as intermediaries of information was found to
be important: goals were clarified, and needs and demands from the
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constituencies were presented to the governments. The MPs provided to
some extent feedback from the implementation of policies. However,
Hopkins observed that the MPs in both countries contributed insignificantly
to the formulation of specific policyalternatives. This was partly explained
by lack of capacity to undertake independent policy analysis.
The role of the MPs as linkages between the country side and the central
government was in both Kenya and Tanzania found to be important. In
Kenya the MPs functioned as patrons for their constituents. The MPs had
an important role in raising funds for development projects (e.g. schools).
The MPs assisted constituents in allocation of land, and to overcome
problems with the bureaucracy. The performance of the MPs in such fields
was found to be important for their chances to become reelected. Although
some of the functions of the Kenyan MPs were performed by the
institutions of the TANU party in Tanzania, the presence of the MPs in the
rural areas was still important. Hopkins further emphasises the role of the
Tanzanian MPs to create understanding and legitimacy of government
policies in the constituencies.
Lessons from the comparison seem to be that the MPs may still perform
important roles, even if the survival of a government is not reliant on the
support from the legislature, and even though the MPs are not major law-
makers, or do not present alternatives to government policies. The
legislature contributes to the legitimacy of the government by giving
consent to policies presented to it. The MPs bring forward information
about the needs in their constituencies, and they may provide important
feedback for the efficient implementation of government policies.
* * *
To facilitate the ensuing empirical analysis I have paid attention to
variables like state-society relationships, political institutions, administrative
capabilities and policy instruments available. I have argued that a state-
centred approach does not preclude a focus on actors outside the state. On
the contrary, a recent trend in political science is to analyse how society-
centred forces may get access to policy-making processes, and how political
institutions may regulate the ability of such actors to infIuence policy-
making. Organisations in civil society and elected politicians may be
perceived as intermediaries between state and the populace. A strong
legislature may be important in making the executive and the bureaucracy
largely accountable and responsive to real needs. However, this strength
may in addition represent a challenge to the autonomy of the policy-
makers.
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3. Development planning, policies and
economic change
This chapter outlines the policies adopted, development patterns and
structural changes in the post-independence period. A main objective is to
demonstrate the coherence in the Botswana government' s approach to
economic development. The history and role of development planning
during these years will be emphasised. As the scope of this study is limited,
I will focus on some selected, but central, aspects of the economic
development process; i.e. industrial development, rural-urban dualism,
agricultural modernisation, and income policy. The analysis will combine
comparisons across sectors of the economy with a focus on policy choices
over time. The aggregate of these dimensions will be looked upon as
Botswana' s development strategy.
3.1 The challenges at independence
Botswana' s exceptional low leve! of development at independence may be
illustrated in various ways. In terms of economic dualism, the dichotomy
between a traditional and a modern sector of an economy, Botswana's
underdevelopment was revealed by the virtual absence of an industrial
sector (e.g., manufacturing and mining), a service sector, or educated
citizens (Colclough & McCarthy 1980; Harvey & Lewis 1990; Murray &
Parson 1990). As table 3.1 illustrates, one could hardly talk about any
urbanisation at all, and 90 per cent of the population was based in the
underdeveloped rural economy (Parson 1984:58). This rural predominance
should be kept in mind, not least as an important dimension of Botswana
party politics.
However, the low leve! of development did not rnean that independent
Botswana started from a "point zero" (e.g. a non-monetarised traditional
economy based mainly on subsistence agriculture). Colonialism affected the
economy despite negligible physical presence. Taxation, for example, made
the population increasingly dependent on income from wage labour (Murray
& Parsons 1990). The economic structure had for more than a century been
affected by its proximity to South Africa. Cattle rearing for export to the
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southern neighbour had taken place since the nineteenth century, and
although it did not occur on a large scale, the establishment of a modern
abattoir and meat cannery in the 1950s increased the export capacity and
created some formal employment (Harvey & Lewis 1990). However, formal
employment opportunities within the protectorate were virtually non-
existent. Temporary labour migration to South African mines and farms
represented both the major source of wage income, and forme d a linkage
between traditional and modern economic sectors. In the late 1930s, for
example, about 20,000 Batswana worked temporarily in South Africa
(Murray & Parsons 1990: 164); a figure which has remained roughly at the
same leve! until today (see also table 3.4 below). It is illustrative that in
1965 twice as many Batswana had formal employment outside the
protectorate as within (RoB 1991f:box 1.1). The economy of the
Bechuanaland protectorate had further been linked to the South African
economy through a customs union established in 1910. Beyond the produce
from the subsistence agriculture, nearly all consumer goods were imported
(Harvey & Lewis 1990:24).
Table 3.1
Leve! of urbanisation
(largest settlements, population in thousands)
Settlement/Year 1964 1971 1981Gaborone 3.8 17.7 56.7Francistown 9.5 18.6 31.1Lobatse 7.6 11.9 19.0
Selebi-Phikwe 4.9 29.5
1991
136.4
58.2
28.4
54.6
Urban share of total
population 4% 9.5% 17.7% 33.1%
Source: RoB 1991f:table 1.2; Harvey & Lewis 1990: table 3.5
UntIl the 1950s there were hardly any efforts to develop the domestic
Bechuanaland economy. The colonial rulers had until that time given
priority to balancing the budgets, and consequently kept the public
expenditures low. Domestic taxation was meant to cover the recurent
expenditures, and insignificant transfers from Britain to ok place. Beyond
some spending on infrastructure and veterinary services, and a small
amount on education and health, no funds were spent, or efforts made,
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before the 1950s to modernise or develop agriculture or industry. This
neglect was noticeable in comparison to other African areas subjected to
colonial rule. However, a change occurred from 1955 and onwards, as
development funds, budgetary grants and loans were increased from British
sources. As a re sult, some improvements occurred in the decade prior to
independence, i.e. increased levels of school enrolment, increased spending
on health, and some development of infrastructure, especially centred on the
establishment of the capital Gaborone, which literally had to be constructed
from scratch (Colclough & McCarthy 1980:table 1.1; Harvey & Lewis
1990).
The initial low level of administrative capacity, combined with the
multiplicity of development needs, presented tremendous challenges to
Seretse Khama and his government at independence, both in number and
scope. The manpower and financial constraints required the new rulers to
make strict priorities. Although it may be correct to say that the Khama
government in the early days after independence lacked autonomy vis-à-vis
their former colonial masters, this does not necessarily imply that different
decisions would have been made even if, for example, reliance on British
funding for the development and recurrent budgets had not been necessary.
I will argue that considering the objective constraints which existed at
independence, it is reasonable to question whether there was any alternative
development path open at all. However, at the same time, one should keep
in mind that Khama and his ministers ideologically represented a
moderate/liberal African government, compared to the "socialist oriented"
rulers in several other contemporary newly independent states. As will be
,elaborated inchapter 5,apolitical "left-right"'cleavage apparentlyexisted!
in Botswana politics in the 1960s; with the party in power to the "right",
and the opposition parties to the "left". However, I will argue that although
the opposition "rhetorically" positioned itself to the "left", it was unclear
what real political alternative the opposition actually represented.
The priorities which were made at independence had been elaborated
through a process commencing in the early 1960s when the colonial
administration adopted a more explicit planning approach, and African
politicians were gradually brought into decision-making and administrative
matters (see chapter 5). Among other things, three "principal" objectives
came to the fore at independence:
(a) Priority was given to development planning, although primarily
focused on resource allocation to the various sectors, and less on direct
state involvement in productive activities (RoB 1968). This emphasis
was reflected institutionally, as planning departments were given a de
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facto strong position; more dominant than in many other African
countries (Colclough & McCarthy 1980).
(b) It was explicitly pronounced that the emphasis on planning was not
intended to lessen the importance of the private sector in the
development efforts. On the contrary, the government was to assist the
private sector in its contribution to the attainment of overall
deve10pment goals (RoB 1968: 11).
(c) A major objective was to reduce the dependency, or diversify the
sources, on external funding of the recurrent and development budgets
(Healey & Robinson 1990; RoB 1968).
The priority given to financial independence is understandable, as the
domestic economy in 1966 could hardly provide the government with any
revenues at all. British aid financed half of the recurrent budget and all
development spending (Harvey & Lewis 1990:39). Soon after independence
it became clear that a potential for mineral exports (i.e. copper-nickel and
diamonds) existed. Hence a major share of development spending and
administrative capacity was assigned to fast development of the mining
industry. Secondly, institutional development of the government agencies
themse1ves, and further construction/plans for the capital Gaborone
demanded much attention. Priority was in general given to development of
physical infrastructure, geared especially toward improving the roads
between the major urban areas. In general, the development priorities in the
first post-independence years were biased towards the urban sector, while
education, health and agriculture lagged behind (Colclough & McCarthy
1980). The first planning efforts were marked by their transitional nature,
which is understandable as the new rulers had to "get organised" before one
could expect attention to be directed towards economic development in a
broader sense.
In the early 1970s the prospects for future development were
exceptionally enhanced by the improved financial situation; for three main
reasons. First, the customs union which had existed between Botswana and
South Africa since 1910 had until independence only brought insignificant
gains to the former. In 1969 the agreement had been renegotiated, and
Botswana' s share of the customs union' s revenues increased significantly
as the receipts now became tied to the volume ofimport to Botswana, and
not a fixed share as earlier, as well as a bonus emanating from a
renegotiated revenue sharing formula (Harvey & Lewis 1990: 190). Between
1968 and 1970 the annual revenues from the agreement quadrupled, and
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increased further to represent 45 per cent of domestic revenues in 1972-73
(Murray & Parsons 1990: 168). Second, the development of the mineral
export sector turned out to be a success, and although the diamond mine
project was financed by a private South African company (De Beers), the
government received an increasingly large share of the profits from 1972
onwards (Harvey & Lewis 1990: table 6.1). Third, great efforts had been
made, with success, to increase the contributions from bilateral and
multilateral donors. The copper-nickel mine project was largely funded by
foreign aid, and the financial dependency on the United Kingdom decreased
after 1970 (Harvey & Lewis 1990:198). A contributing factor to the good
performance was certainly also the end of a devastating drought in 1966;
a factor which led to a "self-driven" restoration of the agricultural
production in the early years after independence (Isaksen 1981:9).
To sum up; the prospects for economic development had improved
noticeably during the first five years of independence. The confidence in
the economic prospects expressed by the Minister of Finance and
Development Planning in 1970 was in retrospect justified (RoB
1970:introduction). As the political leaders now had more room for
manoeuvre, the extent to which the new prospects tumed the development
efforts towards those sectors which had been neglected during the initial
years of independence became a relevant issue for planning.
3.2 The sec ond "independence"
The revenue situation of the government continued to improve throughout
the 1970s. In 1972/73 the reliance on support from the United Kingdom to
meet recurrent expenditure ceased - a circumstance that Harvey and Lewis
characterise as the achievement of a second "independence" (1990:53).
High economic growth rates were sustained. However, some changes in the
relative contribution of the various sources of income took place. Cattle
production, in terms of the size of the stock and volume of exports,
increased steadily until the early 1980s. The major markets in the first post-
independence years were South Africa and the United Kingdom (UK). After
UK entered the European Economic Community (EEC), the Botswana
government put much effort in getting access to the EEC market. In 1974
an agreement was reached which gave Botswana a fixed quota and reduced
tariffs on cattle import into the EEC countries (Harvey & Lewis 1990:79).
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Table 3.2
Major exports in selected years (per cent of total revenues)SectorN ear 1974 1980 1985-91 *
Meat & meat products 38.9 7.2 5.1Diamonds 36.7 60.7 78.5Copper-Nickel 10.1 20.7 8.9
Source: Calculated from RoB 1986b:table 23 and 1991f:table A7.
* Annual average rates for the period.
As table 3.2 reveals, the livestock sector has declined in importance as
a major source of export revenue. The cattle industry has ceased being a
source of net income for the Botswana government. On the contrary, it has
been estimated that the taxes and payment for services received from the
cattle holders do not exceed the transfers to the sector from the government,
e.g. vaccination, fencing, and subsidies for borehole drilling (Harvey &
Lewis 1990:89). However, it should be kept in mind that the sector
continued to represent a major source of income for the individual
Motswana.
After major investments were made in the early 1970s, the mining sector
increasingly became the major source of income for the government.
Income came not only through the direct stiare of the export revenues
accruing to the government, but also by increasing revenues from the
customs union agreement, which increased proportionate1y with the import
of ..irtputs demanded.hy"the"Cofistructiol1.boom'Il1thernneralsector.c'"'lheiEE.
revenues from mineral exports facilitated a build-up of foreign exchange
reserves, and the dividends from these reserves became an important source
of revenue from the late 1970s onwards (Harvey & Lewis 1990:194). An
increasing amount of deve10pment aid was furthermore received by the
government in the 1970s, and the objective of diversifying the range of
contributors of external aid was accomplished. No donor provided more
than 20 per cent of the development aid received by Botswana at the end
of the decade (Harvey & Lewis 1990:42).
A development plan which was presented in 1970 signified a more
comprehensive and long term perspective concerning the development
strategy of the Botswana government. However, the plan did not represent
any major change of strategy. A dual strategy was outlined in the plan, in
which surpluses generated by mineral exports were intended to be
transferred to rural development. It was in the plan explicitly stated that
rural development was a major challenge, and the government intended "to
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devote considerable resources to the task of rural development" (RoB
1970:13). However, beyond a modest increase in spending on education, no
important changes in terms of allocation of public funds occurred during
the initial years of the plan period (Colclough & McCarthy 1980:table 4.4).
In the revised development plan presented in 1973, it was reiterated that
inequality within the rural sector was a problem. The government
maintained that rural development should be given priority, through:
"improvement and expansion of social services and Infrastructure" and
"creation of income generating activities" (RoB 1973:58). The government
reconfirmed that resourceswere available for rural development.Mur.uay
and Parsons (1990), however, claim that the project portfolio did not Teveal
anymajor favouring of the rural sector, compared to the former expenditure
pattern. The plan was furthermore, according to Colclough and McCarthy
(1980), vague in defining the relative priorities of the various objectives
presented. However, a rural development programme was launched in 1973
(the Accelerated Rural Development Programme - ARDP).Funds
allocated to the rural sector in the following years increased substantially
(Colclough & McCarthy 1980:table 4.4). Water regulation, primary schools,
health facilities and road improvements represented the major elements of
the development programme (Picard 1987:241). This may be looked upon
as a sincere attempt to devote attention to the government' s rural
development objectives. However, the sudden increase in spending had
apparently also a political motive. The timing of the launching of the rural
development programme has by several authors been related to the election
in 1974, and the ne ed for the ruling party to present tangible results of its
policy (Colclough & McCarthy 1980; Harvey & Lewis 1990; Murray &
Parsons 1990).
The approach towards rural development adopted in the 1970s has been
characterised as being mainly focused on development of infrastructure and
social services (i.e. schools and health). It has been argued that a
comprehensive strategy for rural development ina broader sense was never
presented (Picard 1987). Agriculture, for example, received only 3 per cent
of government development spending between 1973 and 1976 (Harvey &
Lewis 1990:table 10.1). Although the modern, predominantly urban,
economIc sector had expanded continuously in the 1970s, neither the level
of employment in the rural sector, nor agricultural productivity improved.6
6 The high level of self-employment within the rural sector has to be kept in mind. The
number of farmng households increased by 67.5 percent between 1968/69 and 1979/80,
which inc1uded a 70 percent increase in farm households holding cattle (calculated from
Harvey & Lewis 1990:table 5.2).
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Development of manufacturing industries both in urban and rural areas also
lagged behind (see table 3.3 & 3.4). Governmental institutions charged with
the task, among others, to allocate public funds to industrial development
emerged in the early 1970s, however with limited success (Murray and
Parsons 1990). The funds allocated by these institutions had, for example,
largely been concentrated in urban property and commercial business
(Harvey & Lewis 1990).
Table 3.3
Contribution by selected sectors to GDP (per cent)
Sector/Year 1966 1977/78 1982/83
Agriculture 39.6 19.9 5.8Mining 15.5 31.2
Manufacturing 7.9 6.8 6.3
Construction 5.7 4.7 5.4
Trade/Hotels 18.6 20.0 21.3
Finance 6.6 8.3 6.6Government 16.7 16.3 17.2
1988/89
3.0
51.0
4.2
3.3
16.4
5.3
12.8
Source: RoB 1991f:table 1.3.
In his analysis of the Botswana economy until 1980, Isaksen (1981)
claims the government had been biased towards sectors which generated
revenues (i.e. mineral export and cattle), and less concerned with
employment creation per se. The role of the state in employment creation
is crucial, Isaksen argues, because in Botswana a disproportionately large
share of national funds is concentrated in the hands of the government,
compared to the private sector. However, the development strategy which
had emerged in the 1970s revealed that the government had ascribed to
itself mainly an indirect role in manufacturing growth and employment
creation within this sector. The government attempted to provide various
incentives for private entrepreneurs, but refrained from getting directly
involved in manufacturing activities. In a report published in 1978 it was
suggested that a rural employment programme concentrating on the
development of small scale industry and modernisation of agriculture might
substantially improve the employment situation in the rural sector (Lipton
1978). I will in the following section discuss the economic strategy and
development achievements in the 1980s, and explicitly focus on the
approach towards development in the rural sector .
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3.3 Economic strategy in the 1980s
The mineral-led growth which started in the 1970s continued throughout the
1980s, especially after 1985 when growth accelerated both in the mining
and non-mining sectors (except for agriculture). Mineral exports made the
foreign exchange reserves swell, and the financial scope of manoeuvrability
of the government was expanded (RoB 1991f:table 3.2 & fig.3.3).
In his comprehensive report, Lipton (1978) claimed that the absence of
deliberate policies militated against employment creation, and especially the
development of a manufacturing sector, both in urban and rural areas. This
was related to the organisation of Tesponsibilities between the ministries,
and he pointed to the institutional weakness of the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry. He further argued that the existing policies did not activate
"the gre at mass of industrial potential - in rural areas" , and claimed that
"restrictive legislation" was a further obstacle to the development of
industry and commerce (Lipton 1978:97). It is unclear what direct bearing
the Lipton report had on the government' s policy choices in the years to
follow. According to Harvey and Lewis (1990), at least it coincided with
a shift ofemphasis in economic priorities - a shift which apparently
signified a "higher priority to rural development, employment creation,
income distribution and diversification away from the country's dependence
on mining and cattle" (Harvey & Lewis 1990:56).
A number of reviews of existing policies were made in the early 1980s,
and new policy initiatives were presented by the government. A
comprehensive study of economic opportunities in Botswana, with a focus
on the major economic sectors, were presented by the government in 1982.
Its major recommendations were subsequently adopted in a white paper
entitled National Policy on Economic Opportunities (Harvey & Lewis 1990;
RoB 1982a; 1982b). The strategy outlined in the white paper included inter
alia:
(a) Increasing citizen involvement in the economy, albeit without
decreasing the economic growth rate; in other words, create productive
employment increasing the share of expenditures devoted to productive
activities and rural development; refraining from government activities
that are regulatory and discourage economic activity; and advocating
investment by indigenous citizens, although without relinquishing the
openness towards foreign investment.
(b) Improving educational opportunities.
43
(c) Developing arable agriculture, and, because of limited grazing land,
promoting qualitative improvement of the cattle rearing.
(d) Improving the efficiency of the government' s institutions.
(e) Developing further the commercial banking services and government-
sponsored financial institutions.
It would be an exaggeration to look upon the white paper as representing
a major alteration of the economic strategy. Although diversification of the
economy had come ta the fore"thewhite-paper in general renewed.the
approach towards economic development which had been developed
throughout the initial post-independence period; i.e. livestock and the
mining industry should continue to be the backbones of the economy, the
direct involvement of the state in productive activities should be limited,
and the economy should remain open in terms of foreign investment and
trade. However, some modest efforts in the following years were made to
diversify the economy.
Efforts to diversif the modern sector
The launching of the "Financial Assistance Policy (F AP)" in 1982,
followed by the "Industrial Development Policy (IDP) in 1984, were both
initiatives aimed at employment creation, and development of the
manufacturing sector, both in urban and rural areas. These schemes, which
excluded cattle and mining activities, mainly provided direct financial
support. Some measures of a more qualitative nature were also presented,
e.g. "local preference purchasing", and, to some extent, protection of
domestic industries (Kaplinsky 1991). However, the openness towards the
South African market was in general not changed:. The programmes
distinguished between support to small-scale enterprises (SSE) and medium-
and large-scale enterprise (MLE). The SSE scheme was limited to citizen
owners, and is regarded by Kaplinsky (1991) as a response by the
government to political pressure for indigenous participation in industry.
Although table 3.3 may suggest that manufacturing's contribution to the
economy has stagnated, or even declined, this is an observation which is
distorted by the substantial increase in revenues from mining through the
1980s. As table 3.4 reveals, employment in manufacturing has continuously
increased since the early 1970s, and accelerated towards the end of the
1980s. As the number of employed in the parastatals have only grown
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insignificantly through the 1980s (RoB 1991f:table A2), the major
contributor to manufacturing growth has been the private sector.
Table 3.4
Employment structure 1972-1989
(Shares of total employment in selected years (per cent)
and absolute changes within the individual sectors after base year 1972,
in brackets)
1972 1980Sector/Year
(a) Formal sectors
Agriculture
Mining
Manufacturing
Water & Electricity
Construction
Trade & Hotels
Other services *
Government* *
12.6 (100)
4.2 (100)
5.7 (100)
0.01 (100)
16.1 (100)
15.1 (100)
12.0 (100)
33.5 (100)
(1976)
42.7 (100)(b) Employment in
South African mines* * *
(Relative size related to (a))
1985 1989
5.2 (85) 3.4 (79) 3.7 (130)
8.6 (428) 6.2 (434) 4.3 (452)
6.7 (243) 8.6 (438) 10.3 (786)
1.8 (445) 1.6 (564) 1.2 (653)
16.1 (207) 9.9 (179) 13.6 (370)
12.5 (172) 15.6 (303) 16.2 (473)
12.2 (209) 15.6 (379) 16.2 (592)
37.0 (229) 38.9 (339) 34.4 (451)
24.2 (79) 18.0 (83) 9.9 (68)
* Includes: Transport & Communication, Finance & Business Services and Social &
Personal Services; domestic servants excluded. ** Parastatals incorporated in the other
sectors. ***Base year 1976.
Source: Ca1culations based on RoB 1977:table 1.5; 1985a:table 2.8; 1986b:table 15;
1986c:table 8.4 and 1991f:table A2.
However, to assign the FAP and the IDP schemes the main credit for
formal sector growth after the policies' introduction does not seem to be
justified. Although it has been estimated that the F AP until 1987 had
contributed 4,500 new jobs, this was only half of the projected number.
Evaluations revealed that the scheme's focus on financial support was
inadequate to challenge the major obstacles to industrial development
(Kaplinsky 1991:156). In other words, in its efforts to induce economIc
diversification, the government overlooked major constraints, as, for
example, the insufficient competence of entrepreneurs, skilIs of the workers,
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the inadequate functioning of the markets, and technological weaknesses.
Kaplinsky argues that much of the employment growth which has been
related to the government schemes may have occurred even without
financial support, and claims that a "free rider" problem has been associated
with the schemes. For example, in a survey of medium- and large-scale
enterprises it was revealed that the majority would have made their
investments even without the support from the schemes (Kap lin sky
1991:159). The growth of the manufacturing sector has been stimulated by
factors additional to the financial support provided by the government, e.g.
the attractiveness of the open Botswana economy to entrepreneurs in
neighbouringcountries, especially from Zimbabwe; the. increased demand
caused by the revenues generated by cattle and mineral production; and the
potential for domestic production which was left unexploited through the
colonial neglect of this sector. As Kaplinsky sums up (1991:158):
...in common with many African economies the poor state of the
manufacturing sector at independence left considerable scope for what has
come to be called "the easy stages" of import substitution. Thus, with the
exception of textiles, the sectors displaying growth over this period were
largely either "pull ed" by the success of the mineral sector or filled the
spaces left by colonial neglect.
However, one cannot disregard the employment generating effects of the
government programmes in the 1980s. As the recent development plan
reveals, the number of Batswana owned manufacturing firms increased
almost five-fold between 1984 and 1989 (RoB 1991f:158), and the FAP
focus on citizen ownership has certainly been one contributing factor to this
growth.
One should keep in mind that the Botswana government has never
intended to be a major participant and employer in the economy. As the
programmes discussed above demonstrate, the government has mainly
assigned itself an indirect role in the economic development process;
especially towards industrial development beyond mining. NationalIsation
of private enterprises has, for example, not been on the political agenda in
Botswana. This may certainly be explained by the virtual absence of larger
private enterprises at independence, but should as well be seen as reflecting
the ideological orientation of the politicians in power. Hypothetically, one
might have expected that the government would have spent a share of the
mineral revenues on establishing government-owned industrial enterprises
(parastatals ), as happened elsewhere in Africa after windfall revenues from
mining or oil got into the hands of the political rulers (i.e. Zambia and
Nigeria). In Botswana, the transfer of public funds to industrial activities
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has not been less substantial than in other countries, but of a different
nature. Direct involvement in productive activities, and creation of
parastatals, have been limIted to a few enterprises which provide core
services in utilities and infrastructure such as communications (railway and
civil aviation), electricity and water supplies, and telecommunications.
Public enterprises engaged in housing and marketing of agricultural
products also exist. The government is also a shareholder in several
manufacturing firms through the Botswana Development Corporation.
However, these engagements have mainly been of a commercial and profit-
making nature, and do not compare to the "loss-making" public enterprises
of ten found in other African countries (Harvey & Lewis 1990; Jefferis
1991a; World Bank 1989). The government continued to favour such an
approach when the strategy for the 1990s was presented in the seventh
National Development Plan (RoB 1991f:28):
...the initiative must be seized by those in the private sector. Beyond
direct investment in physical and socIal infrastructure, and human
resources, the government' s strategy for productive investment of the
mining revenues wil be to channel the funds to the private sector, and
continue to improve the enabling environment which makes engaging in
business activities in Botswana attractive.
This should be looked upon as a deliberate political choIce by the
government, and reconfirms the approach adopted with regard to its own
role in the economIc development process which was initiated at
independence.
Rural development
Although development of the rural sector to some extent is incorporated in
the government programmes discussed above, the main growth and
diversification has occurred mainly in the urban areas. This suggests that
the private sector has been less able to contribute to economIc development
in the rural areas. Although successful in urban areas, the same strategy
may be less applicable to rural development.
As revealed by table 3.4 above, the contribution of agriculture to formal
employment has remained stagnant in absolute terms, and declined in
relative terms after the early 1970s. This stagnation is also reflected in
absolute figures of output and area planted (RoB 1991a:table 1), and in the
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contribution to the GDP (table 3.3 above).7 These indicators, however,
refer to activity in the formal sectors, and it has to be kept in mind that an
estimated 260,000 persons are engaged in traditional farming in the rural
informal sector, which therefore represents a major source of income for the
two-thirds of the population liv ing in rural areas (RoB 1991f:239).8
The standard of living for the rural majority is ambiguous, depending on
whether it is to be measured by income or by access to social services. On
the one hand, a household and income survey conducted in 1985/86
revealed that large inequalities of income, in general, between the urban
and rural sectors, and within the rural sector , had remained unchanged since
the early 1970s (RoB 1988). It was reported that urban households, on
average, had a total income twice that of rural households (RoB 1988 &
1990a:21). Commenting on the survey, and its finding that no improvement
in the income of the poorest 40 per cent had taken place, Harvey and Lewis
write (1990:281): "fourteen years of rapid overall growth had liule
measurable impact on poor households' cash income." A commission
appointed by the government concluded similarly that "rural development
policies have had only limited impact on relative poverty" (RoB 1990a:24).
On the other hand, indicators of health and educational aUainment reveal
that the standard of living with regard to these dimensions has improved.
The provision of public services (i.e. health, primary schools and access to
safe water) has been improved through the 1970s and 1980s, and fairly
equally distributed throughout the country (Harvey & Lewis 1990). The
substantial emergency funds spent to ameliorate the negative effects caused
by thedrought between 1982 and 1987, have accomplished fairly their
objectives (RoB 1990a), although not without imperfections.9 However,
considering the low lev el of productive activities and insignificant
employment opportunities in the rural sector, rural poverty has to be looked
upon as a prevailing structural problem.
The government itself claims that a change of focus in the approach to
rural development took place after the late 1970s, i.e. an explicit emphasis
was put on productive employment and income generating activities (Ro B
1991f:87). Although the FAP scheme created some non-farmemployment
7 It has to be noted that the absolute number of persons employed in the formal agriculture
sector increased towards the end of the 1980s (tab le 2.4).
8 This figure is associated with some uncertainty, as, for example, a labour force survey
in 1985 reported that 142 876 persons were employed as "traditional farmer" in the
informal sector (RoB 1985c:table 27).
9 Applying rncro-level data, Simmons and Lyons (1992) argue that the drought relief and
food aid programmes in Botswana have not been without deficiencies.
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in the rural sector, and initiatives were made to target and concentrate rural
development efforts geographically to specific areas within each district,
these attempts cannot be looked upon as a major assault on the non-farming
employment problem. Agriculture has continued to be the principal sector
in the rural areas, but insignificant modernisation has taken place. For
example, the Ministry of Agriculture' s own review of Botswana' s
agricultural policy points to the low adoption rate of modern farming
techniques since independence (RoB 1991a). This may be related to the
capabilities of the farmers themselves, but as it is reasonable to assign the
government a critical role in the transformation process of traditional
agriculture, I will argue that the stagnation suggests that the adopted
policies have been ineffective. A lack of will or ability by the decision
makers to respond to the challenges in a comprehensi ve fashion is
apparently one factor behind the stagnation.
Cattle rearing and export of beef are two sides of a well known major
economic activity in Botswana, and together constitute a dominant
contribution to agricultural output (RoB 1991f:252). The size of the
livestock sub-sector has, in terms of number of cattle, doubled since
independence. However, the productivity of the mode of production does
not indicate modernisation to any appreciable degree. The policy on cattle
rearing seems to be rather arbitrary, and allegedly reflects a reluctance to
intervene in an activity dominated by an economic elite (Picard 1987;
Parson 1984). The Ministry of Agriculture has been successful in terms of
disease control, but unable to counteract the detrimental ecological effects
of growth of the cattle stocks. Productivity (measured in meat per
slaughtered animal) has been nearly stagnant during this period (RoB
1991a:17).
The socio-economic importance of the expansion of the cattk sector can
be questioned. Exports of beef, although modest compared to other non-
mining activities, are less significant as a source of foreign exchange than
the mineral exports (table 3.2), and the sector represents a net cost in public
budgets. The sector is not labour intensive, and its growth has had
insignificant employment generating effects, as reflected by agriculture' s
declining contribution to formal employment (table 3.4). However, the
growth of cattle stocks has been accompanied by an increase in the absolute
number of households owning cattle (Harvey & Lewis 1990:table 5.2), and
this self-employment has as such contributed to the maintenance of the
standard of living in the rural areas in proportion to population growth. On
the other hand, the distribution of the cattle herd has remained very unequal
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throughout the post-independence period.lO For example, it was reported
in 1987 that one-tenth of the farming households held 60 per cent of the
national cattle herd, and about 40 per cent of the farming households owned
no cattle (RoB 1991a:3). As cattle holding is an important source of
household revenue, and important for other farming activities (i.e. draught
power), Good (1992:78) seems to be right in arguing that "the heavy
inequalities present in cattle production are reproduced in arable agriculture
and through rural society".
Production of fresh milk constitutes another example of ineffectiveness
in policies directed towards the rural sector. One objective of the F AP
scheme was to increase the domestic production of milk, by restricting
production to citizens only, and providing financial support. However,
largely because of lack of managerial expertise, indigenous entrepreneurs
were unable to take advantage of this opportunity (RoB 1991a:21). This
suggests that financial support only is insufficient to produce changes -
an argument which is strengthened by looking at the efforts made in the
1980s to develop arable production. In the National Development Plan
covering the period 1979-85, it was stated explicitly that there would be
a shift of emphasis from cattle production to arable farming albeit without
neglecting the former (RoB 1980a:133). The Arable Land Development
Programme (ALDEP) was launched in 1980 with the ambitious objective
of achieving self-sufficiency in basic grains, and increasing employment
opportunities in the rural areas - specifically aimed at slowing down rural-
urban migration. The target group of ALDEP was small-scale farms, and
financial grants were the main mechanism (RoB 1980: 150). The initial
phase of ALDEP was seriously constrained bya drought whichstarted in'
1982. Partlyas aresponse tothe drought a complementary programme was
launched in 1985, the Accelerated RainfedArable Programme (ARAP),
which enlarged the target group to include farms of medium scale. Børhaug
(1992a) argues that ARAP can be looked upon as a political response to the
initial lack of success of the ALDEP programme.Whereas ALDEP had a
long-term perspective of improving the productivity of poor farmers, ARAP
aimed at "somewhat quicker and more concentrated assistance to better off
10 There is some ambiguity whether the distribution in the late 1980s was worse than at
independence. Good (1992:78) indicates that the inequality in cattle produetion has
worsened, while Harvey and Lewis (1990:77) observed that the total number of
households owning cattle had risen by about 50 percent - approximately the same
increase as the number of farms in general - and concluded that the distribution had
neither worsened nor improved. The Government itself states that "one effect of the
drought (in the 1980s) has been to concentrate cattle ownership in larger herds (RoB
1991f:17)."
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farmers" (Børhaug 1992a:119). The political dimension of ARAP was,
according to Børhaug, illustrated by its massive and determined thrst,
which made it more visible, and furthermore, its continuation until the 1989
election, despite its inefficiency having been recognised soon after its
adoption. Although the schemes led to an increase in area planted and total
output growth, the productivity of the sector did not improve. In other
words, the scheme became "a subsidy of existing arable farming patterns"
and "did not become an incentive for change and development" (Børhaug
1992a:121).
During the sixth planning period (1985-91), funds spent on ARAP
together with drought relief measures were nearly double the total amount
spent on other agricultural development activities during the period (RoB
1991f:table 11.9). The subsidies raised the domestic production co st of most
cereals to double the import price (RoB 1991a:13). Børhaug (1992a) further
emphasises the substantial administrative resources required by ARAP,
which diverted attention away from other agricultural activities undertaken
by the Ministry of Agriculture.' The considerable resources spent on the
programme imply that it has to be considered a serious attempt by the
government to be seen to be doing "something". It is difficult to distinguish
how much of the ARAP programme was motivated by a desire to develop
arable production per se, how much was aimed at drought relief and how
significant the political dimension was. The subsidies continued for about
two years after the drought ended. This may on the one hand have been
necessary to give the farmers some time to adapt to the new conditions. On
the other hand, this coincided with the 1989 election, and the claim that
ARAP was partly politically motivated is plausible. This claim .is
strengthened by the fact that the subsidies had benefited most of the
Batswana farmers engaged in arable agriculture. The decision to end the
programme after only five years suggests not only that it was ineffective as
ameasure beyond drought relief in the short run, but also that it may have
been considered a temporary measure by the politicians from the outset.
Again, financial support only proved to be insufficient as a catalyst for
agricultural development. A serious shortcoming pointed to by Harvey and
Lewis (1990: 10 1) was, for example, "the failure to develop a strong arable
research programme and to link it with an effective extension effort."
Another factor is the customs union agreement with South Africa, which
because of the flow of imported goods, works against domestic production
of agricultural goods (RoB 1991a). Although the ALDEP programme is
intended to continue until 1993 (RoB 1991f), this programme is a much
smaller programme than was the case when both ARAP and ALDEP were
at work, and the recent emphasis on "targeted subsidies" further indicates
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a return to the approach to agricultural development prior to the extensive
subsidisation schemes of the 1980s.
Although the government seems justified to argue that its agricultural
development efforts in the 1980 were constrained by the severe drought
between 1982 and 1987, the sector has always been facing harsh physical
and climatic conditions, so the drought cannot alone excuse the stagnation
of the sector. The insignificant agricultural development is certainly rooted
in the pre-independence period, but should today mainly be related to the
policy choices and priorities of the politicians after independence. In other
words, the government has still not developed any coherent strategy
towards agricultural development, and expressly assigns itself only a limited
role, as stated in the current National Policy on Agricultural Development
(RoB 1991b:6):
The role of government in agriculture wil be like in other sectors, limited
to the provision of necessary services and infrastrueture for efficient
agricultural produetion.
Infrastrueture has in general received a disproportionately large share of the
government' s attention and financial resources. As Murray and Parsons
write (1990: 181): "The economic history of Botswana since Independence
has been infrastructural development writ large." This focus reflects not
only the chosen development strategy by the government, but also the
objective needs at independence and the infrastructural requirements of the
expanding mining sector. The emphasis on infrastructure reflects the
government' s definition of the division of labour between the public and
private sectors, by virtue of which the former is to create favourable
conditions for the latter, while not itself,getting involved in productive
activities. As discussed above, the direct participation of the state in the
economy has been limited to a few parastatals, providing services and
utilities not unusually undertaken by the public sector. Post-independence
economic history reveals that productive activities in agriculture,mining,
commerce and manufacturing industry have mainly been undertaken by the
private sector; although with substantial financial support from the state. As
Harvey and Lewis (1990) argue, it is somehow not relevant to criticise the
government for not being more extensively involved directly in employment
creation, and putting less resources in to infrastructure, because this is an
option beyond its defined development strategy.
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3.4 Development planning in practice
Seven National Development Plans (NDPs) have been presented since 1968.
The economic policy in the first two years immediately after independence
was loosely guided by a transitional plan presented in 1966. The NDPs had
until1979 a five-year perspective, but were suspended by a new plan after
three years in a rolling plan fashion. 
11 After 1979 the NDPs have covered
six-year periods, and have been published without any overlap in time, but
with a mid-term review undertaken after three years. The essence of the
NDPs is a description of how the government plans to allocate public
funds. However, the scope of the NDPs has increased, and the re cent
documentshavepresented comprehensive reviews of the Botswana
economy: the economic development in the period covered by the previous
plan is presented, principal aspects of the economic strategy are outlined,
and scenarios about the future are presented. Below I will focus on the role
of planning and the NDPs in the economic development process. The
policy-making process behind the NDPs will be elaborated in chapters 6
and 7.
Planning as an objective in itself has been emphasised continuously by
the government since independence:
The Government wishes to stress its belief in the necessity of planning the
socIal and economic development of the nation. The available resources
are so few and the problems so great that only by careful planning can
these resources be put to their most effective use. A rationally planned
and guided economy is the objective of government policy (Ro B 1968:7).
...the first ten years of Independence have seen remarkable progress...This
progress would not have occurred without energetic and carefully planned
Government action: the Government wil continue to pursue actively
interventionist economic and socIal policies (RoB 1977:15).
Words like "guided economy" and "interventionist" may suggest that the
Botswana government has given itself an extensive and major role in the
economic development process. However, although this may in some sense
be correct, it has to be kept in mind that the nature of the government' s
involvement in the Botswana economy has been of a different nature than
those of other African states which have attempted to "guide" the domestic
economy (e.g. Tanzania, and Ghana during the Nkrmah period). For
example, the pivotal ro le of the private sector and the government' s
11 The NDP published in 1968 was replaced by a new plan after twü years.
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intention not to put constraints on private entrepreneurs have been
emphasised in all development plans presented since independence. The
way the planning objectives are defined in the current development plan
seems to be illustrative of the nature of development planning in the post-
independence period (RoB 1991f:77): "Planning in Botswana is intended
to ensure that the nation's financial, manpower and natural resourcesare
used effectively and in accordance with national priorities." In other words,
as stated in the Planning Officers Manual (RoB 1986:1-1): "the emphasis
is on making the best possible use of the scarce resources under
governments control within a mixed economy."
It should be noticed that the strategy pursued after independence has not
been signified by a level of public expenditure relatively lower than that of
other developing countries. On the contrary, total public spending as share
of the Gross National Product (GNP) has in Botswana been in general
above most African countries (World Bank 1989a:table 25). In perspective,
the share has been about the same as in the Scandinavian countries, France
and Italy. However, as revealed in this chapter, this does not reflect a state
extensively involved in productive activities. In brief, indicative planning
characterises the Botswana governments involvement in the economy.
The nature of the current approach to planning is rooted in the first
planning efforts around independence. These efforts were largely
determined by the constraints facing the planners in the early post-
independence years. As the country was very poor, the planners had to
consider the ordering of priorities very carefully so as to make maximal use
of the scarce resources available. Hence, planning was from the outset
fucused "ongovernment budgets.Amajorobjective inthefirst.yearsw,a;s::.'\.
to increase and diversify the sources of external development aid, and this
further directed the planning process towards projects (RoB 1986a).
However, although a dose link between the National Development Plan
and the project portfolio of the development budget has remained, the plans
have gradually become more sophisticated and broader in scope. The role
of the plans in soliciting external aid is still important. On the other hand,
the substantial growth of the revenue base has made it a maj or task from
the mid-1970s onwards to manage public expenditures in a fashion which
will not distort the macro-economic balance, i.e. avoiding accumulation of
foreign debt and inflation.
The revenues generated by the mining industry, and the large share of
them in the hands of the government, have upheld the crucial role of the
Botswana state in the development process. A central question which arises
is to what extent the plans actually serve as genuine guidelines for the
implementation of the objectives decided upon by the government. The
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National Development Plan has during the budgeting process been given a
legal status in the sense that development projects can not be implemented
without prior incorporation in the NDP and approval by the legislature (the
National Assembly). However, this does not imply that all development
expenditures have to be decided up on at the beginning of the six-year plan
period. The planning exercise should be looked upon as a continuous
process. New projects may be incorporated into the plan, and the budgetary
frames can be altered, through the annual budgets, or during the budgetary
year. These formal procedures all require approval by the legislature.
Gasper (1990:238) characterises these mechanismsas a "system of ordered
flexibility. "( This flexibilìty' isdemonstrated by thedifference between
planned and actual expenditures after the revenues from the mining industry
accelerated in the late 1970s. While actual expenditures in general were
lower than the level forecasted in the NDPs prior to 1978/78, the pattern
has been the opposite in the recent years (RoB 1973:30; 1977:48; 1980a:34;
1985:33; 1991f: 100). In other words, as the revenue situation has improved
beyond what has been forecasted, the government has responded by
increasing the leve! of expenditure. However, these increases have evidently
been undertaken in a planned mann er. As discussed in the sections above,
the government has acted relatively consistently as the growth of
expenditures has in general corresponded to the growth of government
revenues. A substantial financial surplus has thus been generated (Harvey
& Lewis 1990: 195).
It may be seen as a paradox that a large inflow of export revenues may
create serious problems for a domestic economy, even causing more harm
thangood, ifspent wisely.Increased export revenues might, .according.to
Hill and Mokgethi (1989:178), have affected the Botswana economy
negatively by:
(a) Appreciating the exchange rate, so that other export products are made
more expensive for foreign buyers.
(b) Raising the cost of non-tradables (e.g. servIces) in the domestic
economy, because of increased demand created by export revenues
fuelling the economy.
(c) Leading to wage increases in the export- and public sectors, and,
consequently, generating pressures to increase wages in other sectors.
The latter may have a detrimental effect on employment creation, as
the employers turn towards capital-intensive production techniques, or
55
productive investments are not made because of lack of
competitiveness vis-à-vis extemal markets.
A concrete problem related to development spending by the government is
the effects on the recurrent budget of expanding the project portfolio. In
other words, by adding to the development programme one additional
project, the recurrent budget has to be increased as well, not only during
the year the project is initiated, but for the whole lifetime of the project, if
financed mainly by public funds. Jf the development budget grows beyond
the long-term growth of revenues, the government may be forced to
increase its foreigndebt,:and ,mayina worsLcase be trapped ina spiralling
debt problem.
The Botswana government has so far been able to avoid the problems
outline d above. Harvey and Lewis (1990) relate the growth of export and
manufacturing specifically to the stable exchange rate in the 1980s. The
government has been successful in stabilising the growth of public
expenditures. This confirms that avoiding foreign debt problems and
stabilising the economic growth rate have been guiding principles in the
planning efforts after the inflow of mineral revenues started (Hill &
Mokgethi 1989). The mechanisms built into the planning system seem to
be a major factor behind macro-economic stability. As elaborated by Hill
(1991) and Harvey and Lewis (1990), the government has followed a
counter-cyclical policy in the management of the foreign exchange reserves.
During years of unexpected high revenues from the mineral export, public
expenditures have not been automatically increased, but saved, to be spent
in years with revenues below forecasted leveIs.
As discussed above, a main mechanism to keep the level of expenditures
stable has been the annual budget. The budget may be seenas an annual
updating of the NDP, and through this mechanism it has been possible to
adjust the total level of public spending as the forecast of revenues has
changed. However, the sec ond half of the 1980s has demonstrated that the
governmentis far from conservative in their.spendingpolicy. During the
1985-91 period, the actual development expenditures exceeded the
originally projected level by 143 per cent. Drought-related expenditures
have been estimated to account for 16 per cent of this deviation, other
major factors behind the increase being adoption of new projects (18%),
increased cost of existing projects (54%), and government' s own expansion,
especially transfers to parastatals and military spending. Accordingly the
expansion of the development budget led to growth of recurrent
expenditures by more than double of what had been targeted (RoB
1991f:99-102). Still, the growth of public expenditure did not imply that the
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state was becoming more directly involved in the economy. The
expenditure growth was mainly related to an acceleration of projects
already decided upon. However, it was admitted that the effects on the
recurrent budget from the increase in development spending had been
underestimated, and that a budget deficit in the following year was
expected (RoB 199Ie:19). In the National Development Plan (NDP7)
adopted ¡n 1991 it was announced and outlined how the government
intended to decelerate the rate of expenditure growth (RoB 199If:53-56).
That the government was able to cut spending if necessary was
demonstrated in the early 1980s. In 1981 and 1982 the diamondexport
revenuesdeclined. .. because.. of changing. world market prices.The
government responded to this change by reducing its expenditure, and the
growth of recurrent spending was zero in 1983. When the revenue situation
subsequently improved, the government responded by increasing
expenditure (Harvey & Lewis 1990:216). Whether or not the government
will be capable of repeating this operation in the 1990s remains to be seen.
As mentioned, the development plans are not only frameworks of the
expenditure programme of the government. The plan documents also
explicitly outline more qualitative aspects of the development strategy. In
the current development plan (NDP7), for example, a white paper titled the
Revised National Policy on Incomes, Employment, Prices and Profits (RoB
1990b), constitutes an important point of reference for several sections of
the plan. I will below present some of the policy guidelines contained in
this white paper.
3.5 A note on Botswana' sincome policy
As the title indicates, the Revised National Policy on Incomes, Employment,
Prices and Profits refers to several central aspects of the economic
development process. The white paper presents a review of the
government' s policy on several issues, e.g. minimum wages, low-income
groups, prices on consumer goods, business licensing, housing policy and
rents, training and localisation, expatriates, and how to implement such
policies. I will here mainly deal with the policy on wage and salary leveIs,
and the white paper will henceforth be referred to as the Income Policy.
The income aspect of the white paper is worth discussing for several
reasons. First, the policy paper should be seen as a political statement. It
relates to the role of the state vis-à-vis the private sector, and to the role of
the government as an employer. The latter is illustrated by a strike in 1991
by blue-collar workers in the public sector, which was related to the wage
policy decided upon in the white paper. In chapter 5 I will use this incident
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to illustrate the strength of civil society in Botswana. Second, the political
nature of the white paper makes it interesting in terms of distribution of
influence out side and within the Botswana state. The policy-making process
behind the white paper will therefore be analysed in chapter 6.
The first Income Policy was presented by the Botswana government in
1972, but some of its substance had been adopted as policy already in the
first years after independence. A major objective had been to change the
public sector salary structure inherited from the colonial rulers. This
structure represented wide inequalities in wage levels within the public
sector. The government announced a policy of keeping the upper levels
stable, while raising the salaries of junior employees (RoB 1968:10). The
ratio between the highest and lowest levels consequently decreased from
36:1 to 13: L between 1966 and 1974 (Harvey & Lewis 1990:293). The
prospering economy in the early 1970s presented new challenges to the
government as regards income policy. The modem sector of the Botswana
economy was very small, and the government was the largest employer.
The wage levels decided upon in the public sector would therefore set a
standard and affect the private sector.
In a report prior to the 1972 Income Policy, it was set out how the
government' s wage policy decisions might affect several aspects of the
economy: the pattern of income distribution, the volume of investments, the
level of employment, and the magnitude of rural-urban employment (Ghai
1970:6). Atension between two concerns was reflected in the policy
subsequently adopted (RoB 1972). On the one hand, it was decided to
establish a legal minimum wage for unskilled workers within the public
sector, parastatals, and within same main private sub-sectors, ostensibly to
protect the workers. The wages for skilled workers within the public sector
would be decided annually by the government, and the private sector was
expected to adhere to the levels set by the government. The other concern
underlying the Income Policy was an awareness of the detrimental effects
uncontrolled wage increasesmight have on employment growth, and on
urban--rural differences. It had alreadybeen statedin thedevelopment plan"
presented in 1970 that the wage levels in the mineral industry and in the
public sector should be restrained (RoB 1970: 13). This may explain why
the government established institutions, i.e. Salary Review Commssions
and the Wages Policy Committee (WPC), to monitor and decide upon wage
leveIs. The annual review of wages by the WPC covered some 30 to 40 per
cent of non-government employees between 1974 and 1980 (Harvey &
Lewis 1990:295). The real wages in sectors covered by the Income Policy
had been only modestly increased. A guide line for the nominal increases
had mainly been the changes in the cost of living. Although a stated
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objective had been that the minimum wage should reflect the average rural
income, parity with rural income had in reality not been adhered to (RoB
1990a). The policy to compress the differences between the highest and
lowest wage levels was continued until the end of the 1980s; the ratio was
16:1 in 1987 (Harvey & Lewis 1990:293). These observations reveal that
the Botswana government to a certain extent has been able to "coach" the
development of the wage levels, and that it has followed a coherent policy.
However, beyond enforcing minimum wages, the government has in the
1980s become less interventionist in deciding the wage levels in the private
sector. Astheemployment growthinthe private sector hasbeen fasterthan
in the publicsector, theabilityof the government to control the general
wage levels has been reduced (RoB 1990a:48).
The expanding private sector was probably one main reason why the
government decided to review its income policy in 1989. As mentioned
above, the wage differentials within the public sector had consciously been
compressed. This implied, for example, that the salaries of senior
professionals within the public administration remained stagnant throughout
the 1980s (RoB 1990a:50). In the private sector, on the other hand, the
salary levels for senior professionals and employees with sought-after skills
have in general increased well above their counterparts in the public sector.
Consequently, the public sector experienced an exodus of personneI towards
the private sector (RoB 1990a:60). Harvey and Lewis (1990:293) argue
further that a widening wage gap between local and expatriate employees
also increased the pressure for higher incomes at the senior level within the
public sector.
The revised Income Policy approved by the National Assembly in 1990
entails a liberalisation. It was announced that the policy toward licensing,
restrictions on shop hours and price controls would be eased. The
government rejected a recommendation made by the commssion which had
reviewed the existing policy to introduce a uniform minimum wage to all
Batswana employees. Arguing that "the level of minimum wages affects the
competitive ability of local producers", the government decided that the
level of the minimum wage should be allowed to differ across various
sectors (RoB 1990c:9). The criteria underlying the individual minimum
wages should be both the cost of living, and the ability of the individual
category of employers to pay. This differentiation was further reflected in
the emphasis on market forces to determine the individual wage leveIs. The
government announced that collective bargaining between the employers
and employees should in the future be the main mechanism for deciding
wage levels in the private sector. The rationale behind this "withdrawal" of
the state, compared to the interventionist policy pursued since 1972, was
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that greater reliance on market forces was now feasible because the private
sector had become more effective (RoB 1991f:86).
The government began in the late 1980s to decompress the salary
differentials between its own employees. This policy was formalised by the
new income policy in 1990. It was further decided to let the parastatals
become more autonomous in determining theirown wage scales. The
effects of the new Income Policy on the government sector were soon
observed by an increase of the total salary bill for central government by
18.7 per cent (Mmegi, 14-20 December 1990, p.3). This refIected increased
salaries for the middleand seniorlevels (RoB1990c:26). Thiswidening..of
the gap,between.thehighest and 10west paid governmentemployees didnQt
pass unnoticed by the latter group. The trade union of central government
and parastatal manual workers demanded in 1991 a 154 per cent wage
increase. Although obviously an unrealistic demand, it has to be viewed as
a serious signal of dissatisfaction with the existing wage leveIs. This was
confirmed by the dramatic strike which ensued when the demand was
turned down. The trade union argued that the actual cost of living was far
above the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) ca1culated by the government. The
PDL constituted a reference point for the wages offered by the government
to manual workers. It was during my stay in Botswana, September -
December 1991, commonly recognised that an income refIecting the PDL
(148 Pula in 1991), provides for a very low standard of living, especially
if the employees have several dependants. I will argue therefore that the
wage demand was to some extent justified, when seen from the point of
view of the manual workers. However, considering the governments
definite rejection of the claim, and resolute response to the strike which
followed, the incident also illustrates that the government consciously wants
to keep the wage leve! of manual workers low. Macro-economic
deliberations are apparently justifying this stance in the eyes of the
government. A wage increase within the public sector would certainly
spre ad to the private sector. This might further negatively affect the general
growth of the economy and the creation of new jobs; objectives which
seemingly are fundamental and unalterable in the economic strategy of the
Botswana government.
3.6 Botswana's development strategy in retrospect
When comparing the current development plan and the plan presented after
the mineral prospects had been unearthed in the late L 960s, it is striking
how similar the "Strategy for Development" sections appear to be. The
actual strategy pursued also reveals a coherence in the approach to
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development by the Botswana government, both across sectors and over
time. The approach may briefly be characterised as a capitalist mineral-led
growth strategy with development planning as a facilitator.12 Although not
all Batswana have equally benefited from the economic growth after
independence, the development strategy has been a success in terms of
macro-economic stability. As the preceding pages have shown, the tas k of
realising the development strategy has been approached step by step by the
political rulers in Botswana. At the same time, however, I will argue, the
major principles underlying thestrategy weredecidedupon in the early
days prior to and soon after independence.
The economyinBotswana has Temained open, both in terms of trade
policy ,and an accommodating attitude towards foreign investors. This
openness was introduced during the colonial period by virtue of the
protectorate' s geo-political position, and institutionalised by the customs
union agreement with South Africa. Botswana' s small domestic market and
meagre production capacity at independence seem to be major reasons why
a more protectionist policy has not been seen as an option. However,
openness should also be looked upon as part of a conscious policy not to
intervene in the private sector. The maintenance of such openness is thus
seen as a political choice by the Botswana rulers.
To facilitate growth of the private sector has been an important
component of the economic strategy through the post-independence period.
This has been repeatedly stated in government documents, and reflected in
the conscious policy to limit the involvement of the state in directly
productive activities. Considering the substantial funds at the disposal of the
government, the presence ofstate"'owned enterprises is strikingly modest,
compared to many other developing countries. The government has carried
through its policy of creating an enabling environment for private
entrepreneurs. Financial support for the private sector has been substantial,
especially in the 1980s. However, it has been argued that the growth of the
private sector might have taken place even without government funding.
Although the rural sec tor to some extent was given attention in the efforts
to diversify the economy, manufacturing growth occurred in the urban
sector. In other words, the development strategy has been more successful
in the urban sector than in rural areas. At the beginning of the 1990s the
government has reiterated that the private sector and market forces will
continue to be the many elements in its development strategy.
12 In his analysis of Botswana's industry policy, Kaplinsky (1991:167) concludes that the
policy has in general remained within the "neo-liberal paradigm" in contras t to the more
interventionist "structuralist" approach.
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The approach to rural development has in general been the same as to the
urban sector. However, less public funds have been spent on the former,
despite the fact that the majority of the population lives in rural areas. The
development efforts have mainly be en directed to provision of social
services and development of physical infrastructure. Individual
entrepreneurs have been assigned the main responsibility for non-farm
employment, and the government has mainly limIted its role to provision
of financial support. The latter has also been the main device in efforts to
modernise non-cattle agriculture. I have shown that this approach has been
ineffective in generating rural development. Lack of employment
opportunitiesin theTuralsectorhas Temainedaproblem" andmodernisatiøfl
of the agricultural sector has been insignificant.
I do not disclaim that the peaceful transfer of power from the colonial
rulers makes it reasonable to believe that the policy of the former mas ters
had a bearing on the "ideological" orientation of the independent
government, and further more, that the budgetary dependence on UK in the
initial years after independence established guiding principles in the
budgetary process which basically remain today. However, the situation
changed significantly when Botswana attained financial independence in the
early 1970s, and the economy increasingly became fuelled by revenues
from the mIneral sector. The current strategy should be looked upon as a
deliberate choice of the BDP government which has remained in power
continuously after independence. Although Botswana has pursued a
coherent strategy, flexibility and gradualism have characterised the choice
of economIc policies. Pragmatism in terms of adjusting policiesand
priorities to objective conditions has apparently been one hallmark of
realism found in Botswana' s policy choices. However, pragmatism may
alternatively be seen as adjusting policies and priorities to political
concerns. This does not imply that the overall principles of an economIc
strategy will be ignored, but may, for example, alter somewhat the ordering
of priorities in certain conjunctions. For instance,. the sudden increase in
spending on infrastructure and sncial services' in the rural are as in 1974 was
no doubt related to the general election in the very same year. The
introduction of a financial support scheme to small-scale enterprises in the
early 1980s may furthermore be seen as primarilya political response. The
substantial transfers to arable agriculture prior to the 1989 election
constitutes another example of political pragmatism. As Picard (1987) and
Parson (1984) argue, the policy towards the cattle sector has largelybeen
ane of accommodating economIc elites in Botswana society. It is reasonable
to believe that political concerns have somehow been intervening factors in
several other development activities undertaken by the government.
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However, the relative coherence of the development strategy suggests that
the political dimension has not been too dominant, and less present in some
central aspects of the development strategy than in others. The unequal
distribution of income may be related to the influence of economic elites,
as demonstrated, for example, by the favouring of cattle owners. Moreover,
the persistence of rural poverty and unemployment seems to support
Lipton's (1978) assertion that these issues have not been at the forefront of
the political agenda. Achievements in termsof provision of social services
and development of infrastructure may also attest to the governmenthaving
been successful in creating "political acquiescence" (Picard 1987:232).
However, itis,still'feasonable to expect that tensions mustexist belowthe
surface. Lipton (1978) forecasted that an increased level ofurbanisation and
literacy in the wake of economic development would create a growing
awareness of structural deficiencies. The government has, however, recently
signalled that any direct assault on the poverty problem is not to be
expected. The revised Income Policy and the current development plan
demonstrate that the government intends in the future to further limit its
intervention in the economy. It has been said explicitly that policies on
social welfare will come second to facilitating productive activities (RoB
1990b: 16).
The Botswana government has given much attention to macro economic
management, which is an important aspect of development planning. It was
shown above that a major objective in the planning efforts has been to keep
the growth of expenditures within the growth of revenues. The achievement
of this objective in general, coupled with sound macro economic
management, suggests that the planning exercise is less influenced by short-.
term political intervention. Botswana has succeeded with its efforts to apply
development planning as a tool within the context of a capitalist economy.
A technocratic approach seems partly to lie behind development planning.
On the other hand, the essence of development planning is allocation of
funds, and the possibility of political interference has to be kept in mind.
For example, the ARAP programme was prolonged partly for political
reasons. However, this move was accompanied by growing revenues from
mineral exports, and it was subsequently demonstrated that the government
was highly efficient in terminating these generous subsidies. The
government demonstrated such a strength also in the early 1980s when
public spending effectively was reduced as a response to falling revenues.
A kind of dualism appears to be present in Botswana decision-making. On
the one hand, policy choices are to some extent led by political concerns.
Technocratic assessments, on the other hand, are seemingly given due
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attention as well, and these keep policy choices and the volume of public
spending within the confines of macro-economic objectives.
The Botswana government and its economic strategy has been unable to
effectively tackle the problem of rural poverty and insufficient employment
opportunities. This may reflect a lack of capacity in devoting attention to
the multiplicity of development needspresent in the post - independence
period. As policy documents (i.e. the development plans) reveal that the
government is aware of the problems, one may ask why it has not
responded more effectively. A reluctance of the political rulers to let the
public sector become directly involved in productive activities seems to be
one explanation.Asociety-centredapproach might, for example, fUvther
reveal that the power of rural economic elites works against structural
reforms needed for rural development. The political power of such elites
may thus be an obstacle to rural development (Picard 1987). On the other
hand, although the chosen development strategy deliberately limits the
direct participation of the state in the development process, one may argue
that more effective policies might be chosen, even within this framework.
As Kaplinsky( 1991) has argued, government assistance beyond financial
support is needed to mobilise indigenous entrepreneurs. Marketing,
administrative assistance, and technological development are mentioned as
issues whereby the state may further fostereconomic diversification.
Mechanisms in the policy-making structure may hinder feasible
approaches for rural development to evolve. One shortcoming seems linked
to the administrative framework and the division of tasks among the
ministries (Lipton 1978). The planning process at large may also become
a factor which stultifies the approach towards development. As Faaland..
(1982: 13) warns, development planning may become an "exercise in
extrapolation." The abundance of financial resourcesrepresents a particular
challenge to the Batswana policy-makers, compared to the situation in
poorer countries. Faaland argues that an "imaginative" approach is needed.
Rural underdevelopment may thus be related to a conservative nature of
governance in Botswana.
As the presentation of the National Development Plans regularly brings
the continuous planning process to the surface, the development plan may
be looked upon as an important "institution" in the political system. The
plans are debated and approved by the National Assembly. The presentation
of the plans to the public exposes the government to scrutiny. In other
words, the plans may be seen as a mechanism for making the political
rulers accountable to their constituents. These issues figure prominently
when the role of elected politicians in economic policy-making is discussed
in the subsequent chapters.
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4. The Botswana state: A special case?
The advantageous financial situation of the Botswana state has provided a
policy instrument not available to most other African states. However, the
utilisation of such an advantage requires a commtted government and an
effective administrative apparatus. Jf wrongly used, the diamond wealth
might have generated both political and economic instability. It was in the
preceding chapter revealed that the Botswana government has been far
more successful in its contribution to economic development than most
other African countries. As elaborated in chapter 2, the relationship between
the state and society, the availability of policy instruments, and
organisational factors are important determinants for the development
strength of a state. The state-society aspect of Botswana politics will be
analysed in the subsequent chapters, but I will here briefly introduce some
particular features of the Botswana state.
It was argued in chapter 2 that the patron-client dimension within the
"African state" has been detrimental for economic development. A political
rationale obliging political rulers to distribute patronage in exchange for
political support is one important raison d' etre for patrimonialism. It may
beargued that patron-client relationships between the political rulers and
the population in Botswana are present as well. Examples were given above
on how allocation of public funds may have a political motive. However,
this type of public spending is fundamentally different from that undertaken
in other African countries. The level of public spending is controlled by the
budget process, and exposed to public scrutiny. Patron age is usually
distributed in the form of development programmes (i.e. provision of public
services ), or subsidies distributed openly and subject to formal criteria.
Although the public sector is large in Botswana, this has not been related
to a political rationale of making means for social control available to the
political rulers. The bureaucracy has grown mainly because of functional
needs, not because the political rulers needed j obs (patronage ) to distribute.
Although the activities of the government have been constrained by
shortage of skilled manpower (Harvey & Lewis 1990:217), this limitation
has not led to expansive staffing of unqualified personneL. The growth of
the bureaucracy has been modest. The deliberate decision to keep the
number of parastatals low further demonstrates that the political rulers have
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not felt a need to expand the public sector out of a need to "buy" political
support.
Constraints put on the private sector, e.g. a rigid licensing system, may
be seen as part of a patron-client order. In Botswana the government has
consciously pursued an accommodating policy towards the private sector,
and has repeatedly stated that it will avoid unnecessary regulations (e.g.
RoB 1982b:10 & 1990c:13). In other words, the Botswana government has
neither used regulations and licences to constrain the development of a
pri vate sector which might challenge its dominance, nor to make patronage
available. The development of the private sector has probably been an
important reason why the decay of the state as an institution in other
African countries has not been paralleled in Botswana. The state has been
an important employer, and an important avenue for the career of the
individual educated Motswana. However, the recent problems concerning
an exodus of skilled personneI from public institutions to better paid
employment in the private sector demonstrate that the state is not the only
road to personal prosperity . Cattle Tearing has since independence been a
major source of personal wealth. The involvement of both civil servants and
politicians in this activity seems to be a major reason why the development
of the livestock sector has been given so much attention by the government
(Picard 1987). This demonstrates a pattern contrary to many other African
countries, where a deteriorating agricultural sector has reinforced the
important ro le of the state as a source of personal prosperity .
Anecdotal evidence gathered during my fieldwork suggests that the
Batswana politicians and civil servants take advantage of their positions to
promote their own or associates' activities outside the public sphere.
However, the extent of such activities seemingly does not represent a
penetration of state institutions to the extent found in other African
countries. Corruption, in terms of the need to pay bribes for public services,
licences, permits etc., does not seem to be widespread, and is not an
obstacle to the development of the private sector. However, misuse of the
position as civil servant or politician is not totally absent in Botswana. The
government allowed in 1982 public officers to participate in private sector
activities (RoB 1982b: 15). This has apparently opened up for the possibility
of individual public servants, as well as politicians, benefiting from
exclusive access to information conceming his/her specific activity; they
can thus influence relevant decisions (e.g. provision of licences, appraising
of tenders, and deciding government regulated prices on certain goods).
Although it was also decided in 1982 that both public officers and ministers
should register their economic interests (RoB 1982b: 16), the government
has apparently not yet made any efforts to make such activities subject to
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public scrutiny. When I presented this issue to MPs, the response was
ambivalent; some feared that corruption might become a more serious
problem and called for more openness, others clearly expressed that private
sector involvement "has to be looked upon as a private matter."
In December 1991 a commssion of inquiry presented President MasIre
with a report dealing with allegations of non-legal transfers of land in the
outskirts of the capital (RoB 1992).13 In the wake of the report it was
revealed that the Vice-President and one minister had taken advantage of
their positions to acquire land by overriding local authorities, and one
minister allegedly had been involved in corruption concerning tenders
(Mmegi 6-12 March 1992). Consequently, the three cabinet members had
to resign. The affair confirms that corruption and/or exploitation of one' s
position as politician or public official has become a problem in Botswana.
However, the decision to make a commission of inquiry investigate the
irregularities, the publication of the report, and the handling of the affair by
the president suggest that the political rulers have become attentive to the
problem, and are prepared to take drastic steps against it.
Despite the irregularities discussed above, Charlton (1991) seems to be
right in characterising the public administration in Botswana as a
bureaucracy in a Weberian sense. Gulhati (1990a:29) claims that the policy
makers in Botswana feel a "strong commitment to rational decision-
making." Recruitment into the civil service is based to a large ex tent on
merit rather than personal connections. Salaries and promotions are
regulated by defined guidelines. The authority to employ and promote is
centralised in the Directorate of PersonneI and the Manpower Planning Unit
in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (Raphaeli et aL.
1984:69). The budgetary process is regulated by the Finance and Audit Act,
and practice demonstrates that formal procedure is adhered to (Raphaeli et
aL. 1984:3). The transfer of public funds to the private sector, i.e. through
development programmes like the F AP and ARAP schemes, is mainly
based on formal criteria and not arbitrarily distributed in accordance with
personal connections and/or bribery.
Institutional coherence was above pointed to as an important factor for
government efficiency and capacity to insulate itself from societal pressures.
Several scholars emphasise the core-position of the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning (MFDP) in the Botswana bureaucracy. As Colclough
and McCarthy (1980:91) write: "the sectoral executive ministries found that
they could exercise little initiative without (the MFDPs) approval." The
13 A similar report concerning politicians taking advantage of their position to benefit from
a development programme was presented in 1980 (RoB 1980b).
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authors further claim that the ministry is allotted the best qualified staff.
According to Gasper (1990:230), only the Ministry of Agriculture manages
to achieve a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the MFDP. The present
strength of the MFDP is not only reflected in the organisational set-up; the
fact that Quett Masire after independence both headed the MFD P and
served as Vice President, has apparently also caused the MFDP to develop
as a stronghold in the bureaucracy. After becoming president in 1980,
Masire has been in the position to mitigate any conflicts emerging between
the line ministries and his former bastion. In chapters 6 and 7 I will pursue
the argument further that the MFDP constitutesa powerful core in policy-
making.
A general problem of policy-making in African countries, according to
Gulhati (1990a/), seems to be that the process is confined to a narow
circle, often dominated by an autocratic powerholder, and civil servants
being subject to arbitrary political rule. In Botswana, Gulhati (1990a:29)
claims that the policy circle is "much more institutionalised", and
confidence and consultation are key elements in the relationship between
the politicians and the bureaucrats. The bureaucracy has by various authors
been characterised as a powerful actor in Botswana policy-making (Børhaug
1992a; Gunderson 1970; Picard 1987). However, Gasper (1990:228) under-
scores that: "The right to dispose remains with the politicians. They
override the civil servants when they feel fundamental political or economic
interests are at stake." It was demonstrated above that a political dimension
has been overtly present in several policy initiatives. When discussing
policy-making processes more specifically in chapters 6 and 7, I will thus
assuinethat,' although thebureaucracy ispowerful, the ministersare 'capable"
of exercising politicalleadership. An important question to discuss is to
what extent politicians in the legislature provide input to the policy-making,
and how the politicians are able to control or make the bureaucrats
accountable.
One dimension which apparently acts as a bridge between the political
and administrative spheres is the sharing of economic interests by the
political and bureaucratic elites. Both politicians and civil servants have
been involved in the livestock sector, and both groups are increasingly
participating in economic activities in the modern, predominantly urban,
sector. The harmonious relationship between the political and bureaucratic
elite may further be explained by the fact that many politicians have
formerly been employed in the civil service. My own research revealed that
at least twelve of the sixteen cabinet members in 1991 had prior experience
as civil servants, and in addition six of the twenty non-cabinet MPs of the
ruling party had such experience.
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What may explain this alleged balance between political leadership and
administrative efficiency? I have already argued that the development of the
private sector as an alternative path of personal prosperity partly explains
why the Botswana state has not fallen into decay. I will here briefly present
some preliminary explanations for the healthy administrative structure.
These, together with the observations made above, should be looked upon
as assumptions underpinning the further analysis.
The transfer to independence in Botswana was a peacefulprocess. As
revealed in the preceding chapter, modest promises about the future were
made in the politicalprogramme of thepoliticianswho gainedpoweriRthe
1960s. The initial development plans presented to the public demonstrated
that Seretse Khama' s government did not encourage unrealistic
expectations. The government stated from the outset that the private sector
was assigned an important role in employment creation. Morrison seems to
be right in relating the roles assumed by the public and the private sectors
to the configuration of political and economic elites dominating the
independence process. The situation, he writes (1987:xii), was characterised
by "an accomodationist form of elite politics which bridged public and
private spheres...".
It was argued in chapter 2 that the administrative structures inherited
from the colonial rulers in several respects were ineffective as instruments
for development, and disproportionately large compared to society-centred
forces, which might have countervailed their dominance. The private sector
seems to have represented such a balancing force in Botswana. However,
the administrativeinheritance from the protectorate period was also
different in Botswana as compared to other former colonies. The colonial
neglect and insignificant physical presence did imply less administrative
development (Harvey & Lewis 1990). The administrative centre of the
protectorate had been located in South Africa, and consequently,
colonialism, in terms of physical presence, had less direct bearing on the
society in general, and put less leverage on the institutions of the post-
independent state; as Harvey and Lewis write (1990:26):
The colonial attitudes, the hierarchies based on status in the civil service,
the large residences for senior officials, the bands of government clerks
who lorded it over their fellow citizens whom they were supposed to
serve - these residual effects of a colonial era were also absent in
Botswana, as was any tradition of government intervention in the
economy.
The absence of a large corps of expatriate colonial administrators seems
partly to explain an accommodating attitude to foreign advisors after
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independence. The shortage of educated Batswana required the government
to employ foreigners in key positions. Batswana civil servantsfilledonly
one-fourth of the senior posts in 1966, but the share had increased to three-
fourths by the early 1980s (Raphaeli et aL. 1984:5). However, Gulhati
(1990:30) still claims that the continued presence of expatriates in the civil-
service has strengthened the policy process. Isaksen (1981) argues that
expatriate influence has been substantial, especially in the MFDP and its
associate, the Bank of Botswana. Although the expatriates contribute to
efficient decision making, their presence may have dysfunctional effects as
well. The differences in salaries between the local and expatriate civil
servants have, for example, led to pressures from the former group(see
section 3.5). Isaksen (1981:37) claims that the presence of expatriates in
keypositions has fostered a conservative attitude to public spending. The
fact that the individual expatriate is engaged for only a brief period (two to
four years), and the imperative to leave Botswana with a good testimony,
makes the expatriate avoid risks and "experimentative development
policies."
* * *
I have argued above that the achievements of the Botswana government
reflect a strong state compared to its counterparts in many other African
countries. Three preliminary explanations for this strength have so far
emerged:
(a) The substantial financial means avaIlable representsa policy instrument
usually absent in other developing countries.
(b) Botswana has a far more effective bureaucracy, adherent to rational
policy-making, than most other African states.
(c) Patron-client relationships which may penetrate the institutions of the
state, and thus frustrate effective policy-making and implementation,
have not become a major problem in Botswana.
An argument to be elaborated in the subsequent chapters is that the strength
of the Botswana state is partly explained by low pressure from the
opposition, the legislature in general and a weak civil society, which thus
facilitate insulation of the key policy-makers found in the institutions of the
government.
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A discussion about the political development in Botswana and the
strength of civil society will be presented in the next chapter. I will
especially focus on the role of the elections, explanations for the party
preferences of the voters, and the position of the opposition. In other words,
the emphasis will be on what kind of mandate the politicians are given
when elected. In chapter 6 and 7 I will address the issues of how able the
politicians are to influence the policy-making through the National
Assembly, and to what extent organised interests groups are given access
to the decision-making arena.
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5. Parties, elections and civil society
It was concluded in chapter 3 that continuity characterises the economIc
development strategy pursued in Botswana after independence. This seems
to reflect ahighlevel of politicalstability in the post-independence period.
In this chapter I will discuss the political development which has taken
place after the democratic institutions were introduced in the 1960s. The
main attention will be given to politics at the nationallevel and the
evolution and functioning of the party system. The role of organised
economIc interest groups and the media will also be discussed. Underlying
the discussion is a belief that an analysis of the political development may
somehow uncover the capabilities of society-centred forces, and what kind
of expectations the constituents hold about their elected representatives.
One important question should be asked: does the outcome of the elections
reflect genuine support for the development strategy of the government? In
other words, do legal-rational principles prevail or is legitimacy still based
on "traditionalism" and stability reliant on the authority exercised by the
chiefs and headmen ?
5.1 The emergence of a party system
Holm and Molutsi (i 990a) argue that the majority of the Batswana were on
the eve of independence unprepared for liberal democracy. The traditional
decision-making forum, the kgotla, did not represent any genuine
democratic tradition. This institution was mainly a vehicle to mobilise
public support for decisions already made by the community' s political
elite. Women, younger males, and mInority groups were left outside the
kgotla discussions, and if there was any opposition, it was bound to be
cautious. Ngcongco (1989), on the other hand, underscores the democratic
nature of the traditional Tswana polity. Leaving this debate aside, at least
it seems correct to say that the political system embracing parties and
elections which was adopted immediately before independence in 1966
introduced novel institutional mechanisms upon which to base legitimacy
and authority.
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As outline d in the chapter l, nationalism and the struggle for
independence did not surface in Bechuanaland until the late 1950s. The first
political party to emerge was the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party
(BPFP), founded in 1959. However, the BPFP was never able to mobilise
any large number of Batswana, and vanished in 1962, after an unsuccessful
attempt the previous year to rename itself "the Liberal Party". 14
The first party which led to any political mobilisation was the
Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP), founded in 1960. The founders of the
BPP have been described as well educated and having experience from the
nationalist movements in South Africa: the African National Congress
(ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The BPP found support
mainly in the most urban areas, FrancIstown and Lobatse.15
One reason why the BPP did not receive any major support in the rural
areas was the absence of links to the traditional power structure (i.e. the
chiefs and their headmen). However, as emphasised by Nengwekhulu
(1979), the "radical" policies expressed by the BPP frightened the colonial
administration and the local white population. There have been claims that
the colonial rulers put pressure on the chiefs to suppress BPP activity in the
rural areas, where the majority of the population lived. Nengwekhulu
further relates the lack of support to a general low leve! of political
consciousness of the peasant community. By 1964 the BPP had become
fragmented into three factions, each associated with the three founders of
the party: BPP (Motsetse), BPP(Matante) and BPP(Mpho). The latter
forme d that same year the Bechuanaland Independence Party (BIP). The
major reason for this division is.unclear, but a combination of three factors
seems to have. beendecisive: personality clashes,'accusationOfl
embezzlement of party funds and property, and the transfer of the conflict
between the ANC and the P AC in South Africa to Botswana politics.
The Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP), which has gained a
dominant role in Botswana politics, was formed in 1962. Various scholars
seem to agree that the initial success of Seretse Khama and theBDP was
ensured by the support of four influential groups: traditional authorities, the
educated elite, large cattle owners (including European settlers), and the
colonial administration. Both Nengwekhulu (1979) and Picard (1987)
14 Background information for this historical outline has mainly been found in Gunderson
1970; Holm 1988; Nengwekhulu 1979; Parson 1990; Picard 1987; Polhemus 1983; Tlou
& Campbell 1984.
15 The present capital, Gaborone, was in the early 1960s stil only a vilage (see table 3.1
in chapter 3).
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attribute the arrival of the BDP partly as a reaction to the initial success of
the BPP. The radicalism, Pan-Africanism and links to the ANC and the
p AC were perceived as something "alien" , not only by the chiefs and the
colonialists, but also by a segment of the Bechuanaland establishment,
which was represented in political bodies established by the colonial rulers;
i.e. the African Advisory Council and the Legislative CounciL. The latter
should especially be noted because the position of the BDP founders iuthe
pre~independence political. institutions is. an. importantpremise for the
"administrative state" thesis put forward by Gunderson (1970:277), an issue
. to whichlwill Teturn inchapter 6 and 7. Briefly, it issuggested that the
support given by the colonial administration to the BDP seLa .pattenli,for
administrative-party cooperation in Bechuanaland and later in Botswana.
Gunderson argues that the colonial administration in the years prior to
independence had started to encourage the more modemist minded
segments of the African establishment, the "new men" (Gunderson
1970:273):16
...it seems that from this point the eolonial administration had tumed away
notonly from the ehiefs but also from the Europeans. It had been with
those two elements which the eolonial administration sought to eooperate
during the eolonial era. But as self-govemment and independenee beeame
possibilities the British east their lot with the non-traditional oriented
Afrieans who were also oriented towards British values and who forrned
the nucleus of the African element on the Legislative CounciL.
The "new men" werea group in society constituted by citizens whowere,
anti-traditional, in the sense that they wanted to reduce the power of the
chiefs, and anti-colonial, although they represented a more cooperative
attitude towards the British colonial rulers than the pan-Africanism
expressed by the BPP.
In 1963 the transition to independence had gained momentum with a
conference and an announcement by the colonial rulers that intern al self-
government would be granted in 1965, and that a Legislative Assembly
should beestablished. The new Assembly was to be constituted by thirty-
two members elected from single-member constituencies, four nominated
members, and two government officials. No special arrangements were
made for the European citizens, and the chiefs were "relegated" to a House
of Chiefs with power only related to issues of tribal concern. The BDP
16 It should be noted that Gunderson (1970) assoeiates this term with the BDP founders,
while Picard (1987) relates it generally to the emerging group of more educated citizens,
and those working at the clerical-Ievel of the colonial adrnnistration.
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captured 81 per cent of the votes and twenty-eight of the seats in the
election held in 1965, while the BPP gained three seats.17 Although they
received 4.6 per cent of the votes, the BIP gained no seats (Gunderson
1970:278). The BDP formed after the election the first indigenous
government, with Seretse Khama as its Prime Minister.
Various factors explain the overwhelming support for the BDP. In
addition to the backing from the colonial rulers and other influential groups,
the loyalty to Seretse Khama from the majority of the population living in
the rural are as has been emphasised. The controversy caused by Seretse
Khama's marriage to a British woman seemsto have generatedsupport for
the BDP leaderthroughoutBechuanaland (see chapter 1). Although KhaIla
renounced his claims to the chieftaincy of thelargest tribe in Bechuanaland,
bothat his return from six years of forced exile in 1956, and again in 1963,
he continued to hold traditional legitimacy. Gunderson even claims that
"the peasants were told that a vote for Khama was a vote to recognize him
as chief of all the Tswana" (1970:347). Picard (1987) further argues that the
favouring of the BDP by the colonial administrators was demonstrated in
the election campaign in 1965. All parties but the BDP were closely
watched by the colonial administrators, and Picard claims that the chiefs
were directly advised to support the BDP.
The role of the traditional power structure, especially the position of the
chiefs, has been an important dimension in Botswana politics both
throughout the colonial period, during the transition, and remains today a
factor of concern for the central government (Gunderson 1970; Molutsi &
Tsie, n.d.; Parson 1990). The BDP's initial success could partly be ascribed
to the support from thechiefs;if not active cooperation - at leasttheir.
nominal endorsement at the election. The relationship between the BDP
rulers and the chiefs may be seen as a paradox. The BDP rulers recognised
that the majority of the rural population, the peasants, remained voluntarily
obedient to the chiefs, and the BDP was thus dependent on the support
from these. They introduced, on the other hand, measures to neutralise the
power traditionally exercised by the chiefs.Gunderson (1970:286)
emphasises especially the necessity to eliminate the chiefs' power "to
compete for authority to allocate resources..." At the nationallevel the
chiefs were delegated only "symbolic" power in the House of Chiefs. At
the local level their power became subject to the constitution, and various
institutional arrangements were introduced to take care of the tasks formerly
17 Two factions of the BPP had put forward candidates in this eIeetion. The Matante faction
won all three representatives, while the Motsetse affiliates obtained only 377 votes
(Wiseman 1990:table 4-1).
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undertaken by the chiefs and their headmen. The instalment of District
Councils, with the majority of the members elected, took away most of the
formal decision-making power of the chiefs and the kgotlas. The Councils
were assigned tasks which earlier were responsibilities of the chiefs, e.g.
primary schools, maintenance of public water supplies, rural roads,
licensing private businesses, and assisting in the implementation of various
development projects (Holm 1988). The chiefs' traditional rights to allocate
tribal lands were transferred to local Land Boards, which were supervised
by the central government. The system of District Commssioners
introduced. during the colonial period was maintained, with the
Commssioner to serve as the "field link" between the central government
and the District Council, and as a supervisor of the activities of the chiefs
(Gunderson 1970).
Although the chiefs initially and during the post-colonial period have
expressed dissatisfaction with their "relegated" position, they seem quietly
to have accepted the changes. However, Picard (1987:151) claims that the
chiefs have retained an important position at the district level:
With party branches and District Councils not yet viableas localorgans
of influence, the traditional authorities as a potential political opposition
group remain a potent, if stil muted, force to be reckoned with. It is
easier to strip the chiefs of their power than to deprive them of their
influence.
After independence was attainedin 1966, the cabinet and the representative
assembly eIeetedin 1965 continued until a newelection was held in 1969.
The new constitution abolIshed the Prime Minister post and Seretse Khama
now assumed the title of President. A new party, the Botswana National
Front (BNF), contested seats in the 1969 election. Various authors have
claimed that the formation of the BNF was an attempt to reconcile the
opposition parties: the BIP and the different factions within the BPP
(Nengwekhulu 1979; Parson 1990; Picard 1987). One of the main
prornoters of the party, Dr. Kenneth Koma, had prior to the 1965 election
unsuccessfully tried to mediate between the opposing divisions. Discussions
about forming a united front took place soon after the election, but the
leadership of the opposition parties (the BPP and the BIP) were not
enthusiastic about the idea (Parson 1990). The BNF which materialised in
October 1965 thus became no umbrella for the opposition. Consequently,
the party ended up in the 1969 election competing for seats with the BIP
or the BPP, or both, in several constituencies. These three opposition
parties have until today remained separate (see table 5.1).
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By its socialist rhetoric, the BNF clearly defined itself to the left of the
BDP. The party strongly criticised the BDP rulers for its "cooperative"
relationship with the former colonial rulers, portraying the BDP government
as "a black pro-colonist government" (BNF 1966: l). It is a paradox that the
BNF entered an alliance with a former chief of one of the major tribes soon
after the founding of the party. Chief Bathoen Il resigned his chieftainship
because he was dissatisfied with the BDP' s policy towards the traditional
authorities, and wanted to participate in politics. Re joined the BNF, and
was even put forward as the party' s presidential candidate. Polhemus
(1983:408) applies the term "a schizoid alliance" to characterise this
relationshipbetween the radicalelements of the party and the formerchi~f;
who to a large extent kept his traditional authority. The BNF went as such
to the polIs in 1969 with a rather opportunistic strategy. According to
Picard (1987:152): "The party's goal was to appeal to the left in the cities
and the right in the rural areas, in effect outflanking the BDP in both
political directions."
Gunderson (1970) describes the socio-economic base of the BNF at the
1969 election as constituted by: urban African labourers, lower leve!
African civil servants, and traditional rulers and rural peasants in Bathoen' s
tribal reserve. Rowever, the main credit for the three seats won by the BNF
in the 1969 election could be ascribed the latter group, as these were gained
by Bathoen and two other BNF candidates in constituencies located in the
ex -chief' stribal home land. This confirms the importance of the chiefs as
"mobilisers" at the elections. There was a power struggle within the BNF
after the election, and Bathoen replaced Dr Koma as the party' s president.
Although some radical elements left the party, Koma maintained an
important position as Vice President (Polhemus 1983). The BNF has today
become the most important opposition party. I will return to a discussion
of the electoral bases of the BDP and the BNF below.
5.2 Elections and parties in the post-independence period
The post-independence period in Botswana has been characterised by a
political stability which is unique compared to all other African states.
Although stable, it is reasonable to expect that some changes of the
political context must have taken place. It is beyond the scope of this study
to discuss changes at the micro leve!, for example to what extent
democratic values have become manifest in the individual Motswana.18
18 Gloriah Somolekae (1989) provides a brief, but well documented analysis on this issue.
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However, a point of departure in more general terms is the supposition that
the regular elections and the continuous participation of opposition parties
demonstrate that a democratie institutional framework (eIeetions, parties, the
legislature etc.), was on its way to becoming consolidated as the 1990s
commenced.
Table 5.1
Election results: Support for the parties in per cent, and seats won
(in brackets)
1969 1974
68.3% 76.6%
(24) (27)
13.5% 11.5 %
(3) (2)
6.0% 4.8%
(1) (1)
12.1 % 6.6%
(3) (2)
PartyÆlection year
Botswana Democratie Party
Botswana National Front
Botswana Independence
Party
Botswana People' s Party
Botswana Progressive
Union
Botswana Freedom Party
Botswana Labour Party
Total no. of votes 76,858 64,011
1979
75.2%
(29)
13.0%
(2)
4.2%
(O)
7.4%
(1)
134,496
1989
64.8%
(31)
27.0%
(3)
2.4%
(O)
4.3%
(O)
0.9%
(O)
0.5%
(O)
0.02%
(O)
227,032 250,487
1984*
67.9%
(28)
20.6%
(5)
3.2%
(O)
6.6%
(1)
1.3%
(O)
* Figures adjusted for the results of the by-election in Gaborone South
Source: Figures compiled from the reports on the general elections of 1969, 1974, 1979,
1984 and 1989, reported by the supervisor of the elections to the Minister of Presidential
Affairs and Public Administration; revised figures after the by-election in 1984 compiled
from Keesing's 1985:33444.
The death of Seretse Khama in 1980 and the subsequent peaceful
succession of Quett Masire to the presidency and his reelection in 1984
demonstrate, according to Parson (1990), that legal-rational principles have
gained importanee in Botswana polities. Parson does not deny that the
chiefs and the tribal administration still are important agents for mobilising
support for the different parties in the rural areas. But Masire is
characterised as a "less imposing personality and brings to the presidency
none of the traditional status which may have contributed to Seretse
Khama's authority" (1990:133). Examples of voting support which cannot
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be explained by ethnic identifications lead Parson to argue that one has to
look for multiple factors to explain respect for the politi c al order and
support for the parties. The outcome of the economic changes, and the
recognition by the population that the system has "worked" , is an important
factor put forward by Parson to explain the legitimacy of the political
system.
Botswana has, according to Holm (1989), gone far towards achieving
equality in voting; i.e. there is a general right for persons over the age of
twenty-one to vote, there are polling stations within acceptable distance,
and the elections are held on Saturdays when most formal sector employees
do notwork. However,Holm (1987: 127) has alsomentioned some
shortcomings: the differences in size of the constituencies discriminate
against the urban voters; there is no provision for absentee ballot and the
estimated eight per cent of the population working abroad (mainly in South
Africa) are thus excluded from the elections unless they travel home;
finally, the requirement of voters to get registered prior to the elections, and
the exclusion of persons between the age of 18 and 21, are obstacles to
raise participation at the elections. In addition to the constraints facing the
voters, discussed above, the freedom to participate as a candidate is under
certain restrictions regarding eligibility:
(1) The chiefs are excluded from political participation outside the House
of Chiefs.
(2) Members of parliament are required to be able to speak and write
English.
(3) Tswana political culture excludes de facto females from political
participation.
(4) Government employees (civil servants, teachers, employees of some
parastatals etc.) are not allowed to activelyparticipate in polities.
Holm (1987) claims that these factors limit those who run for office to a
small segment of the society. Especially the last point is a constraining
factor which favours the ruling party. A large share of the better educated
population in Botswana is working in the public sector. The political parties
are thus largely dependent on public employees who resign, retire or ask
for temporary leave prior to the elections. Civil servants who retire are,
according to Picard (1987), encouraged to join the BDP and take part in
politics at both the local and national leve!. Holm (1987) claims that the
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risk associated with a defeat in the election is greater for the candidates
from the opposition parties than for those from the BDP, because thelatter
has the backing of the party in power. There are several examples of
defeated BDP candidates being allotted one of the four "specially elected"
seats in the National Assembly.19 Experience from the civil service among
the BDP politicians is striking. My own studies revealed that at least twelve
of the sixteen cabinet members in 1991 had some prior experience as civil
servants, and in addition six of the twenty BDP backbenchers had such
backgrounds.
The legal framework of the election system has in general favoured the
ruling party. Some factors have already been discussed. It is further
generally known that, compared with the proportional representation
system, the plurality system of elections with single-member constituencies
often leads to a higher degree of disproportionality between the share of
received votes and seats won (Lijphart 1984). The elections in Botswana
confirm this assumption. As table 5.1 above reveals, the share of votes
received by the BDP has fallen in every election since 1974. This has,
however, not been reflected in the number of seats won. On the contrary,
the BDP has consolidated its majority in the National Assembly. Although
the BNF increased their share of the votes with seven per cent compared
with the 1984 election, the number of BNF seats decreased in 1989 from
five to three.
The weak position of the opposition cannot be attributed only to the
inherently strong position of the BDP and the election system itself. The
three major opposition parties (the Botswana Independence Party, the
BotswanaPeople's Party and the BNF), have in all elections competed
among themselves for seats in several constituencies. This fragmentation
was exacerbated in the 1984 and 1989 elections with another three min or
parties joining the race. Without this infighting among the opposition
parties, the opposition might have won ten seats instead of six in 1984, and
eight instead of three seats in the 1989 elections.Although far from being
capable of challenging the BDP in terms of governmental power, an
opposition with one- fourth of the parliamentary seats would at least be
more potent in criticising the policies of the government, and perhaps
succeed in influencing public policy-making more than is the case today.
An attempt was made in 1991 to create an umbrella organisation of the
opposition parties, named the People's Progressive Front (PPF). The
19 Same recent examples are the BDP candidates Mmusi and Matlhabapiri who became
"specially eIeeted" MPs, after being defeated by Koma (BNF) in the 1984 and 1989
elections respectively.
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outcome of this process remains uncertain. Personal antagonisms among the
old guards of the parties seem to be the principal obstade. The uncertainty
increased when Daniel Kwele, who had been one of the main prornoters of
the PPF, died in 1991.
To an outsider there seems to be no overt ideological difficulties in
reconciliating the opposition parties. The left-right dimension, if any, in
Botswana politics is often very ambiguous when party programmes,
speeches by the leaders, National Assembly debates and the socio-economIc
background of the leaders and supporters of the various parties are
considered. Personal antagonisms from the 1960s, partly rooted in ethnic
loyalties,seem.tobeonedividingfactor. Ideologyseemstomatter less.
Nengwekhulu (1979) argues that all political parties initially were primarily
focusing on issues related to national independence, and less concerned
with "ideology" per se. Polhemus (1983:402) suggests that it is "more
accurate to speak of variances in ideas and policies than in ideology, for
this implies a measure of systematic thought which is largely absent."
However, Polhemus daims that some differences exist. The BDP has
followed a consistent line of policy with an emphasis on democracy, non-
racialism and a rejection of socialism. Polhemus associates the party with
both conservatism and liberalism. Compared with the other opposition
parties, the Botswana Independent Party seems ideologically to be doser
to the BDP. Polhemus (1983:404), for example, characterises the
relationship between the BIP and the BDP as being without any "deep-
seated conflict".
The Botswana People's Party is regarded by Polhemus (1983) as a party
of politicalopportunism,asitacceptsan economIc systembased on private
property and "profit" as a mechanism in the economy, but at the same time
advocates "socialism". Polhemus daims that the party has made an issue
of challenging the multiracialism which the BDP represents.
The most ideological opposition party is the Botswana National Front
(BN-l). A point of departure for assessments of the BNF ideology has often
been the National Front PamphIet No.l written by Dr. Koma in the mId-
1960s (BNF 1966). This document presents a dass analysis of Botswana
society and outlines a strategy whereby the radical section of the middle
dass should steer towards a socialist state ruled by the proletariat. There
seerns, however, to have been a gap between the rhetoric of the BNF
leaders and theIr political activities in political bodies like Town Councils
and the National Assembly. Although Marxist analysis is found in
pamphIets and in Koma' s speeches, the socialist profile is not always
overtly present in many of the specific BNF proposals. The ethnic
dimension which was brought into the BNF at the 1969 election, by its
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alliance with ex-chief Bathoen, seems to have moderated the initial
radicalism of the party. Polhemus (1983) claims, however, that the BNF has
in general remained to the left of the BDP.
The BNF presented prior to the 1989 election an election manifesto
which was the first thorough updating of the party' sprogramme since the
publishing of Pamphlet No.i.20 This manifesto (BNF 1989) and my
interviews with BNF leaders,suggest that the party is becoming more
pragmatic and "social-,democratic" in its outlook. However, ideological
differences between the BDP and the BNF seem to remain. In an
assessment of the 1989 election programmes of the BDP and theBNF,
Molutsi concludes that: "the two programmes are substantially different in
their approach to the solutions to the issues of economic growth,
unemployment, housing etc..." (Mmegi 6-12 October 1989, p.2). In the
1989 manifesto it is proclaimed that the Botswana state should be more
involved in the economy, although private ownership is recognised. Among
other things, the party advocated a more extensive social security
programme (pensions, health service, housing etc.), and advocated that
(BNF 1989):
...a vigorous policy to harness all the avaIlable surface and underground
water resources shall be launched to facilitate, among other, dam
construction for irrigation (p.12). (And) public-owned enterprises shall be
set up to operate all the essential means of production, communication,
and distribution on the basis that some services and means of production
are too vital to the nation to be left to private hands (p.19).
To what extent these allegedly ideological differences among the parties are
translated into the daily policy-making proeess is ambiguous. Studies of the
elections in 1974 and 1984 revealed no clear differences in the political
attitudes of the various candidates (Cohen 1979; Masale 1985). The most
frequently mentioned issues by the 1974 candidates were: (1) the need for
more educational facilities; (2) rural development (i.e. provision of water
and loans to farmers; and (3) infrastructural development and health
facilities. Cohen (1979:364) observed that, in terms of economic
development, the candidates were basically concerned with the provision
of more "amenities" and that "(iJssues of economic strategy do not seem
to be troubling the candidates." Masale (1985) observed that the candidates
20 In the 1989 manifesto it was announced that a new comprehensive BNF programme was
available. However, such a programme had stil by December 1991 not yet been
presented to the public.
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in the 1984 election were mostly concemed with drought and
unemployment, and was surprised to find, given the prevailing turbulent
situation in the southern African region, that there was a general ignorance
about foreign policy problems. In my analysis in the subsequent chapters
of policy-making processes which have taken place after the 1989 election,
I will more explicitly discuss to what extent any ideological difference is
reflected in the daily policy-making.
I willbelow discuss varioussocio-economic and culturaLexplanations put
forward to explain the preferences of the voters, but first make a comment
on the organisation and electoral strategy of the various parties. It is
reasonable to expect that organisational strength and the amount of
resourcesput into election campaigns do matter at the elections. The ruling
party, the BDP, has both a larger resource base on its own than the other
parties, and in addition access to governmental resources. The latter gives
the BDP, in addition to being favoured by the election system, certainly an
advantage compared to the opposition parties. The activities by the
government politicians, development programmes and travels made by the
politicians from the ruling party may be seen as a continuous "election
campaign" . As discussed in chapter 3, for example, there are several
examples of development programmes being "timed" to generate support
at the elections. The ruling party has privileged access to the government
owned radio station and daily newspaper, unlike the other parties. Picard
(1987) claims that the BDP utilises the local administration, and especially
the District Commssioners, to monitor the activities of the opposition at the
district leve!, and is thus able to respond to grievances when they emerge.
The BDP is the only partywhich has its own national party headquarters
and owns a large office building - from which it acquires funds by renting
out office space to the ministries (Holm 1987).
Considering the initial strength of the BDP it is understandable that the
opposition have been unable to challenge its govemmental power. The
opposition parties have less funds available, and are in general not as well
organised as the BDP. While most smaller opposition parties have distinct
regional bases, the Botswana National Front (BNF) is today present in most
constituencies. The official election reports reveal that BNF candidates
stood for election in all except one constituency in the 1989 election. This
is twice the number of BNF candidates standing in elections in the 1970s.
However, Parson (1986) points out the geographical unevenness of the
party organisation, and its reliance on local organising initiatives and
resources. A candidate survey conducted in 1984 found that the BNF
candidates to a lesser extent felt they got adequate support from their
mother party than did their competitors of the ruling party. The opposition
83
candidates were, for example, required to spend more of their personal
means in the campaign (Parson 1986: table 8 & 9). Unlike parties to the
left of the political spectrum in many Westem European countries, there is
neither any formal cooperation between trade unions and the opposition
parties in Botswana, nor any dose links to any of the private newspapers.
Holm and Molutsi (1990a) argue that it is difficult for the opposition to
carry out a coordinated election campaign because of the differences in the
structure of power in the various constituencies. Factors like the strength
of the BDP and the influence of the chiefs vary among the particular
constituencies, and the opposition has to adapt their strategy to the local
conditions,e;g.accessto the traditional decision-making.forum(the kgotla)
becomes important in a constituency with a strong traditional leader. In the
urban areas the kgotla loses significance and more regular inter-party
campaigning domInates. The BNF was able in spite of the organisational
strength and control of government resources by the BDP, to beat the
government party in the urban constituencies Gaborone South and North,
both in the 1984 and 1989 elections. This supports Parson's (1990)
argument that there must be a number of factors behind the behaviour of
the electorate, some of which I will discuss below.
5.3 Party preferences; what makes the difference?
In isolation, the dass relations of production in Botswana would lead to
a rather different electoral outcome than has been the case from 1965
through 1984. The contradictions, the dass conflicts, . implicit in the
economic process of social reproduction and surplus appropriation should
alone lead to the election of persons drawn from and acting directly in the
interests of the working dasses or it should lead to significant political
strife if this did not happen (Parson 1986:90).
As Parson argues, the outcomes of the elections inBotswana do not directly
reflectthe..$ocio-economIc stratification. of the society. Although the BNF
daims to represent the poor masses, this party has neither emerged from a
"bottom up" process, nor has the party established dose links with the
existing trade unions. In other words, the interests of the poor mas ses do
not seem to be articulated through one distinct opposition party. However,
Parson (1986 & 1990) argues that the contextual features underlying the
first election after independence, compared to the recent elections have
changed. At the time of the 1969 election the traditional institutions had
been challenged by the introduction of new democratic framework, and the
released frictions had generated support for the opposition. In the 1980s,
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however, Parson (1986:56) argues that the supremacy of the central
government was no longer in question, and "c1ass politics" had entered the
political agenda, resulting in that "the politics of perceived inequality rather
than the politics of shared poverty emerged as an issue." Still, a large share
of the poor peasant masses have remained 10yaLto the government party,
the BDP, and continued its support in the elections - why?
As discussed above, ideology does not seem to have gained notable
importance in Botswana politics. This point is supported by a mass survey
(1297 respondents) conducted in 1987 (Somolekae 1989). Somolekae
observed that two-thirds of the respondents were not aware of any
difference between the BDP and the BNF. Although such knowledge was
associated with the educationallevelof the respondents, only 46.2 per cent
of the better educated (post-secondary level) answered that they knew any
differences (1989:83). Only about one-fifth of the respondents c1aimed that
they supported a particular party because of the party' s ideological basis or
policy toward particular issues. The main reasons given for supporting a
party was a general "like" or "dislike" for one party over another, followed
by "issue reasons" (1989:84).
Although President Masire, who replaced Khama seemingly does not
personally command any traditional authority, the "traditional" factor has
apparently remained important. Khama' s death in 1980 has not led to any
noticeable dec1ine in BDP support in the constituencies which belonged to
the former president' s ethnic base, the Bamangwato districts. However,
compared with the 1984 election, the BDP lost in 1989 on average 4.5 per
cent in the share of the votes received in these constituencies (in two
constituencies the share increased). But in fifteen of the constituencies won
by the BDP in the 1989 election, they still received 70 per cent or more of
the votes (Parson 1986:table 19; RoB 1989b).Holm (1988:191) c1aims that
within the two tribal are as where BDP traditionally has found strongest
support "a vote for the BDP is (still) an affirmation of ethnic membership,"
andwith the resulting dominance in nearly half of the constituencies, and
major support in others, it seems justified by the author to conc1ude that
BDP has "an advantage that virtually assures it of governmental contro!."
However, important socio-economic changes have taken place in the post-
independence period. The rapid economic growth has led to diversification
of the socio-economic structure; differences have developed between the rural-
and the urban-sectors, and the distribution of income has continued to be
very uneven. Parson (1986; 1990) argues that the substantial revenues
received by the state after the mineral boom started in the 1970s have
facilitated maintenance of legitimacy beyond mere reliance on the
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traditional power structure. On the other hands, the support for the two
main parties seems increasingly to reflect the socio-economIc differences.
Rural constituencies
The BDP receives in general more support in the rural constituencies than
in the urban ones, while the opposition in general finds support in the latter
(RoB 1984 & 1989b). However, the BNF controlled until the 1989 election
two rural constituencies which both were located in ex-chief Bathoen's
tribal homeland. The ethnic factor is thus also important in explaining the
party preferences of the rural voters, also those behind the oppositionMPs
in the rural areas. It was mentioned earlier that the constituencies have
continued to follow tribal territory boundaries. This has probably been an
important factor in preserving the significance of ethnicity.
A substantial socio-economic inequality has been maintained in the rural
sector, especially in terms of cattle-ownership (see chapter 3). However,
this inequality has in general not made the rural voters turn away from the
BDP. Although the share of BDP votes decreased in most constituencies in
the 1989 election, the party's total number of votes was not reduced, due
to higher turn-out, and its position in the National Assembly was not
challenged. As ten per cent more voters took part in the 1989 election than
in 1984 (table 5.1), it seems to confirm that the elections are perceived as
important by the electorate.
Several factors have been put forward to explain why the rural electorate
has remained loyal to the ruling party. The significance of these factors
seems to vary among the various constituencies, and is affected by the
dynamics of the development process. One should keep in mInd that the
opposition received on average 48.8 per cent of the votes in nearly one-
third of the rural constituencies won by the BDP in the 1989 election
(calculated from RoB 1989b). However, no comprehensive studies have
until now been undertaken to analyse the individual voter' s perceptions.
The explanations put forward by various authors are mostly based on
qualitative judgements. It is thus difficult to present any unambiguous
explanations about the behaviour of the rural electorate in Botswana.
Parson's analysis of the 1984 election is an attempt to combine ecological
data (i.e. age, gender, employment structure and distribution of wealth) and
election results with more "anthropological" findings about the traditional
power structure. Despite some methodological weaknesses, the conclusions
of the analysis seem to have some validity, and they have not been
repudiated in the later literature.
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Parson (1986) presents two important factors to explain the legitimacy of
the BDP in the rural areas. First, there is the interrelationship between the
wealthier strata of the rural population, those holding traditional authority
(i.e chiefs and headmen), and the peasant masses. Second, the increased
standard of liv ing in the rural areas for the majority, materialising through
the development of physical infrastructure and provision of social services
by the government, despite the unequal distribution of wealth, also point in
direction of BDP support.
Various studies support the assumption that the politicians in Botswana
are recruited from the wealthier segments of the society. This observation
applies just as much to the BDP as to opposition politicians, and to
representatives in district or national-leve! political bodies (Cohen 1979;
Datta, n.d.; Holm & Molutsi 1989; Masale 1985).21 Picard (1987:147)
characterises the BDP politicians as follows:
The political system is dominated by (and policy is set in the interest of)
a coalition of wealthy, well-educated, cattle-owning political elites who
are committed to rapid economic growth in the framework of a largely
free enterprise system. This coalition of traditional leaders, teachers, junior
state functionaries, and wealthy farmers was joined by more senior
administrators beginning in the 1970s. Altogether, the members of this
coalition represent educational and economIc characteristics quite unlike
the majority of the population.
Cattle holding and farming have traditionally been the major sources of
wealth in Botswana. However, according to Molutsi (1989) and Datta
(n.d.), thepoliticians are increasingly becoming in volve d in other
commercial activities. Datta, however, observed in her study of the 1989
candidates that cattle rearing and farming were still dominating. Parson
(1986:85) claims that there are mechanisms at work (e.g. patron-client
relationships) between the richer and poorer segments in rural society that
mediate the tensions one might expect to exist between these two groups.
Examples provided by Parson include the arrangement whereby wealthier
cattle holders assist peasants in ploughing,or peasants taking charge of
parts of their stocks (Mafisa). Estimates from the early 1970s revealed that
the large cattle owners let peasants take care of between L O and 20 per cent
of the total national cattle herd (Harvey & Lewis 1990:74). Wage
21 In her analysis of the candidates for the 1989 elections, Kusum Datta (n.d.) conc1udes
that the BDP candidates in general were better off than their BNF counterparts. However
the sample of Datta's analysis comprised 144 BDP candidates and only 22 BNF
candidates. This unevenness in her material inc1ines me to ignore DaUa' s conc1usion.
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employment seems further to constitute a basis for making the poorer
segments adherent to the political preferences of economIc elites. The
inclusion of persons holding traditional authority (i.e chiefs and headmen)
in this interrelationship, further maintain the loyalty of the rural masses to
the ruling party.
In chapter 3 I concluded that the provision of public services and
development of infrastructure in rural areas had an apparent political
motive. The government party has acquired legitimacy by "delivering the
goods". This argument is supported by several authors, i.e. Molutsi (1989a),
Parson (1986 & 1990), Polhemus (1983), and as Holm (1987: 143) writes:
... the rural population in particular has tended to look on elections as a
peaceful means of perpetuating their ethnic solidarIty which the
government reinforces wIth Its distributionist policies.
Substantial resources have been allocated and have contributed to the
development of health and education facilities, roads and access to water.
Although these development efforts have not altere d structural problems
like rural poverty and insufficient employment opportunities, the continuous
support for the BDP in the 1989 election suggests that the provision of
public services and transfer of subsidies really mattered.
All government programmes are certainly not exclusively for the "poor
masses" . Holm (1988) argues that government programmes have made
"bourgeoisie groups" throughout the country support the BDP as well.
Major government programmes have largely benefited the wealthier
farmers; i.e, policy packages like the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP)
or the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme (ARAP) (Børhaug 1992a/;
Picard 1980 & 1987). The Financial Assistance Policy (FAP), introduced
in 1982, has benefited wealthier groups both in the rural and the urban
sector (see chapter 3). One mIght expect that such a bias in government
spending would make the poorer voters turn away from the ruling party. As
mentioned above, patron-client relationships seem to soften some of the
tension one might expect that the unequal distribution of income would
generate. When, apparently , financial assistance to the cattle sector makes
wealthier groups continue to support the ruling party, it seems that such a
bias in government spending even may contribute to conserving the voting
patterns in the rural sector.
Although the explanations of party preferences put forward by Parson
(1986) probably have validity, and seem to fit the core areas of BDP
support, they clarify to a less extent the behaviour of the electorate in the
rural constituencies where the opposition parties obtain a large share of the
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votes. For example, if patronage through public services matters, how was
it possible for the BNF to win the rural constituency Okavango both in
1984 and 1989, while not even putting forward candidates in this
constituency in the earlier elections? One explanation may be that the party
loyalty of tribal leaders changes, another seems to be that the support-
generating effects of public services and development of infrastructure are
changing. Parson himself argues that the development of basic "public
infrastructure" was on its way to being completed in the 1980s. The effects
of government programmes may thus in the future be less significant than
in the first decades after independence (1990: 125):
The impact of establishing for the first time a once a week health clinIc
in a vilage is much greater than increasing the frequency of its opening
to two days a week. The introduction of free primary education and
construction of a large number of primary schools had a greater
qualitative impact than the extension of more universal education to the
junior secondary school leveL...
To sum up; three factors to explain the preferencesof rural voters seem to
be important: (a) ethnicity, (b) patron-client relationships, and (c)
government development programmes. These seem sometimes to be present
in a mutually reinforcing pattern, and may explain the rural strongholds of
the BDP. However, considering the variance in voting patterns among
several rural constituencies, one has to keep in mind that the explanationary
power of each of these factors will vary among the various constituencies.
Urban constituencies
The opposition c1aims Morake (the BDP MP from this constituency) does
not have much to show in Phikwe besides infrastructural development.
The question people are asking in town is 'who wouldn't have buIlt roads,
c1inics, telephones and schools if they were in his position '. People tend
to be more concerned about the general upliftment of their sodal and
economic life.(Mmegi, 6-12 October 1989, p.2)
Although political comments in the press of ten are far from objective, the
quote above seems to touch on an important aspect of the political
development in Botswana - a growing support for the opposition (BNF)
in the urban areas; as demonstrated by the table below:
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Table 5.2
Changes in number of votes for the BDP and the BNF in major
urban constituencies between 1984 and 1989, in per centConstituency/Party BDP BNF
Gaborone South +36.1
Gaborone North + 0.01Francistown + 14.0Selebi-Phikwe -13.3Lobatse/Barolong + 5.4
All constituencies + 5.2
+59.2
+32.2
+174.9
+78.7
+ 3.5
+44.3
Source: Calculated from RoB 1984 & 1989b and Keesing's 1985:33444.
Parson daims that "dass polarisation" has emerged in the urban areas,
and the BNF has to some extent been successful in mobilising support
among the poorer segments (1986:87):
While glaring inequalities also existed in rural areas, in terms of income
from cattle, for example, there the mutual ties binding the rich to those
less well off mediated the perception of differences in standards of living
.... In the urban areas, those in wage labour daily and vividly experienced
the conflict unmeditated by cultural and ideological buffers.
Phikwe is part of.a predominantly.urban constituency called Selebi-Phikwe,
which emerged out of the development of the copper/nickel mines after
independence. The area was a constituency on its own for the first time in
the 1984 election, and was captured by the BDP with 64.5 per cent of the
votes. Holm (1988:192) points at support for the BDP in the 1984 election
to illustrate that ethnicity is also important in explaining the urban voters'
preferences. Most of the workers in Selebi-Phikwe came from the
surrounding Bamangwato area, which is a BDP ethnic stronghold. The
majority therefore allegedly supported the BDP. Holm argues that this
reduces the explanatory power of Parson' sassertion that the BNF has a
"working dass" base in the urban areas. However, the BDP retained its
Selebi-Phikwe seat in 1989 with only 49.5 per cent of the votes. Split-vote
between the BNF and the BPP, with only 170 votes obtained by the latter,
made the opposition lose the constituency. Taking the increasing BNF
support into account, Parson's argument thus seems justified as far as the
1989 election is concerned.
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5.4 The strength of civIl society
The main objective in the following pages is to discuss to what extent
extra-parliamentary groups are present, and potentially able to wield
leverage on policy-making. It is beyond the scope of this study to present
a more theoretical and historical analysis of civil society in Botswana. A
point of departure is, however, that the development of the modern sector
of the Botswana economy is still at an initial stage, and one should keep
in mind that the economic diversification and the development of interest
groups are part of a dynamic process. As stated in chapter 2, one should be
careful about drawing too distinct boundaries around civil society. My
analysis becomes as such inconclusive, in Bayarts (1986) terms, as I am
focusing on the formal associational structure in Botswana: parties,
organised interest groups and the press.
The capabilities of organised interest groups
Holm and Molutsi (1990a) consider the political parties in Botswana as the
most effective "influence groups" outside the state structure, while trade
unions and the pressliave less influence on the policy-makng. The
agricultural sector is, according to Holm (1989), weakly organised. Beyond
some ad hoc attempts to influence particular policy issues, even the wealthy
cattle farmers have no national association representing them. The latter
observation, however, apparently confirms the claims that the interests of
the cattle owners are directly maintained by the politicians in the
government (Picard 1987). There has thus been no need to establish a
powerful farmers' organisation. However, several interest organisations
exist in other sectors of the economy, although this does not necessarily
imply that these are effective in taking care of their members' interests.
Fifteen trade unions were in 1989 registered by the Department of Labour
and Social Security (DLSS), according to its annual report (RoB n.d.).
These included both specialised workers (e.g. Botswana Diamond Sorters
Valuators Union) and numerically larger groups (e.g. Botswana Mining
W orkers Union). An umbrella organisation called the Botswana Federation
of Trade Unions (BFTU), which comprises most of the individual unions,
is also registered by the DLSS. There are also organisations for white-
collar employees, which are not registered by DLSS (e.g. Botswana Civil
Servants Association, Botswana Teachers Union and Botswana Federation
of Secondary School Teachers. Among the latter, especially the civil
servants have in the recent years had some success in raising their salaries.
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The employers seem to be strongly organised in terms of financial
resources available, office facilities and permanent staff (Holm 1989:149).
The Botswana Employers Federation (BEF) is, according to Holm, probably
the most efficient organisation in representing the interests of its
membership vis-à-vis the government. In contrast to the trade unions, the
BEF has access to the offices of ministers and senior civil servants (e.g.
through informal personal connections). The favourable position of the
BEF, together with financial and organisational resources, gives this
organisation a lead compared to the trade unions.
Most of the trade unions are weakly organised, have insufficient
administrative capacity and are poorly funded.Officials in the Department
of Labour and Social Security complained that they had to spend too much
time in mediating grievances between private employers and employees,
mainly because of the weaknesses of the trade unions. One exception is the
Botswana Mining Workers Union (BMWU) which is strongly organised,
both in terms of membership, office facilities and funds. Through their
negotiating capacity and industrial action, the miners may be characterised
as a powerful group; as expressed in one of my interviews: "When the
BMWU initiates a strike, the whole community comes to a standstiU."
However, the majority . of the miners are employed and domiciled in four
mining centres which are located at a distance from the two major towns,
Gaborone and Francistown.22 Compared to other African states where
mining workers constitute a group with political significance (i.e Zambia),
the thirteen thousand miners in Botswana are less important as a political
influence group in national-leve! politics (RoB 1991f:table 8.6). However,
the fact that BMWU is at least holding some power in the relationship with
the mine owners is probably reflected by the wage-Ievel and standard of
living of the miners which both seem to be at an acceptable leveL. Beyond
the mine workers, the umbrella organisation, the Botswana Federation of
Trade Unions, is the best workers' organisation as regards administration
(i.e. full-time staff and an ILO expert), but its representatives c1aim that this
is still insufficient to fulfil their tasks. The c ap ac it y to prepare background
material, make statistical analyses etc. is insufficient, and they are in a
disadvantageous position in negotiations with the better endowed employers
and the government. Not least the administrative deficiency limits
meaningful participation when the BFTU or individual trade unions are
invited by the government to take part in policy-making bodies. One
general obstac1e facing the workers' representatives in such bodies has been
22 These centres include Orapa, Jwaneng, Lethakane and Selebi-Phikwe. The latter, with
its 54 thousand inhabitants, may be looked upon as an urban centre of some importance.
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restrictions promulgated by the Trade Union and Employers' Organizations
IAct) (RoB n.d.), which disallow elected officers to be employed by the
trade unions. Consequently the elected representatives are dependent on the
goodwill of their employers to be able to attend meetings in policy-making
bodies, or those representing the employees have no mandate to make
decisions. Informants representing both employers and workers claimed in
interviews that employers in general avoided employment of workers who
were known to be active trade unionists.
N one of the interest groups have close links to any of the political
parties. Even the blue-collar trade unions have no formal association or
cooperationwith the major opposition party. The BNF, however, claimsto
represent the poorer segments of the population, and Holm (1989: 146)
quotes one BNF leader saying that:
...their party did not need to enlist the support of the trade unions in
political campaigns because the party' sprogramme was clearly the ane
which most appealed to the workers' economic interests.
A BNF leader told me similarly in one of my interviews that the party de
facto controlledthe trade unions. However, from my interviews I got the
impression that there are tensions within the union movement between the
younger and the older generations. The latter group tends to continue to
support the ruling party out of tradition, and the vested legitimacy
established by Seretse Khama, while the younger trade unionists are
becoming more militant and support the BNF in the elections. It is
ambiguous.towhatextent,the.:(trade . unions ,havebecornepoliticised~\\,l\.,
Although the BNF seemingly finds support among the trade union
members, the activities of the trade unions themselves seem primarily to be
focused on issues of immediate concern for the union members, like wage
increases and working conditions. More political questions like income
inequalities or the role of the state in employment creation are less touche d
upon. However, as mentioned in chapter 3 (section 3.5), the decision by the
government in the late 1980s to widen the wage differences within the
public sector did not pass unnoticed by the employees. The strike in
November 1991 may sugge st that the trade unions are becoming more
aware of political issues. The trade union of the manual workers in the
public sector demanded a 154 per cent wage increase. When the
government refused this demand, the manual workers launched a nation-
wide strike, involving perhaps as many as 25,000 workers, and seriously
affecting public institutions (The Gazette, 13 November 1991, p.8). The
trade unions and the government were unable to negotiate on the demands,
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the strike was declared illegal, and a large number of the workers were
fired, although later reinstated. The breakdown of the negotiations
demonstrated an immaturity of both the government and the employees'
organisations in questions concerning labour relations. However, the
assumption that the trade unions are becoming more militant was also
confirmed. The tensions exposed in the street rallies, the difficulties which
the leaders of the manual workers union had in controlling its members,
and the unwillingness to reduce their demands, may sugge st that the wage
claims signified a political protest against the income inequalities.
The annual reports from the Department of Labour and Social Security
reveal that the number of industrial actions increased in the late i 980s.
However, disputes are not always followed by strikes. Negotiations between
private employers, government representatives and employees take place
regularly. Representatives from the trade unions stated that the dramatie
strike in 1991 was a break with the consensus tradition which has existed
between the trade unions and the government. The Department of Labour
and Social Security had until recently been successful in mediating conflicts
between the employers and employees. Communication between
representatives from the BFTU and the government has to some extent been
smooth, usually informal, and has taken place daily. My interviews
confirmed observations made by Holm and Molutsi (1990a:330) that the
trade unions' involvement in policy-making processes is mainly related to
the administrative domain:
From our interviews with all levels of political activists, including interest
group leaders themselves,.. itbecame apparent that the term "politics"
refers only to the activities of the political parties and does not involve
groups influencing government policy. It is generally considered morally
wrong for leaders of interest groups to approach politicians about their
problems, or for the revers e to happen. Rather, interest groups should take
their problems to the civIl servants.
However, Holm (1989) gives examples of cases where backbenchers of the
ruling party take up interests of the Botswana Civil Service Association and
the Botswana Employers Federation. In my own analyses of debates in the
National Assembly I found no reference to particular interest groups, even
when an issue like, for example, minimum wage was debated.23 Holm and
Molutsi (1990a) found that only the employers' organisation (BEF) and an
23 The debates wil be presented in chapter 6 and 7.
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environmental conservation group (KCS) were regularly formulating policy
proposals on their own and attempting to "lobby" government officials.
Bayart (1986: 112) characterises the relationship between the state and
society, in the African con text, as the former seeking to dominate the latter:
Underlying the ideologies of national unit y there is a hegemonic
imperative which drives the (post-colonial) state and the self-proclaimed
dominant sodal groups to seek to control and to shape civil society. The
first task is to define the basis on which others can gain access to the
political system. Most regimes severely restrict such access by preventing
the autonomous and pluralistic organisation of subordinated sodal groups.
Instead, rulers either attempt to integrate the various sodal forces into
single movements or set up intermediary and indirect means of sodal
control.
With some exceptions, Botswana has gone far in respecting civil rights
(Andreassen & Swinehart 1991), and does not as such fit Bayarts
description of the African post-colonial state as "well-policed" (1986:113).
And, as exemplified in this chapter, organisational and financial factors are
more significant in explaining the low level of organised interests and the
weak private press, than direct government control. However, it seems as
if Botswana conforms to Bayart s argument that political control, at least
indirect control, is facilitated by a small population and continuity in the
political leadership (1986: 114):
In countries of fewer than ten, five or even one milion inhabitants, and
where themajorityare politicallyminors- under thirty years old -- a
ruler who has been in power for one or two decades would in all
probability know personally every instance of personal aggrandizement,
whether of wealth or influence.
It was argued earlier that the ruling party has used government development
programmes as a means to neutralise opposition. It is plausible to believe
that Botswana' s small and relatively homogenous population facilitates the
government' s aim to have far reaching knowledge about the problems and
needs in various parts of the country, and consequently, with the help of its
wealth and administrative control, the government can acquire political
stability by non-coercive means. Holm and Molutsi (1990a) claim that the
relationship between the government and organised interests is assuming
some corporatist characteristics. They emphasise, however, that it is not an
objective of the government to create a corporatist state. But the
government apparently attempts to protect itself against interference in the
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policy making. The lack of a group political culture and the shortage of
organising talent are main reasons put forward by Holm and Molutsi to
explain the weakly organised civil society. The ability of the government
to control organised interest groups is therefore characterised as
"corporatism by default" (1990a:329).
However, the government has made some attempts to control the interest
groups. It has been involved in the founding and financing of interest
organisations, and has monitored the activities of these. Various
mechanisms also delimit how such groups may participate in politics. The
latter include both legal constraints and institutionalised practice, and will
be discussed in the next chapter. The trade unions are also to some extent
directly monitored by the government. A representative of the government
is, in accordance with the Trade Union and Employers' Organization Act
(RoB n.d.), entitled to attend meetings of the trade unions, and this is also
practised. It is plausible to believe that this has contributed to keeping the
unions out of politics, or prevented stronger links between the unions and
the opposition party, the BNF, to develop.
It was mentioned above that links exist between the trade unions and the
administrative side of the government. One of the ruling party' s especially
elected MPs in 1991, Gaotlhaetse Matlhabaphiri, was a former trade union
activist, and stated in an interview that he sees it as his main task to
improve the conditions for the population living in the urban areas.
However, representatives from the BFTU claimed in my interviews with
them that the politicians in general are ignorant about labour relations. The
public manual workers' strike in 1991 may suggest that the links between
the government and the trade unions is largely.aone-waYTelationship,with'"
the former obtaining information about the undertakings of the latter,
without necessarily transferring this into the policy-making process.
The media
The question of government control of the media is much debated in
Botswana. The only domestic radio station is owned by the state. The
newspaper Botswana Daily News is also owned by the state, and is the only
newspaper which is published daily. Regularly published private news-
papers did not appear in Botswana until the 1980s. The private newspapers
which are either published weekly or twice-weekly had in 1988 a
circulation of about 33,000 copies a week (Egner & Grant 1989:256). In
comparison, the Daily News is subsidised by the government and
distributed free of charge, with a circulation of 45,000 copies per day in
1989. The Daily News brings brief reports about the outside world,
96
domestic news, and reports the activity of the government and the debates
in the National Assembly. It seldom prints analytical articles about policy
proposals or adopted policies, but sometimes refers in detail to speeches by
the backbenchers, even when the latter criticise the government. Although
the Daily News occasionally makes reference to the opposition, it clearly
has a bias towards covering the activities of the ruling party, not least
during election campaigns. Coverage by the state owned-media of the
nation-wide strike by the manual workers in 1991 was conspicuously
absent. However, Egner and Grant (1989) claim that the competition from
the private press has led to less "self-censorship" of the state owned
newspaper. None of the private newspapers have links to any of the
opposition parties. Political issues are in general given meagre space in the
private press, although one of the newspapers, Mmegi wa Dikgang,
regularly prints critical comments and analyses of political questions of
current interest. Compared to the African continent in general, it seems
right to say that freedom of the press exists. The private press seems to be
more constrained by financial problems than by direct government contro!.
However, some tensions between the private press and the government do
exist. Some foreign journalists have been deported (Egner & Grant 1989).
After its coverage of the manual workers' strike in 1991, the offices of
Mmegi were ransacked by the authorities, allegedly because the newspaper
had published an intern al government document.
Traditional institutions
The kgotla has been a traditional forum in Botswana cornunities where
discussions of issues raised by the traditional leaders (i.e. chiefs and
headmen) have taken place (Ngcogco 1989). The kgotla has persisted as an
institution of some importance in the rural communities; as Holm and
Molutsi write (1990a:331):
The absence of politicized socIal groups in Botswana means that elected
officials must solicit public opinion directly if they are to keep informed
in this regard. For this reason, the kgotla has enjoyed a resurgence as a
medium through which consultation occurs.
Although the traditional kgotla consultation had a democratic dimension,
Holm and Molutsi (1990a) claim that the subjects had to be cautious about
opposing the position of those with authority. Today the government finds
it necessary, according to Holm and Molutsi, to present policies and
prograrnes in this forum. However, its contribution to the policy-making
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process seems to be limited to questions related to the implementation stage
after the most important decisions have been made at the centralleveL. In
the urban areas, a forum called freedom square, introduced after
independence, does to some extent replace the kgotla, although the two
institutions also coexist. Any political group can arrange a freedom square
meeting, which of ten has the form of a political rally. This forum seems to
be especially important during election campaigns. In the rural areas the
chiefs may reveal their political sympathies at freedom square gatherings.
Molutsi and Holm (1990a) claim that these participatory forums are
important sources of political information. On the one hand, the population
gets information about government policies and the political parties. The
government, on the other hand, also receives feedback on how people
perceive new policies, and notes when the opposition obtains public support
on particular policy question. The latter, according to Holm and Molutsi,
has occasionally led the government to modify aspects of a policy or give
priority to certain policy issues. Although Holm and Molutsi do not see the
forums mentioned above as very important in the policy-making process,
they still argue that such forums "may be critical in facilitating
institutionalization of pluralist forms of accountability" (1990a:340).
5.5 Democracy in Botswana: Parliamentary or presidential?
The formal institutional framework in Botswana seems to contain aspects
of both parliamentary and presidential government. Parson (1984:38)
suggeststhatthe:systemmaybecharacterised as.a "parliamentary republic.'':.i'
The parliament in 1991 consisted of 34 elected and 4 specially selected
members of the National Assembly, the Attorney General, and the
President. The President heads the cabinet and chooses the ministers from
the membership of the National Assembly. The Botswana president is thus
both head of the state and the government - as in many presidential
systems.
The institutional set-up also includes the House of Chiefs. Although this
body is incorporated in the law-makingprocess, it has mainly an advisory
role, and should not be looked upon as a second chamber of the parliament.
The task of the House of Chiefs is primarily to debate issues concerning the
tribes (e.g. use of communalland). However, because of its proximity to
other decision-making institutions, it seems wrong to discount totally the
House of Chiefs' ability to exercise leverage on policy-making.
One difference between parliamentary and presidential systems is that the
government in the former is usually elected by the legislature, while
popular election of a president, either directly or through an electoral
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college, is decisive in the latter (Lijphart 1992:3). In Botswana the
nomination and election of the president is rather intricate. In principle, the
constitution prescribes that the president becomes elected after receiving at
least half of the 34 elected MPs' support in the first sitting of the National
Assembly (RoB n.d. art.35). One may thus say' that the president is elected
by the legislature, as in the parliamentary model. On the other hand, to
become a presidential nominee one needs the backing of at least 1,000
voters in the general election. The voters declare their support for a
presidential candidate by giving their vote to the MP candidate who has
declared support for their preference. The constitution does not bind all
parliamentary candidates to declare his or her presidential preference, hut
the way the system has de facto worked after independence, support for a
presidential nominee is reflected by the share of the votes won by his party.
A president may thus be elected directly by receiving support from more
than half of the constituencies before parliament meets. However, a
majority of the elected MPs may in the first sitting of the parliament
announce that the president does not enjoy their support, and subsequently
the legislature may elect another presidential nominee (art.32).
The political system formally resembles the parliamentary model by the
fact that the power of the executive and the legislature is not separated. The
constitution (art.92) assigns the National Assembly power to declare a vote
of no confidence in the government. Jf this happens, the president may
either resign and let the National Assembly elect a new president, or the
president may dissolve the parliament. A new general election must in the
latter case be held. The president may also dissolve parliament if he does
not accept a bill presented to him, and the parliament is unwilling to
compromise (art.87). The power of the parliament in some issues is directly
limited by the constitution, which, for example, hinders the National
Assembly to increase taxes or reallocate public spending beyond what is
decided upon by the executive (art. 88). The extensive power assigned the
executive by the constitution makes Botswana deviate from the ideal
parliamentary model outline d by Lijphart (1992). The position
constitutionally ascribed the president vis-à-vis the cabinet ministers has
further similarities to the presidential model by concentrating much power
in the president (Holm 1988: 187; Parson 1984:40); for example his nearby
unlimited authority concerning use of arme d forces (art.48).
Although it is constitutionally possible for the Botswana parliament to
vote the cabinet out of office, this does not seem to be a real option. In
Botswana, the cabinet members constitute about 40 per cent of the National
Assembly membership; the ruling party has the backing of the great
majority of the voters and the number of opposition MPs has until now
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been insignificant - the possibility to vote the cabinet out of office in
Botswana is symbolic only. The executive has thus an initial strength vis-à-
vis the legislature both constitutionally and in practice. However, the
importanee of the support of the legislature should not only be valued by
the likelihood of being voted out of office. Support shown to the policies
of the government may have symbolic significance for the legitimacy of the
rulers in general, and for the outcome of the elections in the future. The
legislature may as such be seen as a forum where the government mobilises
consent and acceptance for its policies (Norton 1990).
5.6 Concluding remarks
Botswana introduced a new political framework at independence. This was
a democratie system, resembling the institutions found in western
democracies. Today, it seems as if the system is on its way to become
institutionalised. Considering the nature of the party system and the voting
patterns, it is certainly a distinet Botswana type of democracy which has
emerged.Although the decision-making power of.. the chiefs has. been,
substantially .. reduced, the traditional power. structure and institutions . still
matter and seem to have been one contributing factor to the continuous
majority rule by the Botswana Democratie Party (BDP). The support for the
BDP by the peasant mas ses seems partly to be related to patron-client
relationships between the wealthier and poorer segments in the rural
constituencies. The local notables .(i.e. chiefs and headmen) are part of this
framework, and traditional loyalties seems to matter at the elections.
The secure power basis of the ruling party has inaddition been
maintained by several other comparative advantages vis-à-vis the other
parties. The party is supported by the wealthierBatswana, and the party has
thus exclusive access to financial means as well as organisational talent. By
being the party in power, the BDP has access to the administrative network
of the state, and the publicly owned media. These factors make it easier for
the BDP to run efficient electoral campaigns.
The election system disfavours the opposition. The share of votes
obtained is certainly not accurately reflected by the seats won in the
parliament. Split voting, fragmentation, and poor financial and
organisational resources have further weakened the capability of the
opposition to represent the minority of the voters. The weakness of the
opposition seems also to be explained by the fact that the party system has
until recently not reflected functional cleavages (i.e. poor peasants and blue-
collar workers joined economic elites in supporting the ruling party). The
major opposition party, the Botswana National Front, has also been relying
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on ethnic loyalties. In the recent elections, however, it seems like the
support base for the BNF increasingly is found in the poorer urban
population.
Although the opposition rhetorically positions itself to the left, ideology
has not been at the fore in the election campaigns. The BNF had from its
founding dose links with the traditional power structure, and it is dubious
whether the socialist alternative officially propagated by the party has been
genuinely supported by its ethnic power base. Ethnicity seems to be losing
importance, and the younger BNF leaders are about to outline a more
pragmatic social-democratic profile of the party - in line with the
functional interests of the new supporters.
The continuity of the developinent strategy, as outlined in chapter 3,
certainly makes it wrong to condude that ideology has been absent in
Botswana politics. The strategy reflects a moderate ideology of the ruling
party, with preference given to market economy, private ownership and
reluctance to radical changes of the existing economIc structure (e.g. the
use of grazing land), which contribute to socio-economIc inequalities.
However, the support for the BDP cannot be solely explained by ethnic
loyalties and mediating patron-dient relationships. The government has
been successful in distributing the diamond wealth in a mode which has
given some benefits to all. Provision of public services, development of
infrastructure, and drought relief have legitimIsed the rule of the BDP in
the eyes of a great majority. However, as the ethnic factor seemIngly is
losing significance, the populace seems to become less willing to accept
problems like. unemployment, rural poverty and a widening wage gap.
Society-centred forces seem to be in a weak position to articulate
discontent with the existing socio-economIc conditions. The trade union
movement is in general not well organised, and their membership base has
until now been numerically insignificant. This has impeded the trade unions
from becoming a political force of any importance, and has led to the
workers being outmanoeuvred by the government. The press has nor been
able to make the government more open to scrutiny. The organisation of the
employers, however, seems to be capable of exercising leverage on the
government.
As discussed in chapter 2, repressive, non democratic means have been
applied in other fast growing economIes of the developing world to insulate
the policy-makers. The Botswana government has in general respected
human rights and political freedom. However, the political context in
general does not represent a challenge to the insulation of the policy-
makers. Considering the development strategy pursued after independence,
and the fact that politicians are recruited from the wealthier strata of the
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Botswana society, it is reasonable to conclude that the political context has
reinforced the conservative/liberal ideology of the government. In other
words, there seems to be a consensus among the economic elites about the
substance and direction of the development strategy.
The weakness of the opposition is partly related to structural factors like
the small size of the population, and economic diversification still being at
an initial stage. The analysis has, however, demonstrated that political
development is a dynamic process. In their analysis, based on data collected
in the second half of the 1980s, Holm and Molutsi (1990a) observed that
tensions were emerging between the pluralistic tendencies of society and a
government which attempts to control the forces which are released by the
development process. My observations in 1991 confirm that the trade
unions are becoming more vigorous, and the private press at any rate has
not become less vocal in recent years. The opposition party, civil society
associations and the media will in the future probably become more potent
actors. I would still maintain that the political quiescence suggests that the
rule of the BDP has genuine legitimacy among a large share of the
population. It is reasonable to believe that the performance of the elected
politicians contributes . to this legitimacy. In the subsequent chapters I will
look moreclosely at both the rolesof organised interests groups and the
politicians in economic policy-making.
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6. The policy-making proeess I: Defining
the development strategy
In the previous chapter I outlined the political environment surrounding the
policy-making process. The objective in this and the subsequent chapter is
to uncover how procedures and the institutional framework regulate the
ability of society-centred forces to influence the process. In other words, the
question is to what extent the institutional framework facilitates insulation
of the policy-makers. As concluded above, politics in Botswana is neither
focused on ideological matters (e.g. concerning the issue of state
involvement in the economy), nor pluralist in terms of parties reflecting
functional cleavages or the presence of a dynamIc civil society. However,
voterscontinue to vote in elections, and the legislature regularly gathers to
addressIssues like budget matters, laws, economIc policies and the National
Development Plans. It is therefore necessary to analyse more specifically
the activities which take place in the offices and corridors of the mInistries,
and in the chamber of the National Assembly.
The National Development Plan is a cornerstone of the development
efforts of the Botswana government (see chapter 3). It is therefore
reasonabletoex:pect thatan analysisof the preparation of the plan wiRe
illumInate important aspects related to distribution of power and influence
in Botswana politics. To what extent the policy-makers are able to make
autonomous decisions is here a critical question, because the NDP deals
both with the use of public funds and the development strategy to be
pursued in substantive terms. In other words, opposition MPs, backbenchers
of the ruling party and organised interest groups may, the oretic ally , both
seek to influence the allocation of public funds and the economIc strategy
of the government. In this chapter I focus on the policy-making behind the
strategy aspects of the National Development Plan, while allocation of
public funds will be discussed in the next chapter. Before I discuss policy-
making as it takes place today, I will brie fly present some of the
observations made by Gunderson (1970) concerning policy-making in the
initial years after independence. Gunderson' s thesis facilitates a comparison
of policy-making over time, and an assessment to what ex tent the pattern
of policy-making found today may be said to have changed since the early
years after independence.
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6.1 Policy-making in the late 1960s
The new men in the BDP are at the mercy of outside interests, for they
have few material resources, little expertise, and few organizational
talents. (...) The dominant party "rules" Botswana, but it is the expatriate-
controlled bureaucracy which directs policy. (Gunderson 1970:434)
With reference to Weber, Gunderson claimed that the newborn Botswana
state resembled an "administrative state". Briefly, this meant that authority
flowed downwards from the central government to the rural mas ses - the
ruled. Insignificant input and influence flowed in the opposite direction.
Gunderson especially underscores two factors behind this: First, the
introduction of new "western" politi c al institutions and a central
government was paralleled by a decline of local traditional authority.
Second, the majority of the people had neither the understanding and
organisational resources needed for participation in the new institutions, nor
were efforts made by the government to stimulate participation (Gunderson
1970:431). In addition, the author claims that the ruling party utilised its
advantageous position to coopt and neutralise opposition to the government.
As indicated in the quotation above, the "administrative state" was
characterised by politicians being subjected to the bureaucrats. Gunderson
links the power of the senior civil servants to the strong presence of
expatriates in the bureaucracy. The latter phenomenon is related to the lack
of skille d Batswana, and to the financial dependence on the former British
rulers. The reliance on foreign assistance was reinforced by the demands
generated by the emerging mining industry and development of physical
infrastructure. Central to Gunderson's argument is the external constraints
(embodied in South Africa and United Kingdom) put on the domestic
process of making decisions about the use of public funds. Re argues that
the use of funds in away which would have benefited the majority of the
population (i.e. health, education and water supply) was impeded by this
external influence (1970:436). As observed in chapter 3, several of the
premises for Gunderson' s argument have been changed after the financial
situation of the government improved significantly in the early 1970s. The
presence of expatriates is less significant today than in the late 1960s. As
the increased spending on public services from the mid- 1970s onwards
demonstrated, domestic political concerns have gained importance.
Rowever, if one assumes that Gunderson's observations concerning the
relationships between the political and administrative spheres were valid in
the initial years after independence, it is reasonable to expect that some of
the patterns probably remain today. I asserted in chapter 4 that the
politicians at ministerial leve! exercise political leadership and generate
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political input for policy-making. The politicians seem to be less subject to
administrative rule today than was the case in the late 1960s. This is an
argument which will be elaborated in this and the subsequent chapter. It has
to be underscored that this argument does not necessarily imply that less
power is concentrated in the central government, nor that political input is
generated through a "bottom-up" process. The political framework has been
institutionalised gradually, and, as noted in the previous chapter, pluralism
has just started to be reflected in Botswana politics. Although it can be
expected that there is some continuity with the past in the role perception
and the actual position of the recently elected politicians (i.e. MPs),
changes may well have taken place. In the rest of the chapter, I will
especially focus on the role of organised interest groups and the members
of the legislature, and discuss to what extent these actors represent a
countervailing force to the core decision-makers in the government (i.e.
cabinet mInisters and senior civil servants). This focus will also remain in
the next chapter, but there I will in addition discuss to what extent the
officially stated objective to decentralise the planning process has been
carried through in actual policy-making.
6.2 The making of economic policies
The development strategy, or the "ideological" aspects of development
planning, include, for example: the goals, and policies of the government
conceming the participation of the public sector in the economy, the private
sector, foreigninvestmentandtfade'policy, subsidies, taxation and income,
policy. Formulation of such policies takes place both during and ahead of
the drafting period of the NDPs. The basis for the strategy is constituted
concretely by reviews of specific policy issues, of ten presented to the public
as white papers. Nine such white papers were of particular significance for
the seventh National Development Plan (RoB 1991f:79):24
- Financial Assistance Policy (1982)
- National Policy on Economic Opportunities (1982)
- Industrial Development Policy (1984)
- National Policy on Land Tenure (1985)
- Wildlife Conservation Policy (1986)
- Revised National Policy on Incomes, Employment, Prices and Profits
(1990)
24 Years of approval by the National Assembly in brackets.
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- National Policy on Natural Resources, Conservation and Development
(1990)
- Tourism Policy (1990)
- Agricultural Development Policy (1991)
The strategy aspect of development planning will here be exemplified by
the adoption of the Revised Policy on Incomes, Employment, Prices and
Profits (henceforth theJncome Policy), which was introduced in chapter 3.
The case will be used to draw some preliminary conclusions about the role
of politicians and involvement of other society-centred interest groups.
The production of white papers seems broadly to follow an uniform
pattern: a point of departure is of ten a report produced by an appointed
commission, academic scholars, or private consultants. The report and its
recommendations are subsequently considered by the political executive,
and a draft policy document is presented to the National Assembly, and
finally with a white paper is made public. The review of the Income Policy
illustrates such a pattern, and is also interesting because of its relevance for
various sections of the NDP7 (RoB 1990c; 1991f).
The first Income Policy was approved by the National Assembly in 1972.
An important input for the policy document had been a report on the
present structure of wages and salaries in Botswana, prepared by an
expatriate academic (Ghai 1970). As the historical outline of the Income
Policy and the recent changes presented in chapter 3 revealed, the most
important objective of the Income Policy has been an emphasis on wage
restraint as a means of facilitating economic growth, and of preventing the
widening of income disparitiesbetween urban and rural areas. It was also
decided to compress the wage differences within the public sector. Beyond
price control of some essential goods, the Income Policy was never
formalised through legislation. However, an advisory body, the National
Employment, Manpower and Income Council, was established to monitor
the implementation of the Policy, and institutions were created to
implement the wage leveIs. The Income Policy was revised in 1976, and
although no further reviews were presented to the National Assembly
before 1990, two consultancy reports from 1978 and 1983 have been used
as points of reference for the policy-makers (Lipton 1978; Colclough &
Olsen 1983). I concluded in chapter 3 that the Income Policy adopted in
1990 signified some changes, although not altering the major direction of
this policy issue. It was decided that the prices and wage levels to a large
extent should be determined by the supply and demand mechanisms of the
market. Collective bargaining between employers and employees, with a
minimum involvement by the government, should be the main mechanism
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for deciding wage leveIs. In other words, the new Income Policy both
reconfirmed and reinforced one of the most important characteristics of the
development strategy pursued in Botswana: to minimise state intervention
in the functioning of the private sector.
The issue of state involvement in the economy represents an important
dimension on the ideologicalleft-right axis, with the pure laissezjaire view
on the far right, and those who advocate extensive state interventions in the
economy representing the far left. Several aspects of the Income Policy may
be of relevance for such a left-right cleavage. It ideological differences
were manifest in Botswana politics, I would thus expect this to be reflected
in the policy - making process leading to the revised Income Policy. Was at
any moment the ideology of the government challenged? Here is the policy,
as formulated by the Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public
Administration during the debate in the parliament (Lt.Gen. M.S. Merafhe,
13.09.90):25
...the thrust of the proposed Income Policy really is to let the economy
function with liule or no government intervention. That is all it is saying
and I must say, we are not alone in this view, I am happy to say. This is
what the entire world is saying today, and those that advocate for the
opposite, I can tell you they are moving against very strong tide because
the world is saying, let us liberalise (sic!).
In this chapter I will address this issue by focusing on the various steps in
the policy-making process, the main participants, their relative influence,
and. whetherornotdiverging opinionswere present. The most important,,'
questions to be addressed will be: How did the legislature contribute in the
process of reviewing the existing income policy; for example, did the
representatives (MPs) make important contributions to the process, and did
they amend proposals presented to them by the Executive? To what extent
were organisations in civil society consulted before the final policy was
decided upon?
25 The report from the debate in the National Assembly had in November 1991 not been
published, but I was given access to the drafts of the report in the library of the
Assembly. When extracts of speeehes are used, reference is made to the respective
representative, and the date when his or her statement was made.
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Revision of the Income Policy
The revision of the Income Policy was initiated by the appointment of a
Presidential CommIssion in February 1989. The Commssion was chaired
by the Minister of External Affairs, and comprised two MPs from the ruling
party (one was eight months later appointed Assistant Minister of Finance
and Development Planning), three civil servant representatives, two
representatives from the parastatal sector, one from the civil service
association, two from the trade unions, two from the private employers, one
from the "industrial dass", two from the rural sector, and two individual
members. The latter were both well known scholars on Botswana
economIcs and politics. One of these, Charles Harvey, has for a period been
affiliated to the Bank of Botswana as an expatriate, and since the early
1980s been engaged regularly as a consultant to the Ministry of Finance
and Development Planning. Expatriate participation in Botswana policy-
making had thus not been abrogated in the late 1980s. It should also be
noted that one of the parastatal representatives was the Governor of the
Bank of Botswana, a dose associate of the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning (MFDP). The composition of the Commssion
revealed that this was not an independent, or non-political body. Politicians
from the highest leve! of the ruling party were participating, and it should
be noticed that the MFDP had been given a key-position in the revision of
the Income Policy from its initial stage.
One may view the Commssion as a policy-making arena where it might
have been possible for various groups affected by the policy to exercise
leverage. It is therefore necessary to focus on how the Commssion
gathered information about how the existing Income Policy was perceived,
and whether or not various groups wanted it to be changed. The
Commssion used four methods to gather information and assess the general
knowledge and perception of the existing Income Policy: (1) visiting major
centres of Botswana, and taking oral evidence in public sessions, (2)
consultations with invited organisations, (3) request of written submIssions
from interested individuals and organisations, and (4) special background
studies and reviews of incornes related studies already undertaken. The
Commission received oral submIssions from 250 individuals and
organisations. Approximately half of these came from white collar
employees in the public and parastatal sectors, followed by contributions
from private employers and representatives from the trade unions (RoB
1990a:Appendix C). The latter was, however, domInated by the union of
the parastatal workers and only twelve representatives from other trade
unions were interviewed. I should also point out that only fourteen
politicians at the district leve! were interviewed and only one representative
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from the Opposition parties contributed. In addition, the Commssion
received twenty-six written submissions from various organisations, but
none from political parties. The consultations undertaken reve al that the
Commission was biased towards the question of salaries for white collar
employees. It was less concerned with the questions, also given in its terms
of reference, conceming the poorer segments of the population (i.e. the
applicability of the Poverty Datum Line as a guideline for the minimum
wages and the questions about housing rents). This suggests that although
the trade unions and the "industrial dass" had been represented in the
Commission and consulted, members of this group had seemingly not been
in apositiontopush theinconcerns totheforefronton the agenda.
Figure 6.1
Revision of the Income Policy: February 1989-September 1990
.......................... .... ...
. Existing Income policy .
... ............ ..... ........ .....
I Consul ta tions wi th
Review by the Presidential - public employees
Comrission - private employers
I
- trade unions
Producing the Income I1Policy report
I
I
i
Evaluation of the Evaluation of the
Report by the NEMIC Report by the ECC
I i
i
Evaluation of the Report and
responses by the cabinet
i
Drafting the Income II
Policy Whi te Paper
I
I
Discussion and approval
of the draft by the
National Assembly
Revised Income Policy l.
presented to the public i
The trade union representatives in the Commission took exception to
some of the main recommendations in the final report, i.e. the emphasis by
the majority of the Commission members on the need for allowing higher
109
salaries for civil servants, which would widen income differentials. The
trade union representativesclaimed that too large differences between the
highest and lowest pay were immoraL. Their attitude towards continuing the
policy of wage restraint for the lower levels of employees was in the report
referred to as follows (RoB 1990a:63):
They argued that Batswana workers have borne the brunt of the Policy
and have subsidized the economy. In the past they were. wiling to live
with severe wage restraint in the interest of national development.
However, they are now of the opinion that they have sacrificed enough.
At the same time, they are doubtful of what was gained by this sacrifice.
In their view, with wage restraint came increased profits for employers,
many of whom are foreigners. Unions felt that much of thismoney was
sent out of the country, rather than being used to increase investment and
employment.
In the previous chapter I concluded that tensions are growing between
workers and both private employers and the state. That the new Income
Policy had paid inadequate attention to the interests of this group of
employees was.confirmed by the strike of public sector manual workers in
1991 (section 5.4).
The Commssion completed its report in March 1990, and itwas
subsequently considered by two advisory bodies, the National Employment,
Manpower and Income Council (NEMIC), and the EconomIc CommIttee
of the Cabinet (ECC), before it was formally submItted to the cabinet. The
cabinet presented in September 1990 . a draft white paper to the National
Assembly. The draft was largely a blueprint of the Commission's report. Of
the ninety-one recommendations submitted by the Commssion, the
government had in its whitepaper fully accepted half of these, amended
one-third, rejected eleven, and deferred two. The amendments did not
indicate any major modifications of the policy outlined by the Commssion.
However, some of the amendments may sugge st that the government did
not want to reduce its control of certain aspects of the economy as much
as the Commission recommended; i.e. the Department of Labour and Social
Security should continue to monitor the minimum wage, and the salaries
and benefits of the parastatal sector should still be related to those in the
public sector. On the other hand, there is nothing that suggests that the
government envisaged itself as playing a more interventionist role in the
economy than what was suggested by the Commission (see also section
3.5). This was demonstrated by the government rejecting one of the more
radical recommendations made by the Commssion. It was in the report
recommended that all employers should be obliged to pay at least a uniform
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minimum wage, and that this standard should also apply to employees in
domestic service and in the agricultural sector (RoB 1990a:44). The
government opposed these recommendations, and stated in its draft white
paper that the minimum wage should be allowed to differ across sectors,
and that introducing a minimum wage and legislation regulating working
conditions in the domestic service and agricultural sector would be
"unenforceable" and "impracticable" (RoB: 1990b:39). Although the
government altere d some of proposals made by the Commssion, the
substance of the report had in general been maintained.
A consultative proeess ?
At this stage one might have expected that the Report had been distributed
to the various affected groups (e.g. employers and trade unions). When
presenting the draft white paper to the National Assembly, the government
(RoB 1990b: 1) claimed, with reference to the involvement of the ECC and
NEMIC, that the report had been "subject to extensive consultation within
and outside government." However, several of the backbenchers in the
National Assembly lodged complaints about the composition of the
Commssion and how the report had been subjected to consultation after it
was released. It was lamented in the debate that the same people had been
involved in all the stages of the policy-making process; from the
preparation of the report, to assessing the recommendations and finally
drafting the white paper (Mr. B.Temane, 11.09.90). One MP complained
that the politicalparties, even therulingparty(BDP), had not been asked.,i"
to discuss the Incomes Policy (Mr. G.Matlhabapiri, 03.09.90). Similar
criticism was expressed by the Botswana Federal Trade Union, which
complained that the report had not been sent to the trade unions for
consultations before it was debated in the National Assembly (Mmegi, 21-
27 September 1990). In responding to this criticism, the Assistant Minister
of Finance and Development Planning claimed in the National Assembly
that the commission had published a request for written evidence in the
newspapers (Mr. D.N.Magang, 13.10.90). I will below briefly discuss the
role of the two advisory bodies, the ECC and the NEMIC, and ask if it is
justified or not to look upon these as genuin e channels of consultation.
The first National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Council
(NEMIC) was established in 1972 after the adoption of the first Income
Policy. NEMIC was initially a tripartite body, constituted by representatives
from the government and parastatals, the private sector employers and
workers (RoB 1972). The secretariat of NEMIC has since 1980 been
provided by the Employment Policy Unit in the Ministry of Finance and
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Development Planning, and chaired by its Assistant Minister. The Council
has, after a major review in 1981, met regularly (three times each year),
and played an important ro le in the annual salary adjustments not least
because the wage adjustment given to the lower levels in the public sector
to a large extent has been followed by the private and parastatal sectors.
However, the report of the Cornission concluded that the organisation of
NEMIC had many shortcomings and had in general not been able to fulfil
its envisaged role. Among others, the representatives from the private and
parastatal sectors in the Cornssion complained that NEMIC was biased
in favourof the interest of the government (RoB J990a:218). As discussed
in chapter 5,employees, other than civIl servants, are in general not well
organised. Holm (1989) claims that the advisory nature of the councils and
Cornssions where employees are invited to participate, and the dominant
position of government officiaIs, leads to a lack of enthusiasm about
participation in such bodies. My interviews with representatives from the
trade unions similarly confirmed that NEMIC is not seen as an important
channel of influence. However, the NEMIC still represents an opening for
the employers to articulate their views on employment issues and wage
leveIs, and may as such be seen as a link between this segment of the
society-centred forces and the state. The closeness of this forum to the
institutional framework of the state makes it difficult to regard the
assessment of the Income Policy report by NEMIC as a sincere attempt to
seek feedback on the Income Policy from actors outside the state. This is
a conclusion which seems to be strengthened by the composition of the
sec ond advisory body which was presented the Cornssion' s report.
The Economic Committee of the Cabinet (ECC) is composed of the
entire cabinet, all Permanent Secretaries, the Governor of the Bank of
Botswana, and the heads of the defence and police services. The ECC is
officially only a consultative body, whose object is to assure interaction of
professionals, civil servants, and the politicians at the government level
(RoB 1986a). The MFDP provides the secretariat for the Cornttee.
Although the cabinet and the ECC formally are two separate policy-making
forums, this separation does not seem to have been adhered to in the daily
policy-making. The cabinet seldom meets on its own to discuss, and decide
upon, economic policy questions; as described by one of my informants
close to the government:
When the Cabinet formally is supposed to make decisions on their own,
they ask the Permanent Seeretaries and the Governor of the Bank of
Botswana to leave the meeting mom for 30 minutes. When they return,
the Cabinet have usually just ratified what had been agreed upon during
the ECC meeting.
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The membership of the ECC (i.e. the President, 15 cabinet ministers,
Permanent Secretaries and three others) in total comprises a group about
two-thirds the size of the National Assembly, and larger than the group of
backbenchers and opposition MPs. It is justified to argue that the ECC must
thus be considered the most important policy-making forum with reg ard to
economic policy.
The ECC represents further an important channel for the MFDP to
infIuence the development strategy. The MFDP is strongly represented in
the ECC with both its Minister and a Permanent Secretary, both of whom
in reality rank higher than their colleagues in the other ministries. Through
its secretarial function the MFDP may further control the agenda of the
ECC. These observations taken into account, it seems rather irrelevant to
daim that when the ECC discussed the Commssion's Income Policy
report, this was part of "extensive consultation", as stated by the
government (RoB 1990b:l).
Involvement of the parliament
The involvement of the legislature will here be analysed by asking how the
revised Income Policy was presented to the National Assembly, how this
body dealt with the draft white paper, and the outcome of this final stag e
of the policy-making process. UntIl this stage the process of revising the
existing Income Policy had involved mainly actors dose to the executive.
And, although the politically appointed members of the executive had
amended some of the recommendations presented in the commssion report,
the revision had so far not been exposed to open political debate. As the
legislature may be seen as a linkage between society-centred forces and the
state, one might have expected that the concerns of groups affected by the
Income Policy would be articulated in the parliament. Hypothetically, one
might have expected that the legislature would provide political input for
further amendment of the recommendations presented in the initial report.
However, one reason for not expecting too much from the parliamentary
debate is given in an argument by Nengwekhulu, who daims that the party
system in Botswana is a de facto one party system because of the lack of
"diffusion" of parliamentary power (see also section 5.5):
The res ult is that legislative enactments are not a product of a concerted
debate between ruling party and opposition parties. They are relatively
"undiluted" products of the wil of the ruling party. A substantive
multi party democracy does not only imply the existence of numerous
political parties in the society but also, and this is fundamental, that these
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parties should have parliamentary representation in order to create a
healthy and conducive parliamentary environment in which bargaining and
compromise become the seedbed of legislative enactments (Nengwekhulu
1989:2).
The draft of the white paper was presented to the representatives in the
National Assembly one week ahead of the debate. Several of the
backbenchers and MPs from the opposition protested, and pronounced that
they found it difficult to discuss the draft because they had received it far
too c10se to the actual debate. As one of the MPs stated:
It to ok thirteen months for the Commission to complete its work. The
Report was presented to Ris Excellency the President on the 12th March,
1990 and that is over five months, Mr Speaker, since that date, five
months to the day it was presented to Members of parliament. And, Mr
Speaker, we have three arms in this Government. We have the Executive,
we have the Parliament and we have the Judiciary and it is believed we
are made to believe that Parliament is the Supreme Body in this country.
(...) Now the one mistake Ministers do is, whenever they conclude
whatever business in Cabinet, they feel it is aParliament decision. And
yet it is not (Mr Johnie Swartz, 06.09.90).
The backbenchers have in re cent years frequently complained that the
executive take them for granted, and that the National Assembly and its
representatives are only used to "robber stamp" proposals from the
executive.26 This was also restated by several MPs in my interviews.
Consideringthe fact that the gre at majority of the MPs represent the ruling
party, and fort y per cent are also members of the cabinet, it is perhaps
unreasonable to expect that the debates in the National Assembly itself
should alter the policy of the government. However, Picard (1987: 169)
c1aims that there is a growing "radical" group of backbenchers within the
government party, and it may for that reason be required to look more
c10sely at the debate.
The debate in the National Assembly lasted two weeks. As mentioned
above, several of the MPs complained about being brought into the revision
of the Income Policy only in the final stage. The debate, with contributions
from three-fourths of the members of the legislature, was carried through
in a rather arbitrary fashion. The various spe akers touched upon selected
aspects of the draft in an unsystematic order. The speeches were largely
26 See for example Mr.B. Temane in Botswana Daily News, 27 February, 1991, pA. and
Mr. G. Matlhabaphiri in Botswana Daily News, 4 April, 1991, p.3.
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delivered unilaterally without being met by counter-arguments. The latter
was only to be expected as most of the MPs expressed general support for
the white paper. However, nine MPs (about one-fourth of the National
Assembly membership!) complained that the Income Policy had an urban
bias. It was expressed that a strategy for rural development was missing and
that too little attention had been given to the problem of rural-urban
migration. The Assistant Minister of Finance and Development Planning
(who had also been a member of the Commission), responded that the
Income Policy was primarily intended to focus on formal sector
employment, and further that the government in general was commtted to
rural development (Mr. Magang, 13.09.90).
The debate revealed that the rural development problems are recognised
by the elected politicians. But beyond demanding that "something has to be
done," the politicians did not suggest concrete ways in which the
government could respond more effectively to the challenges. The debate
confirmed that there was a group of outspoken backbenchers (5-6) who did
not de sist from criticising the government. It is wrong, however, to
conclude that this group represents a more radical vie w on the involvement
of the government in the economy. The emphasis on deregulation in the
report and the white paper met general support during the debate. And
although some backbenchers expressed concern for the social justice aspect
of the Income Policy, i.e. the need for housing subsidies or price control to
reduce regional price differences, the approach of the government to this
question was never really challenged:
The Government believes that, in general, policies on social welfare must
take sec ond place to any project which creates employment or increases
productive rural incomes, because the latter approach wil eventually
achieve higher social welfare (RoB 1990b:16).
The opposition did not during the debate express any coherent alternative
to the Income Policy proposed by the government. The leader of the
opposition wanted to have the debate postponed, and stated that he would
only make general arguments for rejecting the draft white paper (Dr.Koma,
07.09.90).27 Whether deliberately or not, this seems also to have been the
attitude of the three BNF representatives. Beyond emphasising the need for
strengthening the role of the trade unions, and speaking in general terms of
the dangers of political instability if social justice were ignored, the
27 It was announced that the BNF would draft a position paper on the Incornes Policy. In
December i 99 i, fifteen months after the debate, such apaper had still not materialised.
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contributions by the opposition in the debate did only to a limited extent
address specifically the proposals in the draft white paper. Considering the
"socialist" profile of the BNF expressed in the Manifesto for the General
Elections 1989 (BNF 1989), the contributions to the debate reconfirms the
view that the BNF is unable to translate its ideological programme into
concrete policy proposals.
The Income Policy white paper finally presented to the public was
identical to the draft presented to the National Assembly prior to the
debate. This suggests that the National Assembly as such is not the arena
where policiesaremade, or inputs for policy formulation are generated. As
will be discussed in the next chapter, the backbenchers may be looked upon
as members of the Government, and may exercise leverage on the policy-
making through informal communication with the ministers, senior civil
servants, through caucus meetings etc. However, considering the concerns
expressed during the debate, the review of the Income Policy demonstrates
that politicians outside the cabinet were only insignificantly brought into the
policy-making process.
6.3 Some concluding remarks
The process leading up to the revision of the Income Policy white paper
confirmed that a strong state is present in Botswana. The policy-making
process was centralised and quite dosed to public scrutiny. The government
was directly represented in the appointed Commission and several other
members were dose associates. Consultations were undertaken by the
Commssion, but there was a bias in the composition of the informants, and
the various segments of the society about to be affected by the Income
Policy had unequal opportunities to influence its formulation. There is
nothing unusual in a government being involved in all stages of a review
of its own policy, and being selective when putting together a Commssion.
However, the smoothness which characterised the later stages of the process
before the White Paper was presented to the public, seems to be
symptomatic of the nature of policy-making in Botswana. Taking into
account that the implementation of the Income Policy has exacerbated
tensions in Botswana society, one might have expected that if the review
of the Income Policy had been more open to public scrutiny, the process
would have been less smooth. More openness might have been achieved by
a public debate after the government had released its draft white paper; i.e.
bargaining among various organised interest groups, headlines in the
newspapers, political disputes within parliament etc. N othing of the sort
took place. The National Assembly debated the white paper for two weeks,
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and it was subsequently approved without a single word changed. The
calmness of the policy-making process seems to be explained by two
factors: (a) a deliberate tactic by the government to avoid public scrutiny;
(b) the weakness of civil society and the low leve! of pluralism in
Botswana politics.
The participation of the trade unions and private employers in the review
of the Income Policy demonstrated that policy-making in Botswana is
characterised to some extent by corporatism. Trade union representatives
were gi ven formal access to the process. However, their influence was
insignificant, and the trade unions were not asked to comment on the draft
white paper produced by the government before its tabling in parliament.
The participation of the trade unions appears to be ameans applied by the
government to legitimise the policy-making process, and to neutralise the
organisations of the workers. However, considering the weakness of the
trade unions, the latter is likely to be less important.
The involvement of the legislature in the process demonstrated important
aspects of Botswana politics. Although the opposition party expressed
con cern about the effects of the Income Policy on the poorer strata of
Botswana society, the MPs from the Botswana National Front (BNF) did
not use the opportunity to present an alternative policy. This lends support
to the argument that the BNF, among other parties in Botswana, is in
reality not representing the poorer strata of the population (Nengwekhulu
1989a/b). However, it was demonstrated that rural-urban cleavages exist
within the ruling party, and although no alternative strategy was propagated,
the need to give higher priority to rural development was certainly on the
political agenda. The debate further demonstrated that backbenchers of the
ruling party are not inhibited in criticising their own government; an
observation which weakens the argument that Botswana is a de facto one-
party state similar to that of other African countries.
The criticism expressed by the backbenchers concerning the biased nature
of the Commission and the consultation process was justified.
Representatives from the MFDP took part in all stages of the review. The
MFDP was strongly represented in both the Commssion which initially
reviewed the existing Income Policy and in the bodies (i.e. ECC and
NEMIC) which assessed the report and advised the government, and the
mini stry has agenerally strong position in the cabinet. It was thus revealed
that policy-making is still very centralised, even at the government leveL.
The core policy-makers, cabinet ministers and senior civil servants, enjoy
a high leve! of insulation in terms of not being exposed to public scrutiny
before the final policy is approved by the legislature. Although the policy-
makers seem to be insulated from pressures from the trade unions, the
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participation of the employers seems to have been more significant.
Representatives from the employers in the private sector were given the
same formal access to the review process as the trade unions. However, as
observed in chapter 5, the private employers are strong in terms of financial
and organisational resources, and are able to approach the government on
an informal basis. The final white paper revealed that the new Income
Policy was in consonance with the interests of the private employers. This
may suggest that the private sector employers had been exercising leverage
on the policy-making process - that the government lacks autonomy vis-à-
vis the private sector when deciding on its development strategy. On the
other hand, it would be more relevant to conclude that the interest of the
private entrepreneurs was determining if the government had a more
socialist profile, and had traditionally been less inclined to emphasise the
necessity of a dynamic private sector in the economic development process.
As concluded in chapter 3, the government decided already at
independence, when the private sector was on ly an insignificant actor, to
create favourable conditions for private entrepreneurship. In other words,
the interests of the private sector and the government coincided in the late
1980s.
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7. The policy-making process Il: Allocation
of public funds
In this chapter I will analyse the process of drafting the seventh National
Development Plan (NDP7), which covers the 1991-1997 period. While the
previous chapter focused on one substantive aspect of the development
strategy, namely income policy, I will here discuss how decisions regarding
the level of public spending and sectoral allocations of funds are made.
This aspect of the economic strategy is manifested in the development
expenditure pro gr amme which is decided upon in the processes of
producing the development plans and annual budgets. The main questions
which will be discussed are: Who were the main participants in the
planning? To what extent are district authorities incorporated in the
planning process? What kind of technocratic mechanisms existed to
facilitate control of the level of public spending? To what extent were the
cabinet ministers able to exercise political leadership? How is power
distributed among the ministries? To what extent did the members of the
legislature manage to wield influence?
The draftingof the NDP7 lasted, in a technical sense, approximately 2
years. The preparation of the NDP7 included: (1) a review of the status of
the different sectors in the economy; (2) outlining strategies about how to
reach major development goals (e.g. the Income Policy); and (3) an
updating of the project portfolio/development programme. The second
aspect was discussed in the previous chapter. It is the third aspect which is
focused upon here. In re al it y , as the recent plan is a continuation of earlier
NDPs and the annual budgets, it may be more correct to say that the
current NDP has been the outcome of a process initiated when Botswana
gained independence in 1966. The historical outline of the economic
strategy and development planning in the post-independence period,
presented in chapter 3, hopefully enables some broad lines to be drawn in
the concluding chapter.
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Fig 7.1
The preparation of the seventh National Development Plan - NDP7
(August 1989-August 1991)
The MFOP prepared its initial Keynote paper, indicated
economic projections of the plan period and outlined
important development issues
The line-ministries prepared Sectoral Keynote Issues Papers
The Keynote Papers were
reviewed and commented
on by local authorities,
ministries, parastatals etc.
Civil servants from the
districts met to discuss the
Keynote Papers and Ois-
trict Plans at the National
Oistrict Oevelopment
Conference
The Keynote Papers were
discussed in two consultative
bodies at the centrallevel:
the National Employment
Manpower and Income
Council (NEMIC) and the
Rural Oevelopment Council
(ROe)
The MFOP summarised comments on the Keynote Papers, and the Economic
Committee of Cabinet (EEC) held a series of meetings where the economic outlook
for NOP? and main issues arisen from the Keynote Papers, were discussed. The
MFOP prepared a key document titled the NOP? Macro Outline. This document gave a
macro economic overview, a table of contents for the NOP?, prepared expenditure
and manpower targets, and outlined the main policy chapters for the plan.
The Macro Outline was reviewed and commented on by local authorities, ministries
parastatals etc., and thereafter discussed by the EEC
The NOP? expenditure and manpower ceilings, as proposed in Macro Outline and
modified by the EEC discussion were formally agreed upon by the Cabinet
The line-ministries
distributed the first full
drafts of their NOP? sub-
missions to local
authorities, other
ministries, parastatals
etc., for comments
The MFOP and the line-
ministries undertook a
"Grand Project Review"
to establish a develop-
ment frame for the entire
NOP? period. The
Cabinet subsequently
confirmed the NOP?
Expenditure Programme
Preparation of the annual
budget for 1991/92
The annual budget,
including the development
programme of the NOP?
was debated and approved
by the National Assembly
A complete working draft of the NOP? was distributed, and later
discussed and a roved b the EEC and the Cabinet
The National Assembly debated and approved the NOP?
The MFOP finalised the NOP? and the plan was presented
to the ublic
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A point of departure for the formal drafting of the NDP7 may be August
1989, two years ahead of the debate and approval of the plan in the
National Assembly. At this time the Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning (MFDP) distributed a Keynote Policy Paper (KPP) to the different
ministries. In the KPP a timetable was outline d for the preparation of the
NDP7 and drafting guidelines were given. The KPP also identified a
number of broad issues to be addressed by the different ministries. Below
I will first present a summary of the key stages in the two year planning
period, and thereafter make an assessment of the role of the main actors.28
It should be kept in mind that the NDP and the annual budgets are dosely
linked, and that there is an overlap in the preparation of the plan and the
budget.
It should be noted that the summary above gives a simplified and an
idealised picture of the planning process. However, the outline depicts the
realities especially in one aspect: the insignificant involvement of societal
groups, and the involvement of the parliament mainly in the final stage.
The outline presents the framework of the planning process mainly at the
national leve L. ParalleI, and interwoven, to planning activities which take
place at the central leve!, are the planning activities at the district leveL. I
will therefore first discuss the decentralised aspect of the development
planning, and ask whether or not the idealised "bottom-up" description of
the process, as often found in official documents and articulated by
informants dose to the government, conform to the realities. For example,
the Minister of W orks, Transport and Communication, Mr. C.Butale, stated
in parliament:
... that National Development Plan VII was a result of wide consultation
and a good example of down-up planning...the government properly
consulted through Vilage Development Committees and the National
Development Conference as well as Parliament at this instance.(Quoted
in Botswana Daily News, 6 August 1991, pA.)
7.1 District level planning: Decentralisation or devolution?
How decentralised is the system intended to be? To what extent is decision-
making power devoluted to local authorities? The planning process in
Botswana is according to a government document (RoB 1991f:4.16):
28 The summary is based on the timetable found in aminute distributed to the Planning
Officers in the line-mInistries (MFDP 1989), the Keynote Policy Paper (RoB 1989a), and
interviews with MFDP civil servants.
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"continuous, spatial, and decentralised in nature." In terms of
decentralisation of decision-making, it is not clear what this really means.
On the one hand, there has been a strengthening of the administrative
capacity in the districts. On the other hand, the local political authorities,
the District Councils, seem only to have been delegated symbolic decision-
making power.
Before independence the districts were ruled mainly by the chiefs and the
colonial field administration led by the powerful District Commssioner. A
post-independence strategy to reduce the power of the chiefs led among
other things to the introduction of the District Councils, with both locally
elected and centrally nominated councillors. However, the distribution of
power which has been institutionalised 25 years after independence only
ascribes to the councillors a nominal role in terms of how development
funds are spent in their own districts (Egner 1987; Gasper 1990). The
district administration seems to have been strengthened. The office of the
District Commissioner (DC) has remained in the districts as the senior
representative for the central government, it has been strengthened by the
assignment of District Officers, and a system of District Development
Committees (DDCs) was introduced in 1970. The DDC is meant to be a
non-political advisory body, chaired by the DC, and made up by public
sector representatives in the districts (i.e. civil servants dealing with health,
agriculture, education etc.), some representatives from the Council, tribal
administration and land-board representatives. The DDC has a central role
in the preparation of the District Development Plan.
The central government has, according to Picard (1987), applied two
methods to maintaincentral. controlover the District Councils. First, most
of the District Council administrative staff has come under the direction of
the central government. The Unified Local Government Service (ULGS),
located at the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, is responsible for
the recruitment, promotion, transfer and training of local authority
permanent staff. An outcome of this arrangement seems to be that the
loyalties of the civil servants at the district lev el have become biased
towards the central authorities. Second, the District Councils have been
given only insignificant fiscal autonomy. Most rural districts have a weak
revenue base on their own, and they are thus dependent on transfers from
the central Government to finance their development activities and recurrent
expenditures. However, most development activities are implemented and
financed directly by the central government. For example, just over five per
cent of the Central government' stotal development expenditures were in
1988/89 channelled through District Councils (RoB 1991f:19.31).
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The local authorities may attempt to influence the central leve! decision
makers by various means: e.g. through the District Development Plans, the
National District Development Conference, formal and informal
communication between civil servants at central and district leve!, and the
districts representatives (MPs) in the National Assembly. It is difficult to
make a general assessment of the relative importance of these channeis.
There is wide variation between the different districts in terms of physical
distance to the centre (Gaborone), development needs and not least
capability of the individual politicians and administrative manpower.
However, there are some common problems facing the different districts in
their relationships with central leve! authorities. One of these is the
insignificant power delegated to the political authorities in the districts, as
discussed above. Another is caused by the shortcomings in the coordination
of district and nationallevel economic planning activities. I will be!ow
discuss the role of the District Development Plans (DDP) in the planning
process at the national leve!.
The various districts in Botswana have since the early 1970s made efforts
to prepare DDPs. The District Plans aim to serve much the same purpose
at district leve! as the NDP at national leve!, i.e. the DDP presents relevant
information about the district, reviews recent developments and presents
projects to which the local authorities have decided to give priority. Ideally,
according to the official "bottom-up" philosophy of the government, the
planning-process should start at the vill age leve!, in Vill age Deve!opment
Commttees, and this vill age "consultation" should later be translated into
projects and priorities in the DDP, coordinated by the DDC. However,
according to a recent study of the planning process (Ellison 1991), and
confirmed by my interviews, there are wide differences between the
districts in terms of the extent of vill age consultation and how the DDPs
are prepared. Since its beginning, the planning efforts at district leve! have
been constrained by a general scarcity of manpower.
In addition to being a guideline for the development efforts at the district
leve!, one official objective of district planning is to incorporate the
priorities of the DDPs into the programmes of the central government (RoB
1991c: 19.59). Ideally, the planners in the ministries should have the DDPs
at hand when they start the preparation of the NDP. The national plan
might thus have been the aggregation of the planning activities at the
district leve!. All development projects in Botswana have to be included
into the development programme of the national plan, and approved by the
National Assembly. A large share of future projects is thus outlined and
incorporated into the plan from the beginning of the six year planning
period. This underlines why the planning activities in the districts must be
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seen as an important aspect of decentralisation. However, with some
exceptions, the DDPs, and the district leve1 priorities, have only to a limited
extent be en incorporated into the National Development Plan. When
preparing the fifth NDP (1979-85), the planners in the central ministries had
DDPs available to them from most districts, and the contents of the DDPs
seem to have been of some importance (Egner 1987:101). But, in 1983
after the 1983-86 DDPs had been prepared, the MFDP in reality declared
them invalid because of changes in the revenue situation (Gasper
1990:248). The DDPs for the 1985-89 period were not completed before
1988, two years after the NDP6 period started, and NDP6 was thus
prepared without direct input from DDPs. Although drafts of the DDPs for
the 1989-95 period were not completed until 1991, preliminary drafts were
circulated one year ahead of the completion of NDP7, and the DDPs seem
this time to have gained some relevance.
Even if the DDPs have been given formal approval by the local political
authorities, the planners in the ministries most of ten use them only as
"working-papers". ParalleI to the preparation of the DDPs, the line
ministries are planning projects and programmes which will be located in
specific districts. Allocation of development funds to districts will thus
often be more a matter of the priorities of different government
development programmes than the contents of the DDPs. This implies, for
example, that even if a District Council has given priority to expansion of
a local clinic, it might be allocated funds for increasing the number of
classrooms, years before the Ministry of Health decides to improve the
health facilities. The government openly admits that ineffective coordination
of planning activities at district and central leve1 is a problem. It has been
stated that efforts will be made in the future to ensure that the periods
covered by the NDP and DDPs coincide (RoB 1991f:463).
The National District Development Conference (NDDC) may be seen as
part of the efforts to coordinate the development activities at the district and
centralleveL. Civil servants from the districts and the central leve1 meet at
the Conference to discuss various development re1ated issues. NDDCs were
he1d annually until 1989, but thereafter every sec ond year. The main topic
of the NDDCs varies, but when coinciding with the preparation of the
NDPs, the Conferences seem to be focused on specific issues related to the
plan. The Conference produces resolutions which are distributed to the
ministries. As figure 7.1 reveals, the NDDC held in 1989 was part of the
initial preparation of the NDP7. Resolutions were made at this Conference
concerning planning, coordination and decentralisation, development
policies, and particular needs in the various districts (Ellison 1990:annex 1).
That the NDDC is a forum for civIl servants and thus within the
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administrative sphere was confirmed by the content of the majority of the
resolutions (RoB 1989c: 134-143). Only a couple of the resolutions were
related to issues beyond the administrative sphere (i.e. minimum wage for
farm workers and incentives for entrepreneurs in rural areas). As the
participants at the Conference are the same as those who are engaged in the
preparation of the district plans, the gathering thus represents an opportunity
for district authorities to influence the content of the development
programme found in the national plan. When I asked a random selection of
participants at the NDDC in November 1991 about how important they
regarded the Conference held in 1989 to be as part of the preparation of the
NDP7, I was given the impression that the Conference itself wasseen as
a channel for influence equivalent in importance to the ordinary
communication between the district authorities and the central
government. 29
The above discussion has shown that the planning and decision making
processes that take place at the district leve! cannot be ignored, although
the system does not function as intended. Consultation is made by the
various ministries, and the information produced during the preparation of
the District Development Plans serves as inputs for the central leve!
planners. However, the ministries decide how they will use the information
and feedback received from the district leveL. Beyond beingasource for
information, the local authorities are insignificantly involved in the final
stages of the NDP preparation. One may conclude that the consultations
undertaken by the central government make it correct to say the planning
process is decentralised. However, formal decision-making has continued
to be centralised, and I find it justified to question the official "bottom-up"
description of the planning process.
7.2 Some technocratic mechanisms for expenditure control
As concluded in chapter 3, the planners in the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning emphasise the need to restrain the growth of
development expenditures so that the recurrent costs generated by new
projects do not exceed the planned growth of recurrent expenditures. The
government has demonstrated its capability to reduce the leve! of spending
29 At the NDDC meeting on the 27 November 1991, I was able to ask 13 participants about
what they considered the influence of the district authorities to be on the con tent of the
seventh NDP. The respondents were asked to evaluate the relative importanee of: (a) the
1989 NDDC itself; (b) responses given to the Keynote Papers distributed by the central
Government; (c) the District Development Plan itself.
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when the revenue situation deteriorates. In other words, the admInistrative
and political frameworks in Botswana seem to have built-Ïn mechanisms
militating against unchecked growth of public expenditure. According to the
government it has been an objective to make the planning system in
Botswana flexible and adaptable to changes in the environment:
...many of the variables affecting development opportunities in Botswana,
such as mineral prices, external barriers to trade, and rainfall, are not
subject to Government contral. Hence, planning must be flexible enough
to adapt to changing circumstances of this kind (RoB 1991c:4.7).
The development expenditure programme (the development programme ) is
the aggregate of projects and subsidy programmes found in the National
Development Plan. The development programme is technically organised
in various sectoral programmes which reflect the portfolio of the ministries.
The NDP presents, within a six-year horizon, estimated costs of the various
projects in the development programme, and expenditure ceilings for the
sectoral programmes. The politics involved in development planning may
both be seen as an illustration of how public funds are distributed among
the various sectors, and how the total leve! of public spending is decided
upon.
The distribution of funds has in the recent years been characterised by
incrementalism. The development programme introduced at the beginning
of the NDP period, and subsequently approved annually, after the budget
debate, is largely a continuation of projects which already have been
adopted; I.e. of the 206 development projects proposed in the 1991/92
budget, 183 had been adopted in previous plans (RoB 1991e:19). It is
difficult to termInate the implementation of a project after its initial phase
has been completed, and public funds have already been spent. In other
words, the possibility to make radical political decisions to alter the pattern
of public expenditure seems in recent years to have become constrained by
this incrementalism. However, within the development programme it is
possible to accelerate the implementation of certain projects, and postpone
others. The substantial spending on arable agriculture in the 1980s
demonstrated that although the development programme is tied-up by the
established project portfolio, it was possible for the politicians to alter the
priorities within the programme (see chapter 3). In brief, the current leve!
of public spending seems to be the outcome of a mIxture of technocratic
assessments, formal mechanisms, and political inputs. Considering the
insignificant fiscal autonomy of the district leve! authorities, it seems
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justified to focus further on the planning and budget processes at the central
leveL.
The annual development budget is an important mechanism in the
spending strategy. The budget may be looked upon as the proportion of the
NDP scheduled for a particular financial year. However, although the NDP
is the starting point for the annual budgets, the budgets may as well be seen
as an annual updating of the plan. The development budget includes revised
estimates of the development expenditures five years ahead. The annual
"Project Review" makes it possible, during the planning period, to increase
the level of the estimated costs for existing projects, and incorporate new
projects into the NDP. A comprehensive Mid- Term Review of the plan is
also undertaken half way into the NDP period.
A point of departure for the economIc planners in the MFDP is
projections produced by the macroeconomIc model MEMBOT (RoB
1991f:3.36). This model provides forecasts for the whole economy's output,
prices, employment, foreign trade etc. Based on the MEMBOT projections,
estimates of expected costs of existing and planned projects, and an
assessment of the manpower needs, the MFDP estimates three main ceilings
for the public economy at large:
- The skilled manpower ceiling.
- The recurrent expenditure ceiling.
- The development expenditure ceiling.
These ceilings are the basis for the distributionof funds and manpower to
the different sectors of the economy - the provision of ministerial ceilings.
The budget ceilings found in the final NDP are the outcomes of an inter-
mInisterial bargaining process which starts with the resource guidelines
assigned to the sectoral mInistries from the MFDP, officially through the
NDP Macro Outline. Isaksen (1981:35) describes this "budget game" as
follows:
The ministries are fighting to increase their budget allocation, partly
between themselves but with common front against MFDP to increase the
overall budget ceilng. One of the tactics of this game is overplay, MFDP
stressing the desperate shortage of finanee and ministries the desperate
ne ed for increased resources to their own fields.
The annual budgets and the NDP are interlinked, but their formal status is
different. The development programme found in the NDP is not a formal
authorisation for spending public funds on projects. Since detailed
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preparation and appraisal of a project s technical and economic feasibility
are required before approval of funds by the MFDP, inclusion in the NDP
does not guarantee implementation during the plan period. The NDP is a
device applied by the government to its development efforts, but it is
indicative only (see also section 3.4). The authorisation for the ministries
to spend money is made through the approval by the National Assembly of
the annual budget, or Supplementary Estimates during the financial year,
and thereafter warrants issued by the MFDP.
Although projects can be incorporated into the NDP through the annual
budget, inclusion of a project in the NDP from its inception increases the
likelihood for aproject to be realised. The supporters and thosewhowill
benefit from a project will therefore like to see "their" project as part of the
NDP. There is here a potential conflict between the sponsors of a individual
project, i.e. local authorities or extemal donors, which may want the project
implemented as soon as possible, and the government which has to consider
the recurrent cost implication of a project. The annual budget may thus be
seen as a mechanism for reconciling such conflicts. To keep the budget
decisions centralised seems furthermore to be a tool consciously applied by
the government to control the leve! of public spending.
In the previous chapter it was observed that the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning is powerful in the process of defining the
development strategy in substantive terms. The MFDP seems to be in a
similar position in terms of controlling the leve! of expenditure. The actual
disbursement of public funds illustrates this role. There are several
conditions which have to be met before the MFDP issues a warrant for
project expenditures. Among others (RoB 1986a:3-9):
(a) The project must be approved by the National Assembly and be part
of the Plan; either appearing in the NDP from its inception, or
subsequently inc orp orated via the annual Development or
Supplementary Estimates.
(b) The project must have been appraised by the MFDP and found viable.
(c) The expenditure must be part of the approved annual budget (the
Appropriation Bill), or approved by the National Assembly by a
resolution (Supplementary Estimates)
This system ensures that the individual ministries do not spend more than
allowed by their ministerial ceiling. However, the warrants also represent
an effective tool for the MFDP to reduce the leve! of spending if necessary.
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The warrants for recurrent expenditures are normally issued for the whole
financial year. However, when the government decided to reduce the
expenditure growth in 1982 (see chapter 3), this was accomplished by the
MFDP warranting only 80 per cent of the approved Recurrent Estimates
(RoB 1986a:3-4). Expenditure control through the issuing of warrants is
even more effective in terms of development expenditure. To release funds
for projects the line ministry in question must request the MFDP for a
finance warrant covering each project. The MFDP may withhold the issuing
of warrants for development projects as a means of keeping expenditure
down. But the system also accords the MFDP power to block
implementation of a project if it is not in accordance with project criteria
set by the ministry (e.g. co st recovery). The power of the MFDP to
influence the profile of the development programme can also be illustrated
by its monopoly to negotiate funding of projects with extemal donors.
As argued in chapter 2, coherence of the state' s institutions seems to be
one aspect which may contribute to insulation from societal pressures. By
supervising the line mInistries through the MFDP, the government
seemingly ensures that a pattem of patron-client relationships does not
develop, and consequently hinders uncontrolled growth of public spending.
The power formally vested in the MFDP concerning the use of public funds
may thus be seen as an important factor contributing both to budgetary
discipline, and to coherence of public administration. I will below further
elaborate to what extent the line ministries have financial autonomy or not.
7.3 Planning activities within the line ministries
Although national development planning is a portfolio responsibility of the
MFDP, each ministry has its own planning capacity, and is primarily
responsible for their respective sectoral chapters in the NDP. It seems that
the individual ministries have some autonomy in regard to the priority of
projects within their respective sectors. The line ministries are, however,
linked to the MFDP through the Planning Officers cadre. This is an
institutional arrangement of having economists formally employed by the
MFDP deployed at different ministries. These Planning Officers (POs) are
to a large extent integrated in the tasks undertaken by the economists in the
individual ministries, but they also meet regularly the POs from the other
ministries and the MFDP senior officers in "the Weekly Planning Officers
Meeting". This intermediary position of the POs contributes to
administrative coherence, and to the achievement of a high lev el of realIsm
in the sectoral planning. On the other hand, the POs seem to fe el some
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loyalty towards their "host" ministry , and assist in the struggle (the "budget
game") of the line ministry to get approved budgets as large as possible.
As shown in fig.7.1 above, the preparation of the sectoral plans is a step-
by-step process, starting with the Keynote Papers, followed by the
negotiation of budget ceilings with the MFDP, and the preparation of
working drafts of the sectoral chapters, which after being completed are
presented to the cabinet and the National Assembly. The procedure has
been that the ministries should distribute their drafts to other ministries,
local authorities, parastatals etc., during the planning process, and
continually incorporate the feedback into the sectoral plans. The process is,
however, running less smoothly than fig.7.1 may suggest. Officials
interviewed in the MFDP complained that the line ministries seldom
manage to meet their deadlines, and time is of ten insufficient to consult
relevant actors. On the other hand, it was maintained by civil servants in
the line ministries that they receive no comments when they succeed in
distributing drafts; they do get some from the MFDP but only an
insignificant number from other ministries or from district level authorities.
Adding to this observation the weaknesses of district planning, it seems
justified toconclude that the individual ministries to a large extent are
insulated vis-à-vis actors other than the MFDP. However, within its
financial frames the individual line ministry also seems to have some
autonomous room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the latter.
As long as a ministry complies with its expenditure ceilings, it is allowed
to reallocate funds among approved projects. Although the ministry is not
allowed to exceed the Total Estimated Cost (TEC) of the individual project
during the plan period (RoB 1986a),thereis some allowancefor ministers
to make political decisions within their own ministries. The individual
ministers seem in general to have some influence over the priority of
projects within their ministries. Especially when it has to be decided which
new projects to include in the development programmes, the ministers of ten
have the final word.30 My interviews revealed that ministers in sist on
accelerating the implementation of certain projects, even when this is
against the advice of the civil servants in the ministry. Politicians outside
a particular ministry, both ministers and backbenchers, occasionally also
attempt to influence decision-making inside the ministry, by directly
approaching the minister or higher leve! civil servants. It is difficult to
estimate the extent of such activities. However, compared to the policy-
making in many other African countries, the politicians in Botswana seem
30 This observation is based on interviews with Planning Officers in the MFDP, MLGL,
MOA, MCI and MOR.
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only rarely to force through projects or programmes which are not
economically feasible.31
The influence of the minister over the sectoral plan will dep end among
other things on the nature of the relationship between the ministers and
senior civil servants, the institutional framework of the individual ministry,
and the personality and competence of the minister. Some ministries in
Botswana are known to be more influential than others, and have
traditionally been assigned the most experienced or competent ministers
(e.g. the MFDP and the MLGL). The appointment of assistant ministers
seem further to strengthen the individual ministries; The Ministry of Local
Government and Lands (MLGL) has at the moment two assistant ministers,
the Ministry of Agriculture and the MFDP both have one. Although the
number of political appointees within the individual ministries reflect its
functional needs, it seems likely , for example, that the core group of
political executives in the MLGL (three ministers) is more capable of
exercising political leadership than the majority of the ministries which
have one minister only.
In the previous chapters I have discussed to what extent the ministers are
being dominated by the civil servants or not. I have argued that the
ministers to some extent are effective in exercising political leadership.
Although the development planning is an activity in which much of the
decision-making has to be delegated to the administrative sphere, the
political executive is still extensively involved in the process as well.
Authorisation by the cabinet.is needed regularly at the various stages of the
planning process (see fig.7.1); e.g. the cabinet has to approve the Macro
Outline for the NDP, and the Planning Officers need authorised preliminary
ceilings as guidelines for the budgets. The cabinet is an important arena for
final bargaining between the ministers conceming the ministerial budget
ceilings. Examples were given in chapter 3 on how several aspects of the
development strategy pursued after independence may be seen as politically
motivated. It seems that the cabinet is able to make autonomous decisions
if it finds it politically necessary to do so. Compared with Gunderson's
(1970) characteristic of policy making as a process dominated by expatriate
civil servants, the relationship between the administrative and political
spheres seems recently to have become more balanced. It is seemingly
wrong to conceptualise the activity of the cabinet as basically political, and
that of the administration as being involved with only "technical" matters.
As argued in chapter 4, there is a dose cooperation between the cabinet
31 The ARAP programme may be one example of "political" considerations taking
precedence of economic viability (Bçtrhaug 1992alb; see also chapter 2).
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ministers and the civil servants. The senior civil servants seems to be
closely incorporated in the decision-making of the executive.
The Economic Committee of the Cabinet (ECC) is, as discussed earlier,
an important forum for making economic policies, and a channel for MFDP
influence. As fig.7.1 shows, the ECC met regularly during the preparation
of the NDP7. The economic outlook for the NDP period was discussed, and
the ECC presented the cabinet recommendations concerning policy issues
and budget ceilings. However, I concluded in the analysis on the Income
Policy, that the delineation between the ECC as an advisory body and the
cabinet as the formal decision-maker was blurred in daily policy-making.
Through my interviews I was given the impression that the cabinet itself
seldom amended the "recommendations" reached in the ECC concerning
use of public funds. This observation strengthens the argument that the
ECC may be seen as the de facto arena for deciding on government' s
economic policy. By its strong position in the ECC, the MFDP is thus also
at the political level in a privileged position to have its views concerning
economic policy adopted. One should be careful, however, not to
underestimate the power and integrity of the individual ministers. A
majority of the ministers in the current cabinet have experience as civil
servants at the central leve!. Considering also their long terms in office, it
is further justified to conclude that reciprocity rather than dominance
characterises the relationship between the ministers and the senior civil
servants.
7 .4 Development planning:a politicalactivity without
politicians?
By claiming above that the cabinet ministers exercise political leadership,
the answer to the question in the heading above is obviously no. However,
I argued in chapter 4 that the executive both numerically and
constitutionally seems to be in a strong position vis-à-vis the legislature. I
further suggested that the legislature does not represent a challenge to the
insulation of the key policy-makers, which in turn maintains the strength
of the Botswana state. I will below first discuss what role the National
Assembly and its representatives played in the final stages of the
preparation of the Budget for 1991/92 and the seventh National
Development Plan (1991-97), and thereafter present some further aspects
of the relationships between the representatives of the ruling party in the
legislature and the executive, and the position of the opposition. As the
development pro gr amme and the allocation of public funds to the different
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sectors reflect the priorities of the government, one might expect political
cleavageswhen the budget and the development plans are debated.
Five months before the NDP7 debate, the National Assembly approved
the annual budget for 1991/92. This was the budget for the first year
covered by the NDP7 period, and as such included estimates for projects
to be part of the NDP7. The National Assembly thus gave an initial
approval of the NDP7 development expenditure programme, without having
discussed this in the light of the totality of the Plan. This might have
constrained the manoeuvrability of the MPs when the development
programme later was to be decided upon in the NDP7 debate.32
Some of the backbenchers complained in my interviews that prior to the
budget debate the ministers and senior civil servants had presented the
budget to them in a technocratic way, which did not facilitate "meaningful"
participation of the elected politicians. The backbenchers and opposition
MPs were in addition facing some constitutional barriers. The possibility
for the representatives in the National Assembly to amend the proposed
budget was constrained by the Standing Orders (RoB n.d.,p.28). It was not
possible for the representatives to amend the total size of a ministerial
ceiling; i.e. propose a general increase in spending on the agricultural sector
or cut military expenditures by reducing the budget for the Office of the
President (see Botswana Daily News, 26 November 1991, pA). To what
extent an awareness of this constrained the involvement of the individual
MP is unclear, but it seems plausible to say that the formal constraint has
contributed to the definition of the division of labour which has evolved
between the cabinet and the National Assembly after independence.
The debate confirmed that the elected representatives are mainly
concerned with the problems and needs in their own constituencies, e.g.
water supply or construction of roads. The MPs were insignificantly
concerned with "macro-economic" questions like, for example,
diversification of the economy or the financial situation, even when this
was put on the agenda by the ministers; as lamented by the Minister of
Finance and Development Planning during the debate:
32 Objections to this practice from an MP were overruled for the reason that the budget
figures were merely estimated costs and not actual costs of projects to be undertaken.
The 23 new projects for the NDP7 period eauid, according to the MFDP, be apen to
further modification, adoption or rejection in the later NDP7 debate (Botswana Daily
News, 27 February 1991, pA and 4 March 1991, p.3).
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...Members of Parliament, cognisant of the needs in their constituents,
seemed to have totally ignored the message that this is a deficit budget as
ilustrated by the dramatic drop in exports between 1989 and 1990 with
revenues rising much more slowly than expenditures...Mr Mogae also
complained that MPs had proceeded to make more demands and did not
address themselves at all to an advers e development nor express thoughts
on what should be done about it. Re reminded Parliament that action must
be taken to address the trend of higher expenditure and lower revenue,
warning: 'If tax measures are resorted to, MPs should not say they had
not been consulted.'(quoted in Botswana Daily News, 4 March 1991, p.3)
The debate on the seventh National Development Plan (NDP7) followed a
similar pattern as that on the budget. Prior to the debate, which lasted
nearly two months, the government gathered all MPs for a seminar (a
caucus), and the ministers presented an outline of the main objectives and
priorities of the development expenditure programme for the six year
period. The Minister of Finance and Development Planning initiated the
debate in the National Assembly with a general presentation, and in the
following weeks the individual sections were presented, debated and
approved by the MPs. The debate was a not a debate per se, but mainly
comments and questions raised by the MPs, which were followed by
answers from the responsible ministers. Again, most of the questions
pointed to specific problems and needs in the constituencies (i.e. complaints
about the provision of public services, the quality of roads,
telecommunication facilities, and water supply), often with reference to
specific development programmes in the NDP.33 However, the debate also
revealed that the backbenchers are concerned, or at least aware of, more
general development policy questions like di sp arit y between urban and rural
development, lack of coordination between the various ministries or the role
of a public finance institution (i.e. the Botswana Development
Cooperation). As in the analysis of the Income Policy debate, it was again
observed that there is a faction of backbenchers especially concerned with
rural problems. However, altematives to the existing policy were not
presented. The different sections of the Plan were at the end of the day
unanimously approved by the representatives. Although the opposition
(BNF) expressed concern for the poorer sections of the population (i.e. poor
peasants in the communal areas, schoolleavers or the provision of
33 The main source for assessing the nature of the questions raIsed in the parliament has
been various Notice and Order Papers which present the agenda for the meetings of the
Legislature.
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subsidised housing), the substance of the development strategy in itself was
insignificantly criticised and no major policyalternatives were presented.
The Assistant Minister in the MFDP promised in his closing remarks of
the debate that the final editing of the plan prior to publication would take
the issues raised into account, although he stressed that the debate to a large
extent was mostly relevant to the implementation of the Plan (Botswana
Daily News, 18 September 1991). Comparing the draft NDP7 and the final
version presented to the public after the approval by the National Assembly
(RoB 1991c & 1991f), it is clear that the debate in the legislature did not
produce any visible changes in the content of the plan. It may thus be
justified to conclude that the legislators are in fact mere "rubberstamps",
and that the main role of the debate in the National Assembly is to
legitimise the government' s decisions. However, two observations make me
doubt that the debate was on ly symbolic. First, a large number of questions
were raised by the MPs concerning specific sections of the plan. The two
months of the debate represented a very busy time for the civil servants in
the various ministries, preparing answers for the questions asked by the
MPs. The ministers were called to the floor continuously. Although many
of the questions seemed trivial and parochial, the ministers and the
bureaucracy were still called to account on several important matters. This
mechanism of accountability, although not constituting a real challenge to
the political power of the government, may be seen as an important
contribution to making the government responsive to real needs. Second,
and related to the latter point, although the total ministerial ceilings of the
development programme were not changed, the individual MPs may still
have been successful in. directing the attention of the various ministries to
particular needs in his or her constituency. Several of the projects or
subsidy programmes in the development programme are not targeted for
particular locations, and the NDP debate thus represents an arena for
lobbying for funds to the various constituencies. In other words, the effects
of the NDP debate may be found in the subsequent annual budgets.
It should again be kept in mind that the legislators also might have
provided inputs for the NDP7 prior to the debate by their involvement in
the annual budget process and the revision of government policies.
Although I concluded in the previous chapter that the Income Policy debate
as such did not alter the policy proposal of the executive, it can not be
ruled out that alternative channels of influence have been open to the
backbenchers. This issue will be discussed in the more general analysis of
relationships between the legislature and the executive below.
From the discussion of the involvement of the MPs in the production of
the annual budgets and the NDP7, it seems like a division of labour has
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been institutionalIsed whereby the admInistration and the ministers
formulate the policies and dec ide the priorities of the development
programme, while the backbenchers represent a source of information, and
legitimise the decisions made by the government as well as advocating
constituency interests. The presence of a dynamic system of parliamentary
commIttees mIght have strengthened the capacity of the legislature to
influence the governments policies. Although the National Assembly
appoints a Finance Commttee, consisting of six MPs, this forum has
insignificance influence on how the National Assembly deals with
economIc policy issues.34 It is the duty of the Commttee to make
recommendations on proposals involving supplementary expenditure from
public funds, but this is usually just a symbolic endorsement, and the
Committee is not involved in the preparation of the NDP or the annual
budget. One of the MPs admItted in one of my interviews that he preferred
to "save" his arguments for the debate in the National Assembly, instead
of exposing them in the Finance Commttee meetings. There are several
other parliamentary commttees, but none of these are functioning well. A
general problem seems to be the absence of a clearly defined terms of
reference for the committees. 35
The rapid economIc development in Botswana has made economIc
policy-making more complex. Although the MPs have become more
experienced (see table 7.1 below), and probably upgraded their competence,
it has become increasingly difficult for MPs to counter the "technocratic"
lead of the civil servants and the cabinet mInisters. Another countervailing
force, however, seems to be that the development of the planning system
may have made the economy more predictable. But the MPs have poor
general working conditions. The backbenchers stated in my interviews that
they often are given insufficient time to prepare themselves before the
debates, policy documents are distributed late, and secretarial assistance and
research facilities are lacking.36
34 The opposition by its leader Dr. Koma, had even the chairmanship of this committee in
1991.
35 The National Assembly decided in November 1991 to make a major review of the
Standing Order of the Assembly. In his presentation of this proposal, Mr. B.Temane
requested that especially the committee system had to be revised (The Gazette, 27
November 1991, p.1)
36 The MPs are given an allowance for secretarial assistance, but this is neither sufficient
to employ anybody on a permanent basis, nor is office space available. For example, the
MPs have to borrow the telephone in the library to make important calls, and the
administrative staff at the National Assembly are often requested to assist the MPs in
preparing their speeehes.
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Table 7.1
Seniority of the politicians when taking up office
(average number of years in parliament and/or cabinet)
Year of entering 1969 1974 1979* 1984 1989
All members of parliament 2,9 6,0 7,6 9,7 9,6
(MPs)**
The cabinet members;
- experience as minister 3,0 4,0 5,7 8,1 8,8
- experience as MP 3,3 5,8 7,6 10,7 11,1Backbenchers 3,1 6,0 7,1 11,4 9,0Opposition MPs 1,7 6,6 11,3 O 5,0
*Figures adjusted for Khama's death in 1980. ** The parliament inc1udes the President,
cabinet members, and members of the National Assembly only (Backbenchers and
opposition MPs).
Source: Calculations based on various Parliamentarian Reports (Hansards).
As noted above, the debates in the National Assembly appear in
themselves not to alter the policies presented by the government. Several
backbenchers confirmed in my interviews thatamendments in general are
difficult to get incorporated into policy documents and bills. However, there
seem to exist alternative channels for the backbenchers to put forward
amendments prior to the debates in the legislature.37 All MPs of the ruling
party, both backbenchers and ministers, gather regularly in caucus meetings
during the sessions of the National Assembly.38 During thesemeetings the
ministers informally present economic policies, new projects etc., and the
backbenchers may openly express their viewpoints. The ministers are
assisted by civil servants to brief the MPs in detail on specific issues, and
to respond to arguments which are put forward. The backbenchers also
present problems and needs in their constituencies, and the caucus is as
such an important forum for the representatives to draw attention to
problems in their districts. The caucus may be seen as a forum where all
37 After a bil proposal has been read in the National Assembly, and published in the
Gazette, it cannot normally be read a second time before 30 days have passed (RoB:
Standing Orders, n.d.). During this period it is possible for MPs to prepare amendments,
meet the ministers informally etc. One MP told me that the BDP backbenchers
occasionally, indirectly or directly, made threats to vote against proposals of the
ministers, if their advice or objections were not taken into account.
38 The BDP MPs met twice a week during the session in November 1991.
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the BDP MPs meet on an equal footing to make the backbenchers identify
themselves with the government. Furthermore, it is an important tool for the
cabinet to "soften up" the backbenchers in cases of controversial issues in
order to preserve a harmonious picture of the ruling party. When the
debates seemingly reflect a consensus on major issues concerning economic
strategy, this may indicate that dissenters have been disciplined in the party
caucus, or that compromises have been made informally between the
cabinet and the backbenchers prior to the debate.
By meeting regularly in their own caucus, the backbenchers also gain
some collective strength vis-à-vis the executive. During these meetings they
put forward problems in their constituencies which they want to present to
the ministers, and discuss strategies on how to go ahead, and make deals
about mutually supporting each other. However, it would be wrong to
conclude that the backbenchers constitute a "bloc" in opposition to their
government. The backbenchers generally identify themselves with the
government. When they make critical utterances in the debates, this seems
partly to be a tactic of the ruling party in trying to pre-empt the opposition
(the BNF) by expressing arguments they expect from that side in order to
neutralise it. This may have been demonstrated in the Income Policy debate
when some of the MPs from the ruling party expressed concern for poverty
and social justice. It has not been uncommon that backbenchers who have
been among the most active critics of the cabinet, have later been appointed
to ministerial posts. For example, two of the MPs who had been most
active and critical during the Income Policy debate, Mr.B.K. Temane and
Mr.Roy Blackbeard, became members of the cabinet in March 1992.
It was observed in the parliamentary debates that members of the
opposition (currently the three BNF MPs) in fact do not utilise their seats
in the National Assembly either to criticise the government to any degree,
or to present policyalternatives. This is certainly related to the opposition' s
small size, which has hindered it from wielding any influence on national
leve! politics throughout the whole post-independence period. But, it seems
reasonable to question whether the present BNF MPs actually represent any
alternative development strategy at all.
Reference was made to Hopkins (1979) in chapter 2, who observed that
MPs in Kenya and Tanzania had important roles in policy-making, despite
being without de facto decision-making power. By linking the countryside
to the central governments, the MPs contributed to development in the rural
constituencies. The Batswana MPs seem to perform a similar role. The MPs
are well aware of the conditions and needs in different areas of Botswana.
The great majority of the MPs represent rural constituencies, where they
also reside between the meetings in parliament. Both the ministers and the
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backbenchers frequently visit their constituencies.39 During these travels
they meet with the local authorities, the traditional leaders (i.e. the chiefs
and their headmen) and they address ordinary people in meeting places like
the Kgotla or Freedom Squares (see chapter 5). Regular meetings with local
BDP members are important for the MPs of the ruling party. During their
visits the MPs talk about the projects already in progress, planned
government programmes which will benefit the district, and present
government policies in general. 40 The MPs also gather information about
development needs in the constituency, and listen to grievances about the
provision of public servIces etc. This is how Egner (1990:2-3) depicts the
consultations undertaken by the politicians:
...one result of the insistence of Batswana on their right to be informed
and consulted at face-to-face meetings is that cabinet ministers and even
the President spend much of their time outside the capital city. It is as
though telecommunication, radios and mass media had never been
invented... They take it for granted that the core process of politics consists
of consulting and informing their listeners about selected government
activities wherever a few people can come together to listen...They can
truly claim to be in touch with public opinion, to know how the people
live, and to be experts on the rural areas.
It was concluded above that decentralisation, i.e. the system of district lev el
planning, is not operating flawlessly. Local authorities are to a large extent
delegated responsibility for the provision of public services and the
implementation of projects in their own district, but communication
between district and centralleveIs have some general weaknesses, and the
capacity of the ministries to respond to formal requests from the districts
authorities is limited. Similarly to the situation in Kenya, it seems right to
say that the Batswana MPs (the ministers included) are to some extent
bridging these gaps. However, to what extent these consultations strengthen
the argument that the development pl ann in g should be seen as a "bottom-
up" process is unclear. It is not certain that the information is translated
into policy output (e.g. a development project). It was pointed out above
that the decisions and priorities of the district authorities often come second
to the decisions made at the centralleveL. The same seems to be true with
regard to information gathered by the MPs. The demands and information
39 When asked, most of the MPs told that they usually made travels within their
constituencies three times a year.
40 Civil servants in the ministries are in advanee of these visits asked to prep are briefing
papers for the MPs about the government' s activities in the particular district.
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about the needs in the constituencies are "filtered" through the policy-
making processes of the annual budgets and the NDP before allocation of
public funds eventually are made. The consultations by the politicians seem
further to be focused largelyon presentation of already adopted policies and
projects, and may be seen as an important means of buttressing the
legitimacy of the government.
As demonstrated by table 7.1 above, both the ministers and the non-
cabinet MPs (backbenchers), have traditionally stayed in their positions for
long periods, and have as such attained knowledge about the economy, their
position in the institutional framework, and to what extent their chances of
becoming reelected depend on their performance in terms of fulfilling the
expectations of their constituents. This continuity together with the
knowledge of the situation in the constituencies are probably important
reasons why public services like health and education are relatively well
developed and distributed across the country (chapter 3). However, the
continuity and the secure power base of the ruling party seems also to have
influenced how the MPs see their role as politicians. New ideas about how
the Botswana state may respond more actively to important problems like
unemployment or rural poverty were strikingly absent in the debates
discussed above. This cannot be explained by ignorance about the
problems. In other words, continuity and political stability have seemingly
fostered a conservative attitude to the question of development strategy.
7.5 Concluding remarks
The aspects of Botswana policy-making discussed in this chapter uncover
a centralised process with formal mechanisms facilitating control of the
level of public spending. Considering the powerful position of the civil
servants, especially those in the Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning (MFDP) in the preparation of the annual budgets and the NDPs,
and the fact that the civil servants are not as subjected to the politicians as
in other African states, one might conclude that Botswana is still an
"administrative state" as argued by Gunderson in 1970 (see chapter 6).
However, as argued in this and previous chapters, I do not wholly subscribe
to such a description. The ministers are capable of forcing through
politically motivated decisions concerning allocation of public funds. But
the power of the individual ministers is constrained by the budget ceilings,
which is the outcome of the "budget game" at the ministerial leveL. Within
this game, and in the executive in general, it was again observed that the
MFDP is a stronghold, and it seems likely that the senior civil servants
within this ministry are powerful with respect to the total volume of the
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public budgets. Administrative power is still a feature of the successful
budget policy, but it seems justified to conc1ude that the relationship
between the administrative and political elements of the executive is in
general characterised by reciprocity and not subordination of either the
political or the administrative sphere. On the other hand, in the inter-
ministerial distribution of power it seems as if the concentration of power
in the MFDP tends to assign the core group of political appointees and
senior civil servants within this ministry a paternalistic role vis-à-vis the
other ministries. The planning machinery represents an efficient policy
instrument for accomplishing one of the government' s main goals: avoiding
long run deficits in its budgets. However, the MFDP dominance seems to
limit the room for manoeuvre of the line ministries which have objectives
and tasks more c10sely related to their sectoral or functional areas of
responsibility.
Although I question the official description of the development planning
as a "bottom-up" process, it still seems that the district leve1 to some extent
is able to translate its needs into demands fed into the policy-making at the
centralleveL. The District Development Plans are not documents for
"action". But, together with the administrative linkages between the districts
and the government, the DDPs are of some importance. The ro le of the
individual MP is also important in acquiring funds for deve10pment projects
to his or her constituency.
The observations above about the relationship between the National
Assembly and the cabinet seem to confirm that executive dominance is
prevalent in Botswana politics. The legislature is, for example, not in a
position to alter the total budget ceilings of the various ministries. Although
Botswana thus diverges from the ideal of supremacy of the legislature in
the parliamentary system of democracy, I find it at the same time difficult
to let Botswana unambiguously fit into the presidential modeL. The
smallness of the Botswana parliament and the overwhelming majority
position of the ruling party make the backbenchers and the cabinet
ministers to some extent constitute a collegium with in formal
communication and internal bargaining leading to consensus about major
policy issues, and about the distribution of funds to the various sectors. The
executive still has the final word, though.
As chapter 3 revealed, political concerns have throughout the post-
independence period occasionally been overtly present when decisions are
made about the use of public funds. Politically motivated decisions seem
to be related to the five-year electoral cyc1es (i.e. substantial funds spent on
infrastructure prior to the 1974 election, financial support to small-scale
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enterprises in the early 1980s, and subsidies to arable agriculture in the
years leading up to the 1989 election). However, considering the modest
magnitude of such politically motivated initiatives it is not justified to
conclude that political concerns are in general domInating the economIc
policy-making. As has been uncovered in this chapter, it is more correct to
conclude that an effective balance between technocratic assessments and
political considerations underlies Botswana's development strategy.
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8. ConclusIon
In this study I have sought to present an analysis of the politics of
development planning in Botswana. Development planning and the strategy
pursued were discussed in a historical perspective. It was found that
Botswana has pursued a continuous and coherent development strategy. The
government has consciously adhered to planning as an instrument to
manage the mineral wealth. To explain this strategy I have applied a state-
centred approach. The general hypothesis has been that the coherence in the
development strategy reflects the presence of a state largely insulated from
societal pressures. A historical outline of political developments after
independence to uncover the capabilities of various societal actors which
potentially may seek to wield influence on policy-making was presented.
Policy-making processes were thereafter more concretely analysed to
unravel how administrative structures and procedures of consultation and
political participation regulate access to the policy-making process, and thus
the ability of society-centred forces to activate their capabilities. It is now
time to summarise the findings, and to discuss strengths and weaknesses of
the approach.
8.1 Main findings
It has been revealed that the Botswana state differs in many aspects from
its counterparts in other African countries. Various dimensions used to
explain the economic and political crises of the "African state" seem also
to be useful in explaining why the Botswana state has not experienced a
similar decay. The impact of the colonial period was less significant in the
Bechuanaland protectorate than elsewhere in Africa. No permanent colonial
administration was established within the protectorate. Although this
constrained the development capacity of the government in the early years
after independence, the build-up of a new administrative framework implied
that the new rulers were less burdened byexisting administrative cultures.
The processes of establishing new political institutions and the public
administration coincided, and this has probably been an important reason
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why the political and administrative spheres have seemingly become c10sely
interwoven.
Patron-c1ient relationships between officials and actors outside the state
have impeded the development process in many African countries. Among
other factors this has made it difficult for the governments to control the
growth of public expenditures. One might, hypothetically, have expected
that the substantial flow of revenues from the diamond industry soon after
independence would had led to unchecked patron-c1ient relationships in
Botswana as well. This did not happen. Structural factors like the small size
and homogeneity of the population in general, the insignificant urban
population, the presence of a private sector as an alternative road to
personal prosperity, and the enlightenedbehaviour of the small political and
administrative elite have probably been important reasons why the state has
not been overtly penetrated by c1ientelism.
However, one should keep in mind the patron-c1ient relationships
between the politicians and their constituents. Botswana has experienced a
high growth rate of public spending after independence. Although a large
share of these expenditures has been related to investments in the mining
industry, more pragmatic political concerns have also been present in the
allocation of these funds. The patronage (Le. development projects largesse,
development of infrastructure and subsidies), however, has been
incorporated in the development efforts of the government and has
seemingly not been detrimental to the overall long-term development
process. Chapter 3 revealed that the government has pursued a coherent
approach in their development efforts. This strategy has been characterised
by limited state involvement in directly productive activities, and deliberate
efforts to create an enabling environment for private entrepreneurs. This
strategy has been successful in terms of growth of the private sector in
urban areas, but less effective for the development of the rural sector.
A critical feature of the development strategy has been to enforce a
sound macro-economic policy. This has been defined askeeping the
exchange rate stable, avoiding inflation, and balancing the budgets (i.e.
keeping the growth of public expenditures within the growth of revenues).
The development planning system introduced at independence has been
characterised as forging a c10se link between the annual budgets and the
medium-term (recently six years) horizon of the National Development
Plan. The general argument has been that this development strategy reflects
the presence of a strong state. The strength of the state has been defined as
the extent to which policy-makers are insulated from society-centredforces
which might exercise leverage over the decisions concerning economic
policies and allocation of public funds, administrative coherence, and the
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availability of policy instruments for efficient policy-making and
implementation.
The fact that patron-client relationships have not been able to penetrate
the public institutions has both been a contributing causal factor to the
maintenance of the strength of the state, but also an effect of the committed
governance of the political Tulers. I also found that the political
development after independence has contributed to a tranquil political
context surrounding the policy-makers. Elections have been held regularly
every five years, and the citizens have continued to participate at the polls.
The Botswana Democratic Party has ruled continuously with the support of
the overwhelming majority of the voters. Its power base is largely basedon
its. strongholds in the rural constituencies. This was explained by ethnic
loyalties and patron-client relationships between the rich and poor segments
in the rural areas, mediating potential tensions. Support for the ruling party
also reflects genuine legitimacy generated, inter alia, by the provision of
public services, development of infrastructure, and drought relief. However,
unemployment and poverty remain serious problems in the rural areas. The
reasons why the opposition has not been able to take advantage of this
structural factor, and gain prominence in politics at the nationallevel are
manifold. The opposition parties have been in a disadvantageous position
in terms of not having access to the same means which are available for the
BDP as the government party, having a much smaller ethnic base, and
being discriminated against by the electoral system based on single-member
constituencies. But the opposition has also been troubled by internal
fragmentation, and inability to develop strong party organisations. The main
opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF), has not been able to
define a coherent and realistic ideological alternative to the ruling party.
This seems partly to be explained by its leadership which has been
dominated, on the one hand, by persons advocating a type of socialism with
little grounding in Botswana political realities, and, on the other hand, a
traditional element (i.e. the former chief Bathoen Il) opposing the
government' s legislation curtailing the power of the traditional institutions
(e.g. the chieftaincy). However, the "traditional"factorseems Tecently to
have become less prevalent in the BNF, and the party is apparently about
to outline a more social democratic platform.
By obtaining one-third of the votes in the latest election (1989) one
cannot ignore the presence of an opposition in Botswana politics. However,
the weakness of the party organisations, the absence of links with trade
unions and the press, and the presence of only three opposition MPs in the
parliament, sugge st that support was found for the argument that the
strength of the state has been facilitated by a weak opposition. However,
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it is at the same time reasonable to expect that the government is aware of
the increasing support for the opposition, and that this fact in some measure
influences its policy choices.
The analysis of the capabilities of civil society revealed that neither
strong trade unions nor a vigorous press have been present to challenge the
insulation of the core policy-makers. It was observed, however, that the
employers seem to be well organised, and thus capable of transferring their
interests into the policy-making process. Despite the introduction of
"modem" institutions at the local leve!, the traditional decision making
forum, the kgotla, has remained an arena for consultation. The freedom
square has in addition been established as ameeting place at the local
leveL. These arenas are not part of the formal decision-making structure.
However, both forums seem to be important as arenas of public debate, and
the freedom square is an important channel for the parties to present their
programmes.
What did the analysis of the policy-making process discover? I found it
justified to question the official description of development planning as a
"bottom-up" process. There is a certain degree of administrative
decentralisation, but the major decisions concerning use of funds are made
at the centralleveL. The district authorities produce District Development
Plans, but these are not decisive, and the priorities found in these plans are
subject to decisions made by the ministries. In terms of administrative
coherence at the centrallevel it was observed that the Ministry of Finance
and Development Planning (MFDP) is a key actor in the administrative
framework. The line ministries are organisationally linked to the MFDP by
planning officers, formallyemployed by the MFDP but being seconded to
the line ministries. The financial autonomy of the line ministries is limited,
as they are strictly obliged to keep their spending within the ministerial
ceilings. Each individual project must be incorporated in the development
plan and approved by parliament. The ministries are required to request the
MFDP for a warrant in every case where they ne ed funds to be disbursed
for a project in their sectoral development programme. In the process of
determining the ministerial ceilings, the MFDP is in a powerful position,
albeit not omnipotent. The allocation of funds to the various sectors is the
outcome of an inter-ministerial bargaining process, where the ministers
make p olitic al decisions concerning the use of funds. The Economic
Commttee of the Cabinet (ECC) was found to be the most important
decision-making forum at the executive leveL. All political appointees in the
executive (i.e. the President, the ministers, and the assistant ministers), the
permanent secretaries, the governor of the Bank of Botswana, and the heads
of the defence and police services, meet regularly in the ECC. This forum
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seems to be crucial in the efforts to coordinate development activities, reach
agreement about important aspects of the development strategy, and to keep
the growth of public spending within the growth of revenues. It was
observed that the MFDP is in a dominant position in the ECC, and this
seems to be one important explanation for disciplined expenditure. It seems
justified to conclude that the formal procedures of expenditure control, and
the concentration of power in the MFDP represent a policy instrument
facilitating state strength and adherence to macro-economic policy
objectives.
The general weakness of civil society was confirmed in the analysis of
the policy-making process. This weakness is, on the one hand, explained
by the fact that Botswana society is still in an initial stage of developing
organisational pluralism. On the other hand, there are legal obstacles
constraining the activities of the trade unions (e.g. elected officers in the
trade unions not being allowed to be full-time representatives of their
members). Although the trade unions are given formal access to the policy-
making process, their ability to wield influence over aspects of the
development strategy of their concern (e.g. income policy) seems to be
insignificant. By inviting the trade unions to participate in advisory bodies,
the government may be sincere in their efforts to engage in consultation on
important political matters. However, this participation seems also to be a
means applied to legitimise policy-making and to neutralise, or co-opt, the
organisations of the workers. It seems justified to conclude that the state
and the policy-making process in general are insulated from pressures from
the Batswana workers. However, the possibility of the employers to
influence policy-making was found to be more significant.
The Constitution confers much power on the executive. It is possible for
the legislature to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. However,
considering the large share of MPs who are also members of the cabinet,
and the overwhelming majority of the ruling party, this option seems to be
theoretical only. The power of the executive todissolve parliament seems
to be far more reaL. Taking also into consideration the powerful position of
the President within the executive, I have concluded therefore that the
political system represents a synthesis of the parliamentary and presidential
models of democracy - a parliamentary republic.
The centralisation of policy-making confirmed that much power is
concentrated in the executive. When the legislature is formally participating
in decision-making it seems unable to amend or reject proposals tabled by
the executive. It was further observed that legislators were apparently not
consulted until the final stage of defining or revising important aspects of
the development strategy. However, I found it unjustified to conclude that
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MPs are mere "rubberstamps". The smallness of the p arliament (40
members) opens up for informal communication between cabinet members
and the backbenchers. The party caucus is an important arena for the
backbenchers to articulate their opinions, and for the ruling party to reach
a consensus on important policy issues. The MPs were found to be
important in bringing forth information about the condition and needs of
their constituencies. However, the debates also revealed that the individual
MPs are in general not much concerned with overall substantive aspects of
the development strategy to be pursued. Although there is an awareness of
problems like poverty and insufficient employment opportunities in the
rural sector, the MPs do not put alternatives for state involvement in the
economy on the political agenda. On the other hand, as the MPs do not
refrain from openly criticising the government, and as the executive feels
obliged to answer questions raised in parliament, the debates still represent
a mechanism of making the government and the bureaucracy accountable
and responsive to the needs of the constituencies. The MPs to some extent
bridge the gaps left by deficiencies in the decentralised planning system.
8.2 Has the "state-centred" approach been fruitful?
It has been demonstrated that the development strategy pursued in
Botswana has not been directed by short-term political demands. A political
logic has been present, but not of the detrimental type of political
patrimonialism found in many other African countries. The politicians in
power have been pragmatic, but this pragmatism has be en played out within
boundaries established by the general development strategy, e.g. political
interventions have not run contrary to the primary objective of macro-
economic stability .
The analysis has related the coherence of the economic strategy to the
presence of a strong state. This strength is manifested in the nature of the
political institutions, administrative coherence, policy instruments (e.g. the
planning apparatus), and the insulation of the policy formulation process.
The latter is facilitated by organisations in civil society bein g both weak
and to some extent co-opted by the state. The Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning has been assigned a powerful position in the
administrative framework. Without this organisational concentration of the
tasks related to both medium-term planning and daily administration of the
public treasury, one might have imagined that budgetary control would
have become less disciplined. The dominant position of the MFDP in the
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executive, and its competent leadership, seem partly also to explain why a
high degree of administrative coherence has been accomplished.
The division of labour between the politicians and the bureaucracy is
characterised by reciprocity rather than subordination of either of the two
groups. The small size of the Botswana population seems to be reproduced
in the political-administrative sphere. The narrow elite of politicians and
senior civil servants, and the smallness of the capital, Gaborone, make
politics less complex and inscrutable. There seems to be some realism in
the popular phrase which states that "the most important decisions are made
at the bar of the President Hote!," an establishment frequented by senior
civil servants and politicians.
The analysis has demonstrated that the strength of the state is partly
explained by a weak legislature. This weakness does not imply that the
legislators (the MPs) have no ro le to play in policy-making. But the
distribution of power between the executive and the legislature implies that
the latter is in a weak position to amend decisions already made by the
former. The MPs generate inputs to the policy-making process, and make
the government responsive to the needs of the constituencies. However, the
stable majority rule by the Botswana Democratic Party and the weakness
of the opposition have made it possible for the government to be selective
in its way of responding to political demands. In other words, ruling by an
overwhelming majority has facilitated insulation of the core policy-makers.
It was concluded in chapter 3 that although the state is strong in terms
of pursuing a coherent development strategy, and avoiding macro-economic
imbalances, this does not imply that the state is an effective participant in
the economic development process in all sectors of the economy. Rural
unemployment and insignificant agricultural modernisation have
demonstrated weaknesses in the development strategy. I raised the
following question: Being aware of these problems, why have the political
rulers not responded more effectively? The apparent consensus about not
letting the public sector get too much involved in directly productive
activities (e.g. state owned enterprises) certainly limits the options available
to the government. However, I havealso argued that thepredominantly
parochial outlook of the individual MPs has prevented a more
"imaginative" approach of the government to emerge in the development
process. The dominant position of the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning may furthermore be seen as a paternalism which
curbs innovative behaviour by the line ministries. In other words, there may
be a trade-off between centralised budget control and more effective
involvement of the government in economic development. The argument
that the concentration of power in the MFDP and the ro le of the MPs
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inhibited the emergence of alternative approaches for the government in the
development process, seems to have been strengthened by the analysis.
However, the data material is insufficient to reach definite conclusions
about the causality suggested in the hypothesis. More intensive studies of
decision-making within the ministries are needed.
Does the Botswana case provide a strong argument against the claims
that democracy may impede economic development? As Botswana has
experienced both high economIc growth rates and democracy with regular
elections, the immediate answer is obviously yes. However, it has also been
demonstrated that Botswana is a special case, which makes the experiences
of this country less relevant for other parts of Africa or the developing
world. The small size of the population and the presence of the diamond
windfall revenues have political implications which place Botswana at a
distance from the situation of a "typical" developing country, in which the
combination of a large population and financial constraints may be a
serious problem. Ethnic and/or regional antagonisms which may impede the
economIc development process, and may also be reinforced by socio-
economIc adversities, have not been an impeding factor in Botswana. The
combination of these factors makes it possible to understand why political
quietude and stability have characterised the post-independence period.
Without foregoing other development objectives the political rulers have,
in the first decades after independence, made the majority of the population
experience improvements in their standard of living (e.g. provision of
public services ), despite widespread rural poverty and a skewed distribution
of income.
It democracy has been without significant economIc costs in Botswana,
what have been the advantages? Has a functioning democracy been a
contributing factor in the economIc development process? As already
concluded, the majority of the population has one way or another benefited
from the economIc growth process. The development of physical
infrastructure, schools, health facilities, provision of drought relief, and the
distribution of such facilities to most parts of the country may be explained
by the political representatives being responsive to the needs of their
constituencies. It is reasonable to attribute this to elections being held
regularly. However, the secure position of the ruling party and the
insignificant level of economic development at independence seem to have
kept the price of political support low. Political imperatives have not made
the political rulers feel a need to involve the state more extensively in the
economy. This may partly explain why no substantial assault has been
made on rural unemployment and poverty problems. The political rulers in
Botswana are not facing a political environment which compels them to pay
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attention to short-term political concerns. The stable political context and
a relatively predictable revenue situation have facilitated a long-term
horizon in development planning and adherence to the overall objective of
maintaining macro-economic stability. The Botswana case strengthens the
argument that modest short-term political demands may be a precondition
for effective development planning. On the other hand, the case also
demonstrates that democracy does not necessarily imply that short-term
political demands of the populist kind emerge at the forefront on the
political agenda. As the analysis has revealed, this does not sugge st that
Batswana politicians outside the executive are without influence, but just
that the involvement of politicians in the policy-making process is not
characterised by confrontation, but rather by consensus-building.
The Botswana case has mainly been seen from the angle of a state-
centred approach. I have been able to reach condusions about the
distribution of power within the Botswana state, the role of political
representatives, and how organisations of civil society are participating in
policy-making processes. The state-centred approach has been fruitful in
explaining how coherence in the development strategy and adherence to a
planned approach in the use of public funds have been achieved. I have
argued that the development strategy reflects the ideology of the ruling
party, and that the political rulers have been in a position to make the
institutions of the state implement this strategy.
The determinants of the substance of the Botswana government' s
approach to economic development have been less under scrutiny.
However, I have addressed this issue implicitly throughout the analysis. It
was argued that the basic principles of the development strategy were
decided upon in the early years after independence. A capitalist strategy has
been pursued, with much attention given to economic growth and
development of the private sector. The political and administrative elites
which ruled in the early years after independence represented an economic
and educational elite in Botswana society - the "new men". This elite
shared a common liberal/moderate ideological foundation, and had dose
linkages to the cattle industry. This fusion of economic and politico-
administrative power certainly had a great bearing on the process leading
up to the choIce of economic strategy. The continuity of the private
capitalist growth-oriented strategy pursued throughout the post-
independence period appears to have been related to the gradual
development and strengthening of the private sector. This is a society-
centred argument, and illustrates that the two approaches may to some
extent be seen as complimentary rather than contradictory. Society-centred
explanations were also added to the analysis when the capabilities of civil
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society were discussed, for example, when observing that the employers are
better organised and more capable of exercising leverage on policy-making
than the trade unions.
A more comprehensive analysis of the politics of economic development
in Botswana would have to be complemented by an explicit analysis of
society-centred forces, and a deeper discussion of the autonomy of the
Botswana state. A hypothesis in an alternative study might thus have been
that particular aspects of the development strategy reflect the relative
influence of specific societal interests. A step-by-step approach might have
been in order. First, it would have to uncover the configuration of various
socio-economic groups in society, based, for example, on functional
cleavages or various occupational groups (e.g. cattle owners, peasants,
urban commercial elites, civil servants, and manual workers). Second, it
would have to discuss to what extent these groups have benefitted or not
from the economic policies adopted, and finally to explain how various
groups have been able to exercise leverage, or have been denied access to
the centres of decision-making. The relative influence of private employers
and trade unions have in this study broadly been analysed in such a
manner. However, the analysis has been limited to the involvement of the
formal organisations of these societal groups in policy-making.
As the Botswana economy and society is in the process of becoming
more diversified, a point of departure for a further study would be to see
whether the society-centred forces are becoming more fragmented, or
whether there is a process towards more cohesion among social groups.
Detailed studies of organisations would be ways to explore these questions.
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Gaborone
Mr. Roy Blackbeard, MP, 18 November 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Lemme Makgekgenene, MP, 18 November 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Johnie Swartz, MP, 19 November 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. M.R. Tshipinare, Assistant Minister, 28 November 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Boometswe Mokgothu, MP, 29 November 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Pelokgale Seloma, MP, 3 December 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Bahiti Temane, MP, 4 December 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Gaotlhaetse Matlhabaphiri, MP, 5 December 1991, Gaborone.
Botswana National Front
Mr. Maitshwarelo Dabutha, MP, 20 November 1991, Gaborone.
Dr. Kenneth Koma, MP, 4 and 10 December 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Paul Rantao, Mayor, 26 November 1991, Gaborone.
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Mr. D.M. Gaseitsiwe, Planning Officer, Ministry of Commerce and
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Dr. J.S. Salkin, Chief Economist, Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning, 23 October 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Anthony A. Mokgara, Principal Agricultural Economist, Ministry of
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Mr. Fergus J. Chambers, Economic Consultant, Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, 24 October 1991, Gaborone.
Ms. Monica Tselayakgosi, Senior Planning Officer, Ministry of Health, 25
October 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Modise Modise, Senior Economist, Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning, 25 October 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Dennis Methis, Planning Officer, Ministry of Local Government and
Lands, 31 October 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Klaus Endresen, Planning Officer, Ministry of Local Government and
Lands, 4 December 1991, Gaborone
Mr. N.E. Mooki, Assistant Labour Commsioner, 10 December 1991,
Gaborone.
C. Others
Mrs. C.T. Mompei, Deputy Clerk of the National Assembly, 18 October
1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Brian Egner, Economic Consultant (former colonial civil servant), 28
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Mr. William Lee, former civil servant in MFDP, 29 October 1991,
Mogoditshane.
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Mrs. Sissel Bjerk Steen, UNDP Programme Officer, 1 November 1991,
Gaborone.
Mr. Bezack Maphakwane, UNDP Economist, 20 November 1991,
Gaborone.
Dr. Alfred M. Merriweather, Former Speaker of the National Assembly, 27
November, Molepolole.
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Organization), 9 December 1991, Gaborone.
Mr. Kai Jensen, ILO representative, 12 December 1991, Gaborone.
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